diff --git a/tests/tools/test_cron_approval_mode.py b/tests/tools/test_cron_approval_mode.py
index 838385befe..47ce7997dd 100644
--- a/tests/tools/test_cron_approval_mode.py
+++ b/tests/tools/test_cron_approval_mode.py
@@ -283,26 +283,6 @@ class TestCronDenyModeAllGuards:
 
         assert result["approved"] is True
 
-    def test_session_pattern_key_does_not_allow_command_in_cron_deny(self, monkeypatch):
-        """A session-only approval must not become standing authority for unattended work."""
-        monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_CRON_SESSION", raising=False)
-        monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_INTERACTIVE", raising=False)
-        monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION", raising=False)
-        monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_EXEC_ASK", raising=False)
-        monkeypatch.delenv("HERMES_YOLO_MODE", raising=False)
-        approval_module.approve_session("test-session", "script execution via heredoc")
-
-        from unittest.mock import patch as mock_patch
-        tokens = set_session_vars(session_key="test-session", cron_session="1")
-        try:
-            with mock_patch("tools.approval_context._get_cron_approval_mode", return_value="deny"):
-                result = check_all_command_guards("python3 - <<'PY'\nprint('ok')\nPY", "local")
-        finally:
-            clear_session_vars(tokens)
-
-        assert result["approved"] is False
-        assert "BLOCKED" in result["message"]
-
     def test_pattern_key_allowlist_does_not_bypass_tirith_in_cron_deny(self, monkeypatch):
         """Approving one dangerous pattern must not suppress an independent Tirith finding."""
         monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_CRON_SESSION", "1")
diff --git a/website/docs/user-guide/security.md b/website/docs/user-guide/security.md
index fea2eb5e2f..d41e495a08 100644
--- a/website/docs/user-guide/security.md
+++ b/website/docs/user-guide/security.md
@@ -267,6 +267,14 @@ command_allowlist:
 
 These patterns are loaded at startup and silently approved in all future sessions.
 
+Entries can be exact command text, a shell-style glob (`podman *`), or a
+dangerous-pattern rule key such as `script execution via heredoc` (the key shown
+in the approval prompt). Rule keys are honored on every surface, including
+unattended ones: a cron job, `hermes chat -q` run or webhook session under
+`cron_mode`/`single_query_mode`/`unattended_mode: deny` still runs a command whose
+detected rule key is in `command_allowlist`, while Tirith content-security
+findings on the same command continue to block it.
+
 The setting must be a list of strings. Legacy installs that stored a list as a
 quoted YAML/JSON string recover that list at load time and log a warning to
 re-save it with `hermes config edit`. Other malformed values are ignored with