The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:
git revert <this sha>
removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.
What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)
Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
The Desktop app can now sign in to a gated gateway using the user's SYSTEM
browser and OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC 8252) instead of an embedded
Electron BrowserWindow, and authenticates with bearer tokens it holds itself
instead of relying on HttpOnly browser session cookies.
Why brokered: the upstream IDP (Nous Portal) binds client_id to the gateway
instance and only permits redirect_uris on the gateway's own origin, so a
desktop loopback redirect can't be a direct Portal client. The gateway
therefore acts as the authorization server TO the desktop and an OAuth client
TO the Portal, reusing the existing PKCE start_login/complete_login provider
path unchanged.
Server (Ben's dashboard-auth lane):
- native_flow.py: in-memory broker — binds the desktop's PKCE challenge to a
completed Session, mints a single-use, short-TTL, PKCE-verified gateway
authorization code. Constant-time compare, single-use (consumed before the
PKCE check so a wrong verifier can't be retried), capacity-bounded.
- routes.py: GET /auth/native/authorize (starts the brokered PKCE login,
loopback-only redirect_uri, S256-only), POST /auth/native/token (loopback
code + verifier -> tokens in the JSON body, never Set-Cookie), POST
/auth/native/refresh (desktop-held RT rotation). /auth/callback branches to
mint a loopback code + 302 to 127.0.0.1 when a broker_state rides the PKCE
cookie; the cookie/SPA path is untouched.
- middleware.py: the gate accepts Authorization: Bearer <access_token>,
verified via the same verify_session provider stack (no cookie set/read),
with the same "provider unreachable -> 503, not logout" semantics.
- web_server.py /api/status: advertise auth_flows (["cookie","native_pkce"])
so clients can detect the capability; native_pkce only when a brokerable
OAuth provider is registered.
Desktop (Ben's lane):
- native-oauth.ts: pure PKCE/capability/URL/callback/token helpers.
- native-oauth-login.ts: loopback-listener orchestration (system browser via
openExternal, ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener, state/PKCE verification), all
I/O injected for testability.
- main.ts: capability-gated oauth-login IPC — native flow when advertised,
automatic fallback to the existing embedded-webview cookie flow otherwise;
tokens stored encrypted (safeStorage/OS keychain), REST + ws-ticket
authenticated by bearer, transparent refresh, logout clears both shapes.
Tests: 18 server pytest (broker unit + full authorize->callback->token E2E +
cookieless bearer auth of a gated route + ws-ticket mint + capability
advertisement + refresh); desktop node --test/vitest for both pure modules
(PKCE, capability detection, callback CSRF, loopback round trip, timeout,
browser-open failure). Electron project typechecks clean.
Docs: website/docs/guides/desktop-native-signin.md.
Task 2.0a of the safe-shutdown drain-coordination plan. Widens the dashboard
auth framework GENERICALLY to support non-interactive (service-to-service)
bearer-token auth, mirroring the existing supports_password precedent. This is
a reusable capability — any future machine-credential provider plugs in without
core changes (decisions.md Q-C). The drain bearer-secret plugin (Task 2.0b) is
the first consumer, not the definition.
- base.py: add TokenPrincipal dataclass (the token analog of Session) +
supports_token capability flag + verify_token() on the ABC (default raises
NotImplementedError so a misconfigured provider fails loud). Contract mirrors
verify_session stacking: return None for unrecognised tokens (never raise),
raise ProviderError only on a genuine backing-store outage.
- registry.py: list_token_providers() — the supports_token subset, in
registration order. Empty when none registered (token routes fail closed).
- token_auth.py (new): route-agnostic seam. Routes opt in via
register_token_route(exact path); token_auth_middleware owns the auth
decision for those routes only — authenticate via stacked providers, attach
request.state.token_principal + token_authenticated, pass through. 401 on
missing/unrecognised token, 503 when a provider was unreachable, untouched
passthrough for non-token routes. Fails closed (never open).
- web_server.py: install the seam OUTERMOST (registered last → runs first).
Both downstream gates (legacy auth_middleware + gated_auth_middleware) honour
request.state.token_authenticated and skip enforcement, so a token-authed
service request is never bounced to /login.
- audit.py: TOKEN_AUTH_SUCCESS / TOKEN_AUTH_FAILURE events.
Tests: tests/hermes_cli/test_dashboard_token_auth.py — ABC flag default,
verify_token NotImplementedError, registry filter, bearer extraction
(case-insensitive scheme, malformed/non-bearer → ""), provider stacking
(first-match-wins, unreachable-remembered, unreachable-then-valid, buggy
provider doesn't crash the gate), and the seam's passthrough/401/503/
fail-closed behaviour. 29 new tests; full dashboard-auth suite 169 passed.
Intentionally deferred:
- The concrete shared-bearer-secret provider plugin — Task 2.0b.
- The begin/cancel-drain endpoint that registers itself as a token route —
Task 2.1.
Build status: dashboard-auth + plugin-hook suites green.
Phase 5 task 5.1. Browsers cannot set Authorization on a WebSocket
upgrade, so in gated mode the SPA needs an alternative way to bind the
upgrade to its authenticated session.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/ws_tickets.py — in-memory single-use ticket
store with 30s TTL. Thread-safe (threading.Lock), token_urlsafe(32)
values, ticket value truncated to 8 chars in error messages for log
hygiene. Module-level state with _reset_for_tests() helper.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/routes.py — adds POST /api/auth/ws-ticket.
Auth-required (the gate middleware already attaches Session to
request.state.session). Returns {ticket, ttl_seconds}; emits
WS_TICKET_MINTED audit event with user_id + provider + ip.
hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/audit.py — adds WS_TICKET_REJECTED enum
value for the consume-side rejection event (wired into the WS
endpoints in task 5.2).
11 new tests covering round-trip, single-use, TTL boundary, unknown
ticket rejection, secret-hygiene truncation in error messages, and
concurrent mint+consume from 20 threads.
Phase 1, Task 1.4. Records every auth event (login start/success/failure,
logout, refresh success/failure, revoke, session verify failure, WS
ticket mint) as one JSON object per line. Token-like kwargs (access_token,
refresh_token, code, code_verifier, state, ticket, cookie, Authorization)
are dropped before serialisation so the log never contains live secrets.
Write failures log at WARNING but never raise — auth flows must not fail
because the audit logger broke.
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