Salvaged from #56982 (@rayjun): the live piece of the PR. The
hermes_cli/config.py get_env_value scope-honoring change and its
test_env_load_cache.py tests were already merged via ed1170cd8b
(#76462) and are dropped here.
tools/xai_http.py::get_env_value wrapped the scope-aware
hermes_cli.config.get_env_value in except Exception + a raw os.environ
fallback — swallowing UnscopedSecretError and borrowing the process
env, so a multiplexed xAI credential read could silently pick up
another profile's XAI_API_KEY. Narrow the except to ImportError (the
only legitimate degraded case) so get_secret's verdict propagates: an
unscoped multiplexed read fails closed, and a scoped miss returns the
default instead of the foreign environ value.
Co-authored-by: rayjun <rayjun0412@gmail.com>
Fixes#69379 (v2026.7.20 Docker multiplex regression: the scoped runner
reload dropped API_SERVER_* set via the container environment, silently
losing the api_server platform) by the canonical mechanism — corrects
the direction of #69524, which patched gateway/config._getenv to fall
through to os.environ on EVERY scoped miss, re-opening the
cross-profile borrow for all credentials.
API_SERVER_ENABLED / API_SERVER_HOST / API_SERVER_PORT /
API_SERVER_CORS_ORIGINS are deployment listener settings (Docker
compose environment: block, systemd Environment=), not profile
secrets: they join _GLOBAL_ENV_EXACT so get_secret reads them from
os.environ regardless of scope. API_SERVER_KEY is deliberately NOT
allowlisted — it IS a credential and stays profile-scoped, which keeps
tests/gateway/test_config.py's secondary-profile isolation semantics
intact (a secondary profile without the key still doesn't bind a
listener).
Ports #69524's regression test in the corrected form: container-env
API_SERVER_* stays visible during the scoped runner reload while the
key resolves through the profile scope; plus unit tests locking the
allowlist membership and the deliberate exclusion of API_SERVER_KEY.
The adapter's __init__ and send_weixin_direct read WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID/
TOKEN/BASE_URL/CDN_BASE_URL via bare get_secret, which raises
UnscopedSecretError when the DEFAULT profile's adapter constructs or
sends unscoped under multiplexing (corrects the direction of #66073 /
#68854, which tried to solve this by borrowing os.environ on every
read — a cross-profile leak).
Add a module-level _wx_secret helper following the established Slack
SLACK_APP_TOKEN pattern (#59739) and WhatsApp's _get_wsecret: a SCOPED
miss returns the default (the scope is authoritative — no environ
borrow), while an UNSCOPED read under multiplex falls back to
os.environ, which is the default profile's own value.
Regression tests cover both directions: scoped construction reads the
scope's value and a scoped miss yields empty (no borrow); unscoped
construction falls back to os.environ instead of raising.
Unquoted values truncate only at a # preceded by whitespace (so
KEY=foo#bar stays intact); quoted values scan escape-aware for the
matching close quote, keep through it, and drop a trailing '# ...'
remainder. Verified empirically against python-dotenv 1.2.2 on a
10-case corpus (full parity). Supersedes the approach in #57718, whose
scanner corrupted foo#bar-style values.
save_env_value writes values containing " or \ as escaped
double-quoted strings, and every other .env reader in the repo
(load_env/_parse_env_value, python-dotenv) reverses those escapes.
load_env_file — the parser behind build_profile_secret_scope, which
wraps every cron job and every multiplexed gateway turn — only stripped
the outer quotes, leaving the escapes literal. A credential containing
a double quote or backslash (JSON service-account blobs, generated
secrets) authenticates fine interactively but 401s under scoped
resolution, with no error pointing at the cause. Parse values with the
canonical _parse_env_value so all readers agree byte-for-byte.
test_churn_across_more_files_than_fit_in_one_argv (e65ff9625f) asserts all
1200 checked-out files read dirty before normalization. Whether git diff
content-compares an entry (seeing the CRLF churn) or trusts the stat cache
depends on racy-git detection: entries whose recorded stat is non-racy
(mtime older than the index write) read CLEAN. On CI a 1200-file checkout
straddles that boundary nondeterministically — observed 92/1200 and
661/1200 dirty on two unrelated PRs within minutes (runs 30738759530,
30738842393). Empirically reproduced: freezing a non-racy stat cache gives
0/N dirty; bumping worktree mtimes past the index write forces content
comparison and gives N/N deterministically.
Fix: bump every worktree mtime after checkout in _managed_repo so all
entries are stat-stale. Affects only the fixture; the production
_normalize_managed_eol path is untouched.
Three tests pin the exact kwargs of the picker probe call
(test_model_switch_custom_providers + two in
test_user_providers_model_switch, the latter caught by CI slice 2);
the picker-timeout change now always passes timeout explicitly (5.0 on
the non-picker path), so the pinned shapes gain the key.
Makes interrupt-protected context compression cancellable by an explicit
user or lifecycle stop, without weakening protection against ordinary
incoming messages, voice interjections, or active-turn redirects.
Separates explicit hard cancellation from ordinary interrupt/redirect
state with a dedicated threading.Event; introduces
AuxiliaryExplicitCancellation as an attempt-local frozen-cause signal;
isolates the synchronous provider callback in a bounded daemon worker
during protected compression; atomically linearizes Codex timeout
cleanup against explicit cancellation; propagates hard cancellation
through child agents and explicit stop surfaces; serializes hard-cancel
admission against compression commit admission with
CompressionCommitFence; aborts before session rotation or late DB commit,
restores in-place transcript mutations and compressor state, and releases
the heartbeat and compression lease.
Based on #74449 by @suparious. Resolved merge conflicts in
agent/context_compressor.py (feasibility check + try/except) and
tui_gateway/methods_session.py.
Follow-ups on the startup-burst memo:
- Populate the memo on the valid-token fast path as well. The startup
burst usually finds a VALID token, and each check_fn call still paid
two cross-process file locks + state reads to reach that return; the
original memo only engaged after a refresh. The token has at least
refresh_skew_seconds (>=120s) of life at that return, so a 5s memo can
never serve an expired token.
- Clear the module-level memo in test_nous_portal_staging_allowlist's
refresh-capture helper: with the fast-path populate, a token memoized
by an earlier test would otherwise short-circuit the refresh these
tests assert on (3 tests failed without this).
- Add dedicated memo behavior tests (TTL hit, TTL expiry, insecure
bypass) — the original PR shipped none. Mutation-checked: all 3 fail
against main's un-memoized function, pass on this branch.
Whole-bug-class follow-up to the profiles/ gate: cron/, platforms/
pairing, and legacy pairing/ ran chown_hermes_tree unconditionally on
every boot with the identical warm-boot cost profile. Same
tree_has_non_hermes_owner gate; find evaluates the top directory first
and -quits on the first mismatch, so a mis-owned tree short-circuits in
O(1) while a clean tree pays one read-only walk instead of a full
chown -R inode rewrite.
Demote wrote the empty v23 schema via executescript inside BEGIN IMMEDIATE,
which commits early and can leave trash + empty indexes without rebuild
markers. Re-run then tore down trash and stamped fts_storage_version with
docsize=0, permanently losing historical session search.
Stage markers with the demote, create schema only after they are durable,
heal empty-index bookkeeping on resume, and refuse settle until the base
index is populated. Settle refusal returns ok=False instead of raising,
and resume fails fast if the base v23 table cannot be re-created.
Orphan-marker repair only resets a missing fts_rebuild_progress to 0 once
the index is known empty: the chunk worker replays its whole selected id
range without an anti-join, so a partially indexed DB that lost only its
progress key is first reset to a known-empty surface, then rebuilt.
Ported onto the SessionDB mixin split (hermes_state_search.py /
hermes_state_schema.py).
The RO branch's new FTS capability probe raises sqlite3.DatabaseError on
a malformed store (the probe itself only catches OperationalError). The
outer __init__ handler re-raises without closing self._conn, leaking a
tracked connection for the process lifetime — which makes
_backup_db_file refuse its raw-copy, so the writable heal that follows
(web_server's stale-schema/malformed reopen) repairs the store WITHOUT
the forensic backup repair_state_db_schema promises. Close-then-reraise
on any probe failure, mirroring _open_probed's cleanup discipline.
Regression test: corrupt sqlite_master (duplicate messages_fts row),
assert the failed RO open leaves no live tracked connection and the
subsequent writable heal creates its malformed-backup file. Mutation-
checked: no-oping the cleanup handler makes the test fail.
The terminal-command guard path loaded config 2-3x per invocation via
load_config(), which pays a defensive deepcopy of the entire config on
every call (~356us of the ~376us warm-cache cost measured on a real
config.yaml). All six swapped call sites were audited read-only — every
caller takes scalar reads or iterates the returned structures; none
mutate (the save path at save_permanent_allowlist keeps load_config) —
so they now use load_config_readonly(), the API built for exactly this
(precedent: #74211, #74322; the one unsafe-site lesson from #56085's
salvage is covered by the mutation audit and a cache-integrity test).
Measured (real config.yaml, warm cache): load_config 376.0us ->
load_config_readonly 19.9us (18.9x); full guard pass
check_all_command_guards('ls -la','local') 930.7us -> 241.8us (3.85x).
Tests: new test_approval_config_readonly.py drives the real functions
against a temp HERMES_HOME — readonly call counts per function, a
no-deepcopy pin for the full guard pass, and cache-identity/integrity
checks. Existing test mocks retargeted from load_config to
load_config_readonly (same injection intent). Note: 6
test_approval_mode_parity failures are pre-existing ordering flakes —
identical with the change stashed on clean main.
Review follow-up on the #76098 salvage: the 4096-entry count bound alone
doesn't bound MEMORY — write_file/patch argument strings run 100KB+, so
a long-lived gateway process under sustained heavy write workloads could
pin ~800MB of evicted-session strings. A 32MB byte budget extends the
existing FIFO eviction; common-case args (0.5-2KB) never hit it. New
guard test mutation-checked (fails with the byte leg disabled).
The pre-send normalization pass re-canonicalized every historical tool
call's argument JSON on every API-call iteration — quadratic in session
tool-call count. Route it through a bounded value-keyed memo (the
_MSG_TOKENS_CACHE idiom from agent/model_metadata.py): per-iteration
cost is now proportional to new tool calls, not all of them.
Measured (simulated growing session, repo venv): session-total
canonicalization cost 1056 ms -> 58 ms at 500 tool calls x 2 KB args
(18.3x), 5744 ms -> 79 ms at 500 x 16 KB (72.5x). Byte-parity with the
pre-fix logic is asserted at every iteration (unicode, nested,
malformed, empty, non-string args), and a call-count test proves
json.loads invocations went from K(K+1)/2 to K per session.
Review follow-up on the #76142 salvage: MemoryStore path-resolves and
shares one process-wide connection per file, so MemoryStore(":memory:")
creates a literal ./:memory: FILE whose state leaks across test runs —
the second run of the file failed all three spy tests because the
NULL-vector test had permanently wiped hrr_vector in the leaked db.
tmp_path isolates each run; verified two consecutive runs green + full
tests/plugins/memory/ green.
FactRetriever.search() re-encoded the query vector once per candidate,
related() re-encoded both role atoms once per fact row, and probe()
re-encoded the role-content atom once per row. All three encoders are
deterministic (SHA-256 counter blocks), so the hoisted vectors are
bit-identical to the per-iteration values they replace.
Measured (300-fact store, dim=1024, median of 30 calls): search()
11.62 -> 1.46 ms/call (8.0x; encode_text 30 -> 1 per call), related()
63.08 -> 16.17 ms/call (3.9x; encode_atom 601 -> 3 per call), probe()
431.93 -> 389.36 ms/call (1.1x; dominated by per-fact content encoding,
which is inherent to the algorithm and unchanged).
Tests: call-count regression tests for each hoist plus a bit-exact
parity test of search() against the pre-fix per-candidate loop.
Every ORDER BY id query on the messages table sorted or scanned the
whole session: get_messages_around's window seek, latest_message_row_id
(LIMIT 1), and get_messages' full-load ordering all paid O(session
history) per call — hot mid-turn via session_search and reactions.
messages.id is an original column (INTEGER PRIMARY KEY AUTOINCREMENT),
so the index lives in SCHEMA_SQL next to idx_messages_session — no
legacy-column migration hazard (the kanban lesson from #28776 does not
apply).
Measured (real schema, one 20k-message session, median of 30):
get_messages_around 7.08 -> 0.22 ms (32x), latest_message_row_id
3.37 -> 0.011 ms (307x), get_messages full load 111.6 -> 98.6 ms
(1.13x — remaining cost is row deserialization, not the sort).
Window results byte-identical at probe points across the session.
Tests: VM-step pin (get_messages_around bounded work, calibrated
~12 vs ~855 handler calls, threshold 300 — fails without the index)
and window parity with/without the index. No EXPLAIN/plan text
(behavior contracts, AGENTS.md).
The scheduler's pre-dispatch loop called advance_next_run per due job —
one full load_jobs() + one full save_jobs() of the jobs file each — so
N due jobs cost N reads + N writes of the whole file (gateway-restart
catch-up or co-scheduled bursts). advance_next_runs() does one load +
at most one save for the whole due set with identical per-job semantics;
advance_next_run() is now a thin wrapper over it.
Measured (50 due recurring jobs, real jobs file): 107.9 ms -> 2.5 ms
(45x; 50 loads + 50 saves -> 1 + 1).
Tests: batch advances recurring and skips one-shots, single load + save
I/O pin (fails pre-fix — no such function), no save when nothing
advances, and per-job wrapper semantics unchanged. Related: #60946 and
#75833 both restructure this loop's call site for correctness — neither
addresses the I/O cost, and this batch primitive composes with either
dispatch design; happy to rebase onto whichever lands first.
Every reply paid one extra Discord API round trip: the text send path,
the voice send path, and the edit path each called fetch_message() just
to obtain a reference or an editable handle. Discord resolves
message_reference payloads from ids alone, and PartialMessage.edit()
works without a fetch — so build MessageReference directly (with
fail_if_not_exists=False, preserving the deleted-target behavior the
existing send-side 10008 retry already covered) and use
channel.get_partial_message() for edits. Overflow continuations keep
threading via an ids-built reference fallback for PartialMessage.
Measured by call count (deterministic): reply sends and edits now make
ZERO fetch_message calls where they made 1 per reply and 1 per edit
(including every streaming edit tick).
Tests: pin that first-mode replies construct the reference without any
fetch, deleted-target retry test updated to assert fetch await_count==0
(retry now happens purely send-side), overflow/edit mocks retargeted
from fetch_message to get_partial_message (any fetch regression breaks
all five). Note: 4 discord-suite failures are pre-existing ordering
flakes — identical with the change stashed on clean main.
Architecture fix for the bug class behind the Termux --version NameError
(live on main since eb4040242): version-printing kept being reimplemented
as *_fast() copies at the top of hermes_cli/main.py, each duplicating
canonical logic (project-root resolution, container detection, profile
detection). The copies drift silently — eb4040242 edited the canonical
output and referenced the PROJECT_ROOT module constant inside the fast
function, which doesn't exist yet at the fast exit point.
- hermes_cli/_startup_fast.py: THE implementations, stdlib-only. main.py's
*_fast() names become thin delegates (kept for test/back-compat), and
PROJECT_ROOT itself derives from the same helper — the constant and the
fast path can no longer disagree.
- Fast output now includes the .install_method stamp (one cheap file read)
and a 'Run hermes version for update status' pointer, so globalizing the
fast path doesn't silently drop slow-path info.
- Guard tests: (1) import-weight — subprocess-imports _startup_fast and
fails if any heavy module (config/yaml/argparse/cli/run_agent/httpx)
lands in sys.modules; (2) subprocess parity on+off Termux — the test
that would have caught eb4040242 the day it landed; (3) install-method
stamp surfacing.
hermes --version: ~3.8s cold / 0.2-0.4s warm -> 0.01-0.02s everywhere.
- agent_import.dump_yaml_file now calls utils.atomic_yaml_write instead
of hand-rolling safe_dump + atomic_write_text — same temp+fsync+atomic
rename and symlink preservation, plus mode/owner preservation a
0600-secured config.yaml needs
- openclaw script: the EXDEV/EBUSY copy fallback gains copystat + target
fsync so the docstring's 'mirrors utils.atomic_replace' durability
claim is true on cross-device deployments
- trim load_yaml_file's docstring to the behavior contract
The inlined temp-file + os.replace in openclaw_to_hermes.dump_yaml_file
replaced a symlinked config.yaml with a regular file, silently detaching
managed deployments that symlink ~/.hermes/config.yaml into a dotfiles repo or
profile package. The bare path.write_text it replaced followed the link, and
utils.atomic_replace -- which the hermes_cli twin reaches through
atomic_write_text -- resolves the link for exactly this reason (#16743).
Mirror that here: resolve the symlink before creating the temp file so the
rename lands on the real file, and fall back to copyfile on EXDEV/EBUSY now
that the target can live on another device. Covered by a regression test that
fails when the resolution is removed.
Also guard the permission-denied test for Windows: os.geteuid does not exist
there and chmod-based denial is unreliable, so skip on non-POSIX.
agent_import.py carries a private load_yaml_file/dump_yaml_file pair that
returned {} for an absent file AND for a present file it could not read or
parse. Three importers -- import_permission_allowlist, import_permission_denylist
and import_mcp_servers -- read config.yaml through it, merge one section into
the result, and write the whole mapping straight back. So a YAML syntax error,
a permission problem or a broken mount meant the importer replaced every
setting the user had with only the one to three keys it merged, and still
reported the item as "imported". The write was a bare path.write_text(), so an
interrupted import truncated the file instead.
Distinguish the two cases at the read. Absent, or present but empty, still
yields {} so first-time creation works. Present but unreadable, unparseable, or
not a mapping raises ConfigReadError; the three sites funnel through a new
load_target_config() that records the refusal as a per-item error and leaves the
file byte-identical. Dry-run refuses too, rather than previewing an "imported"
that would destroy the config. dump_yaml_file now writes through
utils.atomic_write_text, which the module already imports and uses for the
memory store.
This is the invariant hermes_cli/config.py already enforces for its own writers
via require_readable_config_before_write / atomic_config_write, whose docstring
names this exact root cause and calls itself "the single chokepoint every
config-update path should use". agent_import.py has its own helper pair and so
was never covered; it was the last config.yaml writer without the guard.
The identical helper pair lives in openclaw_to_hermes.py, the script this module
was ported from, where twelve config.yaml read-modify-write sites share the same
defect; fixed there too. Its refusal is recorded at the run_if_selected dispatch
point, which flips the existing _config_apply_blocked flag so the remaining
config-mutating options short-circuit instead of each rediscovering the same
unreadable file. The atomic write is inlined with tempfile + os.replace because
that script runs standalone with only the stdlib on its path.
kill_started_since duplicated kill_all's collect-under-lock/kill-outside-lock
loop line for line; it is now a thin delegate through new kill_all kwargs
(exclude_ids, source, consume_output). Public signatures unchanged — existing
callers and test monkeypatch seams keep working. kill_process's docstring now
names the deliberate consume_output=True exception for abandoned-turn reaping
so the deviation isn't 'fixed' later.
The API server intentionally lets concurrent runs share a client-provided
session_id (= process task_id), so the SSE-disconnect reap could kill a
process a still-live concurrent run spawned after the disconnecting run's
baseline — the same stale-reaper bug class the gateway path gates via
run_generation.
- Per-task-id run epochs (monotonic counter): each run claims the epoch at
publish; a reaper holding a superseded epoch declines to kill. A missing
entry (the run's own clear pruned it) still reaps, so the leak fix isn't
silently disabled.
- _publish_turn_process_ownership / _clear_turn_process_ownership helpers
replace the copy-pasted marker set/clear blocks, so attribute names and
epoch bookkeeping can't drift between surfaces.
- /v1/runs — the third own-lifecycle surface — now records ownership and
reaps on POST /v1/runs/{id}/stop and on server-side SSE cancellation,
closing the remaining sibling paths of #76115.
Two follow-ups from review of the salvaged fix:
- _reap_gateway_turn_processes now returns 0 for a blank task_id.
ProcessSession.task_id defaults to empty for sessionless callers, so a
blank turn id would match (and kill) every unrelated empty-task process
instead of the turn's own.
- The asyncio poll loop checks executor completion BEFORE the watchdog's
timeout flag. When both race in the same window, the completed run has
already persisted its real reply to session history; surfacing the
'agent inactive' diagnostic would contradict the stored transcript.
This matches _abandon_timed_out_gateway_turn's own worker-done-wins
tiebreak.
dbbb10d39 shipped without direct test coverage for its own new logic
— the same gap teknium's review flagged on the competing PR. Close it:
- _reap_gateway_turn_processes: skips when is_still_current() is
False, proceeds when True, fails open (reaps) if the check itself
raises rather than silently disabling the leak fix.
- _abandon_timed_out_gateway_turn: still marks the turn abandoned
(interrupt fires) even when the reap itself is skipped.
- api_server._reap_disconnected_agent_processes: reaps the
baseline-diff for an owned turn, no-ops when the agent never
recorded ownership markers.
- APIServerAdapter._run_agent: markers are populated with the right
task_id/baseline during the turn and cleared once it completes,
closing the same race window fixed in gateway/run.py for this
separate agent-lifecycle surface.
An agent turn can spawn a long-running background subprocess (e.g.
`next build`) and later be abandoned via inactivity timeout, /stop,
/new, or a client disconnect. Before this fix the gateway interrupted
the agent loop but never touched the subprocess: it kept running
inside the gateway's cgroup, unbounded, until memory pressure starved
the event loop and made every platform/cron look hung (#76115).
The process registry already knew how to kill a process tree — the
missing piece was per-turn ownership: nothing distinguished a process
that predates the turn (must survive), a process the turn started and
finished successfully (must survive), and a process an abandoned turn
left running (must be reaped).
- tools/process_registry.py: snapshot_running_ids() captures a turn's
starting baseline; kill_started_since() reaps only IDs created after
it, scoped to one task_id.
- gateway/turn_context.py: TurnContext carries process_task_id +
process_baseline so the timeout/interrupt paths can reach them.
- gateway/run.py: baseline is snapshotted right before the turn's
executor task starts; the inactivity-timeout path and the explicit
/stop|/new|disconnect interrupt path both reap via the same helper.
A daemon-thread watchdog backs up the asyncio-based timeout poll,
since a starved event loop is exactly the failure mode this bug
causes. The turn's own worker clears its ownership markers the
instant it finishes, closing a race where a /stop landing right
after normal completion could reap a background process the turn
deliberately left running.
Related but insufficient on their own: #37454 (cgroup ExecStopPost
reaper only fires on service restart) and #68915 (orphaned-pipe
grandchild detection, a registry bug not a turn-lifecycle gap).
Neither ties process cleanup to turn abandonment.
- logger.warning when the 6h ceiling stops the heartbeat (matches the
delegate_task stale-stop precedent) so the eventual watchdog reap is
explainable from logs instead of silent
- new mutation-checked test: past the ceiling the heartbeat stops while
the job still completes
- clearer assertion messages (surface res on failure)
- heartbeat loop continues past a raising activity callback instead of
silently stopping (matches delegate_task / touch_activity_if_due
swallow-and-continue semantics) — one transient error must not drop
watchdog protection for the rest of a long job
- hard 6h elapsed ceiling so a wedged job under HERMES_CRON_TIMEOUT=0
(unlimited child watchdog) cannot mask the gateway watchdog forever
- public get_activity_callback() accessor in tools/environments/base.py
instead of importing the private _get_activity_callback cross-module
- tests: deterministic heartbeat test (event-gated, no timing sleep),
no-callback test now asserts the thread is truly never created, new
exception-survival guard; dead started event removed
- fix comment: delegate_task heartbeat cadence is 30s, not 10s
/simplify-code review found _poll_for_token has a second caller:
web_server._nous_poller (dashboard/desktop device login), which surfaces
str(e) as the UI error_message — so wrapping only in
_nous_device_code_login left the dashboard showing the bare timeout.
Move the enrichment into _poll_for_token's deadline raise so every
caller inherits the guidance, and drop the now-redundant try/except
wrap in the CLI login. Add a source-level regression test driving the
real poll loop (authorization_pending stub client) to the deadline.
A bare 'Timed out waiting for device authorization' gives the user
nothing to act on. The most common cause is Portal sign-in failing in
the opened browser tab (including the server-side CAPTCHA loop from
issue #20605), so point at the Portal login page and the hermes portal
retry command.
Salvaged from PR #75290 by @HexLab98 (timeout-guidance kernel only).
The URL-rewrite portion of that PR was dropped: the live Portal has no
/device route (verified 404 with a real user_code), so rewriting the
manage-subscription verification URL would break login entirely.
Guidance text reworded to reference only real URLs.
Follow-up to the salvaged #76000 guard:
- refuse installing a skill INTO an existing skill directory (hybrid
skill-plus-category dirs whose later update/uninstall rmtree would
destroy the nested skill — sibling case of #75983)
- refuse a stray regular file at the install path with the caller's
ValueError contract instead of an uncaught NotADirectoryError
- regression tests: nested-only category (skills at depth >= 2),
category-inside-skill, file collision
The salvaged hydrate_profile_secret_sources (#74549) seeded its
profile-local env from <home>/.env only, but the documented 1Password
bootstrap flow puts OP_SERVICE_ACCOUNT_TOKEN in the gitignored
<home>/.op.env (mirrored from load_hermes_dotenv). A cold profile using
that flow still failed 1Password hydration — the one unaddressed item
from the sweeper review on #74549. Seed .op.env via setdefault so .env
values win; never touches os.environ. Two regression tests.
Fix#75349
Root cause:
Under multiplex_profiles, secondary profiles run inside
_profile_runtime_scope which installs a per-profile secret scope via
set_secret_scope. The WhatsApp adapter (and the shared
WhatsAppBehaviorMixin + Cloud API adapter) read WHATSAPP_MODE,
WHATSAPP_DM_POLICY, etc. via raw os.getenv(), bypassing the secret
scope. Since os.environ doesn't contain secondary profile .env values,
the bridge silently falls back to 'self-chat' and rejects all inbound
messages with self_chat_mode_rejects_non_self.
Fix:
- Add _wenv() helper in adapter.py that reads WHATSAPP_* vars through
get_secret() (agent.secret_scope), which honors the active scope.
- Replace all os.getenv('WHATSAPP_*') calls in adapter.py,
whatsapp_common.py, and whatsapp_cloud.py with get_secret()-based
equivalents.
- Inject resolved WHATSAPP_* values into the bridge subprocess
environment so the Node.js bridge (which reads process.env) sees the
profile's own configuration.
Changes:
- plugins/platforms/whatsapp/adapter.py: 37 lines (+ helper, bridge_env
injection, 2 os.getenv→_wenv)
- gateway/platforms/whatsapp_common.py: 13 lines (6 os.getenv→_get_wsecret)
- gateway/platforms/whatsapp_cloud.py: 21 lines (9 os.getenv→_get_wsecret)
- New regression test: 6 test cases covering scope isolation, fallback,
and cross-profile non-leakage.