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simplify(compat): tools/browser_tool + browser_supervisor — drop 114 re-exports + 6 legacy aliases + PEP 562 requests/call_llm hook, repoint 21 non-test callers; siblings read sibling names directly

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Teknium
2026-09-03 14:16:54 -07:00
parent 7a33369e81
commit de60f789a7
26 changed files with 398 additions and 444 deletions
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tools/browser_tool_eval_policy.py
+8 -7
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@@ -1,13 +1,15 @@
"""browser_console(expression=...) policy: SSRF guard gating, private-URL probes,
and the opt-in sensitive-primitive denylist.
Origin-module symbols are resolved lazily through ``tools.browser_tool`` (``_bt``)
so ``patch("tools.browser_tool.X")`` keeps working; never import it at import time (cycle).
Facade-owned state is read through ``_bt`` (``tools.browser_tool``, resolved per call) — no import cycle.
"""
import re
from typing import Optional
from utils import is_truthy_value
from tools.browser_tool_origin import origin_module as _origin
from tools import browser_tool_cloud as _cloud
from tools import browser_tool_session as _session
def _eval_ssrf_guard_active(effective_task_id: str) -> bool:
@@ -18,7 +20,7 @@ def _eval_ssrf_guard_active(effective_task_id: str) -> bool:
browser-on-host reaches networks the terminal can't); skipped for local sidecars / ``allow_private_urls``.
"""
_bt = _origin()
return not _bt._is_local_backend() and not _bt._is_local_sidecar_key(effective_task_id) and not _bt._allow_private_urls()
return not _cloud._is_local_backend() and not _bt._is_local_sidecar_key(effective_task_id) and not _cloud._allow_private_urls()
def _url_blocked(_bt, url: str) -> bool:
@@ -44,7 +46,7 @@ def _current_page_private_url(effective_task_id: str) -> Optional[str]:
``location.href = '...'`` eval). Fail-open on probe failure, matching the snapshot/vision guards."""
_bt = _origin()
try:
url_result = _bt._run_browser_command(effective_task_id, "eval", ["window.location.href"], timeout=5, _engine_override="auto")
url_result = _session._run_browser_command(effective_task_id, "eval", ["window.location.href"], timeout=5, _engine_override="auto")
if url_result.get("success"):
current_url = url_result.get("data", {}).get("result", "").strip().strip('"').strip("'")
if current_url and _url_blocked(_bt, current_url):
@@ -84,7 +86,7 @@ _SENSITIVE_BROWSER_EVAL_TOKENS: tuple[tuple[str, str], ...] = (
def _browser_eval_flag(key: str) -> bool:
"""Read boolean ``browser.<key>`` (default False) through the origin's config reader."""
_bt = _origin()
return _bt._browser_cfg(key, False, lambda v: _bt.is_truthy_value(v, default=False), f"browser.{key} from config")
return _bt._browser_cfg(key, False, lambda v: is_truthy_value(v, default=False), f"browser.{key} from config")
def _allow_unsafe_browser_evaluate() -> bool:
@@ -137,8 +139,7 @@ def _risky_browser_eval_reason(expression: str) -> Optional[str]:
def _enforce_browser_eval_policy(expression: str) -> Optional[str]:
"""Block sensitive browser JS evaluation when the opt-in denylist is on (opt-in because it gates on
primitive *names*; private-address egress is enforced separately in ``_browser_eval``)."""
_bt = _origin()
if not _bt._restrict_browser_evaluate() or _bt._allow_unsafe_browser_evaluate():
if not _restrict_browser_evaluate() or _allow_unsafe_browser_evaluate():
return None
reason = _risky_browser_eval_reason(expression)
if not reason: