Both shell-command guard entry points returned approval from the isolated-container fast
path before the operator's approvals.deny rules were evaluated, so a Docker sandbox with
no host mounts (or singularity/modal/daytona/vercel) skipped the entire user deny list.
The deny list is documented as never bypassable: it states what the agent may DO, not
what it can reach. Evaluate it before the container skip; the built-in dangerous-command
heuristics keep skipping there. hermes approvals test mirrors the new order.
Salvaged from #91029 by @fangliquanflq.
tools/approval.py no longer re-exports sibling names (approval_context/prompt/floors/detection/
human_wait/smart/gateway_wait); it imports only what it uses. Siblings reference sibling-defined
names directly (module-attribute reads on tools.approval_context so patching the defining module
still works); only facade-owned state (_lock, _gateway_queues, _permanent_approved, _denied,
_denial_breaker_addendum, _gateway_notify_cb) is still read back through tools.approval.
approval_detection calls its own _command_detection_variants instead of late-binding through the facade.
Answers "what would the approval system do with this command?" without
executing it, prompting anyone, or persisting anything. Composes the
REAL runtime evaluators from tools/approval.py in the same order as
check_all_command_guards: container-skip gate, hardline blocklist,
sudo-stdin guard, user approvals.deny rules, yolo/mode-off bypass,
permanent command_allowlist, dangerous-pattern detection. Because the
same functions run — including _command_detection_variants's
normalization/de-obfuscation path — an obfuscated command gets exactly
the verdict its plain form would get at runtime, and the output shows
the normalized-variant trace the detectors actually evaluated.
- hermes_cli/approvals_test.py: evaluate_command() + text/JSON output.
Script-friendly exit codes: 0 allow, 1 usage, 2 ask-approval, 3 deny
(hardline / sudo-stdin / user deny rule).
- hermes_cli/subcommands/approvals.py: `test` subparser with --env-type
(default local), --json, and a REMAINDER command (dest command_words —
NOT "command", which main.py's startup path reads as the top-level
subcommand name).
- hermes_cli/approvals_suggest.py: dispatch `test` and mention it in the
bare-`hermes approvals` usage text.
- tests/hermes_cli/test_approvals_test.py: verdict matrix (benign /
hardline / dangerous / user-deny from config / container skip /
mode=off vs hardline), obfuscated==plain verdict parity with
normalized trace, spy proof that the real runtime detectors are the
ones invoked, read-only invariants (nothing executed; prompt and
persistence paths rigged to explode), JSON shape, dispatcher and
parser wiring.
Read-only by construction: only detection/matching functions are
called; the approval gate, prompts, gateway notify, and allowlist
writers are never reached.
Inspired by: Amp `permissions test` (idea-level, proprietary — zero code)
fangliquanflq