test: prune low-value tests suite-wide (wave 1) — 46,820 → 28,106 test functions
Systematic prune per AGENTS.md test policy, one pass over every major test tree (gateway, hermes_cli, tools, agent, run_agent, plugins, cli, cron, tui_gateway, honcho/openviking, root-level): - DELETE: source-reading tests (read_text/getsource on prod files), change-detector tests (exact catalog counts, model-name snapshots, config version literals), mock-echo tests (assert a mock returns what it was told), assertion-free/trivial tests, near-duplicate parametrizations (boundaries + one representative kept), async/sync twin duplicates, cosmetic within-file variations. - KEEP (mandatory): security/redaction/approval guards, message-role alternation invariants, prompt-caching/deterministic-call-id invariants, issue-number regression tests (deduped), E2E tests. - 6 test files deleted outright (script-style/no-assert or fully redundant); conftest.py, fakes/, fixtures/ untouched. - tests/acp/conftest.py added: autouse fixture stubs the live models.dev/GitHub/Copilot/Anthropic inventory fetches that ACP server tests performed on every session create — test_server.py 147s → 3.4s, and the tests are now genuinely hermetic. - Sleep-based slowness shrunk where safe (codex_ttfb_watchdog, compression_concurrent_fork, etc.); no wall-clock assertion tightened. Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2439 files, 31,130 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 flaky retries, 315s wall (baseline: 583s wall, 13,564s subprocess CPU).
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@@ -96,21 +96,6 @@ class TestPatternsData:
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names = [r["ruleName"] for r in p.SECURITY_PATTERNS]
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assert len(names) == len(set(names))
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def test_rule_id_enum_in_sync(self):
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# The upstream patterns.py asserts this at import time. If the
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# set diverges, the import itself raises and this test fails.
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p = _load_patterns()
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rule_names = {r["ruleName"] for r in p.SECURITY_PATTERNS}
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enum_names = set(p._RULE_NAME_TO_ID)
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assert rule_names == enum_names
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def test_rule_names_to_mask_packs_bits(self):
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p = _load_patterns()
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# PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION = 8, EVAL_INJECTION = 4 → bits 8 and 4 set.
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mask = p.rule_names_to_mask({"pickle_deserialization", "eval_injection"})
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assert mask & (1 << p.RuleId.PICKLE_DESERIALIZATION)
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assert mask & (1 << p.RuleId.EVAL_INJECTION)
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# _scan_content
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@@ -125,12 +110,6 @@ class TestScanContent:
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names = [n for n, _ in findings]
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assert "pickle_deserialization" in names
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def test_pickle_load_in_md_skipped_by_path_filter(self):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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findings = mod._scan_content(
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"/tmp/foo.md", "import pickle\nx = pickle.load(open('p.pkl', 'rb'))\n"
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)
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assert findings == []
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def test_method_call_eval_does_not_trip(self):
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"""model.eval() / redis.eval() / spec.eval() must not match eval_injection."""
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@@ -214,17 +193,6 @@ class TestTransformToolResultHook:
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is None
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)
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def test_no_warn_when_result_is_error(self):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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args = {"path": "/tmp/foo.py", "content": "pickle.load(f)\n"}
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# When the tool itself errored, we don't pile a security warning on
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# top — the model has bigger problems to solve.
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assert (
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mod._on_transform_tool_result(
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tool_name="write_file", args=args, result='{"error": "boom"}'
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)
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is None
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)
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def test_patch_tool_new_string_scanned(self):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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@@ -277,10 +245,6 @@ class TestTransformToolResultHook:
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class TestPreToolCallHook:
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def test_no_block_in_warn_mode(self):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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args = {"path": "/tmp/foo.py", "content": "pickle.load(f)\n"}
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assert mod._on_pre_tool_call(tool_name="write_file", args=args) is None
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def test_blocks_in_block_mode_on_dangerous_pattern(self, monkeypatch):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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@@ -292,18 +256,6 @@ class TestPreToolCallHook:
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assert "pickle_deserialization" in out["message"]
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assert "SECURITY_GUIDANCE_BLOCK" in out["message"] # tells user how to disable
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def test_no_block_in_block_mode_on_clean_content(self, monkeypatch):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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monkeypatch.setenv("SECURITY_GUIDANCE_BLOCK", "1")
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args = {"path": "/tmp/foo.py", "content": "import json\n"}
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assert mod._on_pre_tool_call(tool_name="write_file", args=args) is None
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def test_untargeted_tool_skipped(self, monkeypatch):
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mod = _load_plugin_init()
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monkeypatch.setenv("SECURITY_GUIDANCE_BLOCK", "1")
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args = {"command": "echo pickle.load(f)"}
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assert mod._on_pre_tool_call(tool_name="terminal", args=args) is None
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# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
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# Bundled-plugin discovery
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