_ReadConfig builds its snapshot in __init__; _read_config no longer
assigns the attributes after the fact. cmd_enable prints its hint
inline, since _no_credential_hint had one caller. The split
force_refresh_token signature and call fit on one line. Docstrings and
comments keep the what and the one non-obvious why. No behavior
changes; _apply_edits keeps its original body.
reading the live client's api_key inside _force_reauth races the in-place
rotation: a sibling waiter's apply_token_to_client (or the proactive
refresh entered via the honcho property) can swap the bearer before the
read, so force_refresh_token receives the already-rotated token, disk
matches it, and the adopt branch never fires — reproducing the very
force-refresh burst this PR removes.
_authed_call now snapshots the bearer before invoking the operation and
passes that exact token through to force_refresh_token.
desktop spawns multiple serve processes that share one rotating honcho
refresh token. force_refresh_token treated every 401 as "rotate now" even
when a sibling had already persisted a new grant, which can replay a
single-use refresh token and revoke the whole grant.
re-read honcho.json under the existing file lock and adopt if the token
that 401'd is no longer on disk. on invalid_grant, re-read once more
before marking the grant dead.
plugins/platforms/a2a/security.py::redact_outbound shipped text to a REMOTE peer
through 8 private regexes (sk-, sk-ant-, ghp_ only, xox[bap] only, AKIA, JWT,
Bearer, email) and never called redact_sensitive_text, so every prefix added to
agent/redact.py (hf_, glpat-, xapp-, npm_, Telegram bot tokens, private keys,
DB URLs, env assignments, auth headers, plugin-registered patterns) was absent
on the A2A path. gateway/run.py::_GATEWAY_SECRET_PATTERNS and
agent/monitoring/redaction.py::_TOKEN_RE/_BEARER_RE were two more parallel
"fallback" lists to maintain.
Now agent/redact.py::redact_for_egress is the one egress scrub:
redact_sensitive_text(force=True) + a bearer sweep for prefix-less opaque
tokens, fail-closed ("[redaction-unavailable]"). Gateway user-facing text,
monitoring export and A2A outbound call it; A2A keeps only its e-mail pass.
Behavior changes: a2a egress now masks the full canonical set; the gateway
chat path returns the fail-closed sentinel instead of a raw string when the
redactor raises; honcho plugin registers hch-at-/hch-rt- with
register_redaction_patterns (masked on every surface; mask shape is the
shared head/tail form instead of "hch-at-[redacted]"); proxy_cli token
display uses mask_secret (4 visible prefix chars instead of 12).
Invariant test: redact_outbound masks a synthesized token for every
registered prefix pattern (fails when reverted to the private list).
Erosika