Commit Graph

5 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium 7a33369e81 simplify(compat): interrupt — drop _ThreadAwareEventProxy/_interrupt_event legacy alias, repoint 2 test files
No runtime consumer read the proxy (terminal_tool/environments call is_interrupted()/set_interrupt()
directly); its only users were tests patching tools.interrupt._interrupt_event, which had no effect on
the code under test. tools/terminal_tool.py's own re-export of the name is owned by another worker.
2026-09-03 14:00:59 -07:00
Teknium c93ace77c2 simplify(compat): config/runtime_provider/plugins/commands/secrets_cli/kanban — drop 96 re-exports (incl. PEP 562 facades) + 3 aliases (get_pre_tool_call_directive/_block_message, get_telegram_handler_factories), repoint 56 callers + 50 test files 2026-09-03 14:00:17 -07:00
Teknium 1fcc26e2ba refactor(cli/plugins): extract manifest parsing, discovery scanning/gating, and plugin state into plugins_manifest/plugins_discovery/plugins_state 2026-09-02 15:32:17 -07:00
Jeeves Assistant 17dc773156 fix(plugins): discover entrypoint capabilities 2026-08-13 13:38:58 -07:00
Teknium b088535c78 feat(plugins): capability declarations + install/update consent flow (#64228)
Unify the scattered per-plugin trust gates into one declared, diffable
capability model with an install/update-time consent flow. Consent +
audit over host API surfaces — explicitly NOT a sandbox.

New module hermes_cli/plugin_capabilities.py:
- Canonical CAPABILITY_REGISTRY mapping each capability id 1:1 to an
  EXISTING enforcing gate (no capability minted without a surface):
    tools.override          -> allow_tool_override
    llm.provider_override   -> llm.allow_provider_override
    llm.model_override      -> llm.allow_model_override
    llm.agent_id_override   -> llm.allow_agent_id_override
    llm.profile_override    -> llm.allow_profile_override
    llm.task_override       -> llm.allow_task_override
- plugin_capability_granted(plugin_id, capability): canonical check —
  granted set OR deprecated legacy allow_* key; fail closed on unknown
  ids and any unreadable/corrupt consent state; emits checked_by audit
  log lines on every decision.
- record_consent() persists plugins.entries.<id>.granted_capabilities +
  capabilities_consent {hash, granted_at} and mirrors grants into the
  legacy keys so existing enforcement sites keep working unchanged.
- capability_set_hash / pending_capabilities / declared_set_changed
  power the update-time re-consent diff.

Wiring:
- plugin.yaml manifest field `capabilities:` parsed into
  PluginManifest.capabilities (unknown ids dropped with a warning).
- hermes plugins install: consent screen (one Y/n) when the manifest
  declares capabilities; non-interactive installs proceed with
  capabilities ungranted (fail closed).
- hermes plugins update: when the new version declares capabilities the
  granted set lacks (hash diff), the additions are surfaced and require
  re-consent — an update can never silently widen access.
- hermes plugins enable: consent screen replaces the standalone
  tool-override prompt for capability-declaring plugins.
- hermes plugins capabilities [<id>]: declared vs granted per plugin,
  flags grants held via deprecated legacy keys.
- PluginContext.has_capability() probing API so plugins degrade
  gracefully; _tool_override_allowed migrated to the canonical
  plugin_capability_granted path (reference migration; legacy
  allow_tool_override still honored).

Tests: tests/hermes_cli/test_plugin_capabilities.py (38 tests) —
declaration parsing, consent grant/persist, update re-consent on added
capability, fail-closed on missing/corrupt state, legacy-gate backward
compat, consent CLI flow (grant / decline / non-interactive).

Docs: user-guide plugins.md consent section (with explicit not-a-sandbox
warning) + developer-guide plugin authoring capability note.

Salvages the intent of PR #37976 (@coygeek — require renewed review
before plugin updates), scoped to capability diffs.

Part of #64182.
2026-08-12 18:05:21 -07:00