Skipping `tests/`, `spec/`, ... in EXCLUDED_DIRS made those trees
invisible to the guard, but `plugins_loader._load_directory_module`
sets `submodule_search_locations=[plugin_dir]`, so a plugin
`__init__.py` doing `from .tests import evil` imports and runs whatever
lives there: a `tests/evil.py` with a destructive root remove scanned
`dangerous` on main and `safe` on this branch. `_walk` also matched the
names at any depth, so `src/spec/handler.py` — plain runtime code — went
unscanned.
Keep scanning everything; instead cap a critical finding located under a
ROOT-level test dir at `high`, so the verdict is `caution` (confirmation
required, `--force` overridable) rather than the un-overridable
`dangerous`. Fixture strings still cannot brick an install, which was
the reported problem, while a critical in any runtime file (`setup.sh`,
`src/spec/...`) still yields `dangerous`. Trade-off stated in the PR
body: hostile code deliberately placed under `tests/` is now
force-installable rather than blocked outright.
Docs no longer claim test code never runs.
plugin_guard walks the whole plugin clone, and EXCLUDED_DIRS skipped
caches and vendored dirs but not tests/. A security-conscious plugin's
test suite SHOULD contain adversarial fixtures — a test asserting the
trust boundary holds round-trips the injection string verbatim — and
any single critical finding makes the verdict dangerous, which --force
explicitly cannot override. Scanning tests therefore made exactly the
plugins that test their security unconditionally uninstallable, and the
only workaround was obfuscating the payload strings, weakening the
tests and inverting the incentive. Fixtures are never loaded into an
agent's context at runtime the way README/plugin.yaml are.
Add the conventional test/spec/fixture directory names to
EXCLUDED_DIRS, alongside the existing cache/vendored skips.
Review-fold from the 3-angle simplify pass:
- sed -Ei / -iE / --in-place now match the shell-critical tier (the
bare '\s-i\b' token missed combined short flags and the GNU long
form); read-only sed stays unflagged. Regression tests added.
- agent_config_contract joins plugin_guard's CODE_EXEMPT_PATTERN_IDS:
content-contract prose in plugin code files (docstrings/comments)
is the same false-positive class the existing agent_config_mod
exemption suppresses. Doc/config files keep the full pattern set.
Efficiency reviewer: 1.24x full-scan cost (+3.4ms/file, install-time
only), worst-case adversarial line 55us — no ReDoS exposure.
Claude Cowork (Aug 6, 2026) added skill & plugin security scanning:
third-party skills and plugins are automatically checked for malicious
content on upload/edit, returning pass/warn/fail. Hermes already scans
hub-installed skills (tools/skills_guard.py), but `hermes plugins
install` cloned and activated arbitrary Git repos completely unscanned —
and plugins run Python in-process, making them the more dangerous
surface.
- tools/plugin_guard.py: plugin-adapted scanner reusing the skills_guard
pattern engine. Exempts the documented provider-plugin patterns (own
requires_env API-key reads, HTTP calls with keys) on code files while
keeping true threat signals (foreign credential-store access, reverse
shells, destructive/persistence/obfuscation patterns, prompt injection
in docs). Plugin-sized structural limits; VCS/venv dirs excluded.
- hermes_cli/plugins_cmd.py: scan the temp clone before it is moved into
~/.hermes/plugins/. safe=install, caution=confirm (interactive prompt
or --force), dangerous=blocked (--force does NOT override). Re-scan on
`hermes plugins update`; a dangerous updated tree is deactivated until
the user reviews the findings. Dashboard install path returns
structured scan_blocked/scan_findings.
- Config gate: plugins.scan_on_install (default true) in config.yaml.
- Validated against all 60 bundled plugins: 57 safe, 3 caution (real
sudo / curl|sh content in their docs), 0 false-positive blocks.
- 15 new tests incl. E2E through _install_plugin_core with real git
clones.
teknium1