For each issue anchor present in BASE 63279301bc non-test .py and absent on HEAD, the BASE comment/docstring block was re-attached at the HEAD location of the code it explained (matched by the distinctive code line / enclosing def). Sentences already covered by an existing HEAD comment were deduped; the issue number always survives. Insert-only: no code lines changed.
Same retry semantics (only a non-FileNotFoundError OSError leaves the latch
unset), one latch assignment instead of five; docstring now says the call
runs per get/put and does work once.
Follow-up to the cherry-picked change: reuse the repo's shared atomic writer
(adds the fsync the hand-rolled mkstemp+os.replace skipped, keeps 0600 on
create) and document the clean-verdict staleness trade-off the cross-process
cache introduces.
A busy or briefly unreadable cache file must not disable disk loads for
the rest of the process; only missing or permanently malformed files
should mark the cache as loaded.
The OSV preflight is a synchronous network POST to api.osv.dev (up to 10s timeout) on every MCP stdio server start. Tools like `hermes mcp test` and MCP reconnect ladders spawn the same package repeatedly, but the previous in-process cache was empty after every process restart, so each run re-queried OSV and added 5.91x variance to the connection-time span.
Persist the malware-check verdict cache to `<hermes_home>/cache/osv_check.json`. Cache expiry is stored as an absolute wall-clock timestamp, so it survives restarts and monotonic-clock skew. Loading only adds missing keys so an in-memory overwrite (e.g. a test forcing expiry) is not silently reversed by the disk copy. Writes are atomic (temp file + rename) and happen under the existing cache lock.
Fixes the Hermes-owned OSV preflight variance component of #68416. Server-side `initialize` time is outside Hermes' control.
- Adds `hermes_constants.get_hermes_home()` lazy import to keep `tools/osv_check.py` import-safe (stdlib + typing only at module scope).
- Switches cache timestamps from `time.monotonic()` to `time.time()` for persistence compatibility.
- Updates `tests/tools/test_osv_check.py` fixture to isolate disk cache per test via `HERMES_HOME` + `tmp_path`, and adds regression tests for persistence, reload, and disk format.
Two amplifiers behind the 779K api.osv.dev DNS queries/16h report:
1. tools/osv_check.py: check_package_for_malware() hit OSV on EVERY
call. MCP reconnect ladders, stdio recycles, and parked-server
self-probes re-run the preflight for the same package on every spawn
attempt, so a flapping server became a sustained OSV query/DNS
stream. Verdicts (clean or blocked) are now cached for 1h
(OSV_CHECK_CACHE_TTL to tune); network failures stay uncached so
fail-open never masks a real advisory once connectivity returns.
2. hermes_cli/security_audit.py: cmd_security_audit() ran full
component discovery twice per audit (_count_components + run_audit).
Discovery now runs once via _discover_components() and run_audit()
accepts the pre-discovered list.
Both regression tests fail against the previous code (verified via
sabotage run).
Replace with for all literal-tuple
membership tests. Set lookup is O(1) vs O(n) for tuple — consistent
micro-optimization across the codebase.
608 instances fixed via `ruff --fix --unsafe-fixes`, 0 remaining.
133 files, +626/-626 (net zero).
Before launching an MCP server via npx/uvx, queries the OSV (Open Source
Vulnerabilities) API to check if the package has known malware advisories
(MAL-* IDs). Regular CVEs are ignored — only confirmed malware is blocked.
- Free, public API (Google-maintained), ~300ms per query
- Runs once per MCP server launch, inside _run_stdio() before subprocess spawn
- Parallel with other MCP servers (asyncio.gather already in place)
- Fail-open: network errors, timeouts, unrecognized commands → allow
- Parses npm (scoped @scope/pkg@version) and PyPI (name[extras]==version)
Inspired by Block/goose extension malware check.
Teknium