`_scrub_config_yaml_mirrors` reconciles the config.yaml copies of a credential
when it is rotated or removed through the dashboard. It walks `model`,
`auxiliary.<task>`, and `custom_providers.<name>` — but not the keyed
`providers` schema.
`providers` is not a niche section: `get_compatible_custom_providers` documents
it as "the newer keyed schema" (v12+), and it is exactly where the dashboard /
desktop write a custom endpoint's inline key —
`_write_custom_endpoint` sets `providers.<id>.api_key`. That value is a real
credential: the runtime resolver reads it (`runtime_provider` /
`hermes_cli.main` / `model_switch` all read `entry.get("api_key")` off a
`providers` entry), and an inline key outranks the env var.
So the section the scrub skips is the one the dashboard writes to, and both
callers break on it:
- save_provider_env_credential (rotation, #62269): a stale
`providers.<id>.api_key` is left at the OLD value and, being
higher-precedence than the freshly-rotated env var, shadows the rotation —
the "persistent 401 with a key the UI no longer shows" that #62269 fixed,
reintroduced for the newer schema.
- remove_provider_env_credential: its contract is to "remove a credential from
EVERY store it lives in", yet the `providers` copy survives, leaving the
secret in config.yaml after the user asked to delete it.
Walk `providers.<id>` too. The scrub stays value-matched, so an unrelated
endpoint's key is untouched. Only `api_key` is scrubbed here: in the keyed
`providers` schema `api` is the base_url alias, not a credential (unlike
model/auxiliary/custom_providers), so `_fix` takes an explicit field list and
this section passes `("api_key",)` — a provider's endpoint URL is never
rewritten even if it happened to equal the credential string.
tests/hermes_cli/test_credential_lifecycle.py: drive the real PUT/DELETE
/api/env endpoints against a `providers.<id>.api_key` mirror — rotation moves
it to the new key, delete clears it, and a `providers.<id>.api` base_url alias
is preserved. The two scrub tests fail on main (stale key survives); the
base_url guard passes on main as a control. 15 pass here; 345 pass across the
credential-lifecycle + web-server suites (the one failing honcho-merge test
fails identically on clean main).
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
* fix(env): recognize export-prefixed .env lines in save/remove (#40041)
load_env() parses bash-compatible 'export KEY=value' lines (#6659), so a
hand-added 'export GITHUB_TOKEN=ghp_...' shows as set (green light) in the
desktop Tools & Keys page. But save_env_value/remove_env_value only matched
plain 'KEY=' lines:
- DELETE /api/env 404'd ('not found in .env') — the token could not be
removed through the UI
- PUT /api/env appended a SECOND line; a later delete removed the new line
while the export line silently resurrected the old value
Both writers now match assignments through a shared _env_line_defines_key()
helper that understands the export prefix. Commented-out lines are still
ignored.
Regression tests drive the real dashboard endpoint handlers against a temp
HERMES_HOME with runtime-constructed classic-PAT-shaped fixtures, covering
save-does-not-500, export-line remove, export-line replace-without-duplicate,
and the plain-line path staying intact.
Fixes#40041
* fix(credentials): unify provider key delete/update across .env, auth.json, config.yaml (#51071#59761#62269)
A provider API key can live in three stores at once: ~/.hermes/.env,
auth.json credential_pool (env-seeded 'env:<VAR>' entries persisted by the
pool loader), and config.yaml mirrors (model.api_key, auxiliary.*.api_key,
custom_providers[*].api_key). The desktop/dashboard endpoints and the TUI
gateway RPCs only ever mutated .env, so the stores diverged:
- #51071/#59761: DELETE /api/env removed the key from .env but left the
credential_pool entry (the loader is additive-only and never prunes),
so the provider kept appearing in the model picker — surviving restart
via the stale pool entry + provider_models_cache.json row.
- #62269: PUT /api/env rewrote .env but left the OLD key in config.yaml
(model.api_key wins over env at client construction), producing 401s
with a key the UI no longer showed.
New hermes_cli/credential_lifecycle.py is the single choke point:
- remove_provider_env_credential(): clears the .env entry, prunes
env:<VAR> pool entries across ALL providers (a shared var like
GITHUB_TOKEN can seed several), suppresses the env source so a lingering
shell export can't re-seed it (matching 'hermes auth remove' semantics),
drops the affected providers' model-cache rows, and scrubs value-matched
config.yaml api_key mirrors. Returns 'found' spanning every store so a
stale pool-only entry is cleanable through the same delete button.
- save_provider_env_credential(): writes .env, rotates any config.yaml
mirror that held the PREVIOUS value (value-matched — an unrelated inline
key is untouched), and lifts a prior env-source suppression so re-adding
behaves like 'hermes auth add'.
OAuth preservation: only entries with source == 'env:<VAR>' are pruned.
OAuth/device-code/manual/borrowed pool entries and providers.<id> OAuth
token blocks are never touched by a key-only delete. (model.disconnect in
the TUI gateway still clears OAuth via clear_provider_auth — that surface
is a full provider disconnect, which is the documented intent there.)
Rerouted call sites: PUT/DELETE /api/env (dashboard + desktop),
tui_gateway model.save_key / model.disconnect, save_env_value_secure
(TUI/gateway secret capture), and hermes config set/unset for env-shaped
keys.
E2E tests drive the real endpoint handlers against temp-HERMES_HOME
fixtures (.env + auth.json + config.yaml with runtime-constructed fake
keys) and assert cross-store consistency after delete/update, pool-reload
survival ('restart'), OAuth preservation, models-cache invalidation, and
the suppress/unsuppress round-trip.
Fixes#51071Fixes#59761Fixes#62269
Drexuxux