fix: bound threat-pattern/FTS5 regex input and cover V4A Move-File edits

Salvaged from PR #35130 (the safe subset of jnibarger01's security pass):

- threat_patterns.py: replace unbounded (?:\w+\s+)* filler with bounded
  {0,8} + cap scan input at MAX_SCAN_CHARS (64KiB), and bound the .*
  runs in the exfil/config-mod patterns. Kills catastrophic backtracking
  on adversarial near-misses.
- hermes_state.py: cap FTS5 query length (MAX_FTS5_QUERY_CHARS) and
  extract quoted phrases with a linear scan instead of a regex so
  pathological quote runs can't induce backtracking.
- acp_adapter/edit_approval.py + agent/tool_dispatch_helpers.py: recognize
  '*** Move File: src -> dst' V4A headers so patch-mode edits are
  permissioned/traversal-checked (previously only Update/Add/Delete), and
  surface a proposal for mode=patch V4A calls (previously replace-only).

Tests: +ReDoS-bound + FTS5-cap + Move-File-target + V4A-approval cases.

agent/tool_dispatch_helpers.py

@@ -266,6 +266,17 @@ def _extract_file_mutation_targets(tool_name: str, args: Dict[str, Any]) -> List
             p = _m.group(1).strip()
             if p:
                 paths.append(p)
+        for _m in re.finditer(
+            r'^\*\*\*\s+Move\s+File:\s*(.+?)\s*->\s*(.+)$',
+            body,
+            re.MULTILINE,
+        ):
+            src = _m.group(1).strip()
+            dst = _m.group(2).strip()
+            if src:
+                paths.append(src)
+            if dst:
+                paths.append(dst)
         return paths
     return []