computer_use kept its own approval decision: two module dicts
(_session_auto_approve / _always_allow) mirroring tools.approval's
session store and _persist_choice, a private verdict vocabulary
(approve_once/approve_session/always_approve) that hermes_cli mapped
back to once/session/always, and — the real problem — `if
_approval_callback is None: return None`. Only the interactive CLI ever
installed that callback, so every other host (gateway turns, cron,
api_server, tui_gateway, ACP) ran destructive desktop input with no
approval at all, ignoring cron_mode / unattended_mode / the permanent
allowlist, and "always" grants were invisible to `is_approved`,
`clear_session` and the messaging-platform approval buttons.
_request_approval now calls tools.approval._run_approval_gate with
pattern_key `cua:<action>:<background|foreground>` (the old scope shape,
so a background grant still never covers the visible foreground variant)
and fail_closed_when_no_human=True, the same posture as
request_tool_approval / the SSH-config write gate. The private dicts,
their release/atexit clearing, the verdict mapping in
hermes_cli/cli_modal_mixin.py and the extra callback install in cli.py
are deleted: the CLI's terminal_tool callback answers computer_use
prompts like any other tool. set_approval_callback stays as an optional
explicit-callback hook with the shared callback contract
(cb(command, description, **kw) -> once|session|always|deny|timeout);
no in-tree host uses it.
Behavior change:
- No approval callback and no gateway (cron, api_server/webhook,
headless -q, plain library use): destructive actions are now REFUSED
with a BLOCKED error and never reach the backend. Previously they
silently ran. cron honors approvals.cron_mode, unattended platforms
approvals.unattended_mode, -q approvals.single_query_mode.
- --yolo / gateway /yolo / approvals.mode: off still allow (unchanged).
- Gateway sessions (Telegram/Discord/Slack/...) now get a real pending
approval with once/session/always buttons instead of default-allow.
- session/always grants live in tools.approval's store; "always" is one
command_allowlist entry (`cua:click:background`) and is scoped to that
action+mode — the old blanket "always_approve unlocks everything for
the session" no longer exists.
- Denial wording is the shared gate's ("BLOCKED: User denied ...",
"BLOCKED: Action timed out ..."); the error JSON keeps `action`.
Tests: tests/tools/test_computer_use_approval_isolation.py
::test_no_callback_refuses_unless_yolo (blocked + no backend call, then
yolo executes) and ::test_always_grant_lands_in_the_shared_store
(is_approved sees the cua:<action>:<mode> key; second call served from
the store). Sabotage: restoring the `callback is None -> allow`
short-circuit fails the first; swapping the shared gate for a private
grant set fails the second plus the three delivery-ladder scope tests.
tests/tools/conftest.py gains `grant_computer_use_approvals` for
dispatch tests that only care about routing.
Bug 1 of #55048: when the MCP connection dropped (driver crash / restart),
_lifecycle_coro exited but left _started=True, so the next list_apps/capture
passed _require_started() and then operated on a None session — hanging
forever instead of reconnecting.
- _lifecycle_coro's finally now resets _started=False on ANY exit, so a dead
session is re-enterable (idempotent no-op on the normal stop() path; atomic
bool write, safe from the bridge-loop thread without the lock stop() holds).
- call_tool() re-enters start() when the session isn't active, rebuilding it
before the call. The start_session/end_session handshake (driven by start()/
stop() themselves) is exempted so bootstrap doesn't recurse.
Tests: two cases in test_computer_use_delivery_ladder.py — finally resets
_started, and call_tool restarts a dead session exactly once. Full
computer_use suite green (233).
Refs #55048 (Bug 1). Bug 2 (expose foreground dispatch) is covered by the
delivery_mode work in #67123.
Hermes' computer_use wrapper dropped cua-driver's structured action verdicts,
exposed no delivery_mode, and injected background-only guidance — so the agent
reported unverified no-ops as success and concluded cua-driver 'cannot drive'
Electron/Chromium surfaces (observed live on tldraw offline). Fixes#67052.
Phase A — preserve the result contract:
- ActionResult carries verified/effect/escalation/path/degraded/code/delivery_mode
- CuaDriverBackend._action() reads structuredContent (was data-only); a helper
normalizes it, additive and None-safe on old drivers
- _text_response surfaces the fields additively (ok stays transport-only)
Phase B — bounded, model-reachable foreground:
- delivery_mode (background|foreground) + bring_to_front on the schema, dispatcher,
ABC, and all input methods
- foreground is capability-gated (input.delivery_mode); old drivers get a
structured foreground_unsupported refusal, never a silent background downgrade
- no automatic/hidden foreground retry — the model selects it from the signal
Phase C — guidance + isolation:
- system prompt (prompt_builder) and bundled skills/computer-use/SKILL.md go from
background-ONLY to background-FIRST, teaching the AX→PX→foreground ladder driven
by returned effect/escalation, not predicted from the app being Electron
- foreground approval scoped by (action, delivery_mode): a background approval
never silently authorizes foreground
- approval state keyed per session_id so concurrent gateway runs don't leak unlocks
Tests: tests/tools/test_computer_use_delivery_ladder.py (15) cover confirmed/
unverifiable/suspected_noop/degraded/old-driver verdicts, delivery_mode gating +
foreground_unsupported, and session-scoped foreground approval. Existing 265
computer_use tests still green.
Live E2E (real cua-driver 0.8.3 + tldraw offline on Linux/X11): a background click
returned effect='unverifiable'/path='ax' (no fabricated success), and a foreground
request returned code='foreground_unsupported' — correct on a driver that predates
the input.delivery_mode capability.
teknium1