Nobody should have to learn `hermes vault add` or find a toggle before "log into GitHub" works.
- browser_vault_save_login: when the agent reaches a sign-in page with no saved login it asks the user
on THEIR surface (CLI two-step panel on the sudo modal: identifier shown, password masked; Desktop
card with labelled Email/username + Password fields). The answer goes to the encrypted vault bound to
the page origin and is filled at once; the model gets back only the handle and identifier. Declining
returns save_declined; headless sessions get prompt_unavailable. Never a password in chat.
- Vault tools ride with the browser toolset (check_browser_requirements) instead of appearing only once
the vault has items — an empty vault is exactly when save_login is needed. browser_vault_list hints
at it when empty.
- 1Password / Bitwarden are login sources as soon as their CLI is installed; `vault.<name>.enabled`
is opt-OUT only. Settings shows Detected/Locked/Unlocked/Off/Not detected with a switch only for
installed managers; `hermes vault sources` reports detection, `--disable`/`--enable` flip the opt-out.
- Desktop nav/page renamed "Passwords & Logins"; empty state tells the user they do not need to add
anything; all five locales updated. Docs rewritten from "how it works" to "say log into X".
- New per-thread SaveLoginPrompt callback (agent/vault_backends/unlock.py) installed beside the unlock
prompt on every CLI site and the gateway bridge (vault.save_login.request/respond/expire), propagated
to worker threads via tools.thread_context.
Live: CLI PTY (real model, packaged Chromium, local login server) — panel shown, identifier + masked
password typed, server received the correct password, password absent from terminal transcript and
from every file under HERMES_HOME outside vault/. Native Electron (headless, isolated HOME/HERMES_HOME,
own Vite + CDP port) — card shown, "Save & sign in", server received the password, Settings lists the
saved item, password absent from the rendered UI.
Manager tokens: lock generation fence (a Lock acknowledged while `bw unlock`
/ `op signin` is still running discards the late token); tokens record the
unlocking gateway session and are released when THAT session ends, not when
any sibling session in the profile is torn down.
1Password: OP_CONNECT_HOST/TOKEN come from the profile's scoped secret store
like the service token (Connect outranks a service token inside op), never
from the launch environment.
Vault RPCs bind params.profile (home + secret scope) so a shared remote
backend serving several profiles locks/lists/unlocks the requested one;
unknown profile → RPC error, not a crash.
Fill target: inspection stamps are `<nonce>:<index>`; a fill resolves only
its own inspection's stamps, so an interleaved second inspection can no
longer redirect A's password into a newly mounted field (real Chrome: 0
filled, both fields empty).
Desktop Settings: every RPC goes through the owner profile's socket
(requestGatewayForProfile), query keys carry (connection, profile), an owner
change closes dialogs and wipes drafts (a master password typed for A is
never submitted to B; a late list from A never paints under B), and vault.add
secrets travel in a ref consumed by the mutationFn instead of mutation
variables. Three owner-routing invariant tests on the real component.
Docs/PR body: session-scoped release, lock-race semantics, bw --passwordenv.
Bitwarden unlock now uses the CLI's documented non-interactive channel:
`bw unlock --raw --nointeraction --passwordenv VAR`, VAR set on the child
environment only (bw 2026.x rejects a piped password with "Master password
is required"). Verified against the real published binary.
Manager session tokens are keyed by (profile home, backend): a Desktop
gateway hosting several profiles can no longer reuse or lock another
profile's session. Status probes (`vault.sources`, is_unlocked) no longer
refresh the idle TTL; only real manager calls do. Gateway session teardown
locks the profile's managers (a per-session unlock ends with the session).
1Password service-account token comes from the profile-scoped secret store
(get_secret), not ambient os.environ.
`vault.source.set` no longer references a module constant (bind_module
rebinding dropped it → NameError on every Settings toggle).
Fill target binding: inspection stamps each input with a per-inspection
slot attribute; the fill resolves by stamp and requires type=password, then
strips every stamp. A DOM reflow between inspect and fill can no longer
redirect the password into a text field (reproduced in real Chrome before,
0 filled after).
Redaction boundary: no 4-char floor, CR/LF-normalized form registered
(what a text input actually stores), JSON object KEYS scrubbed in both
browser redactors; longest value first. Docs now state the real trust
model: accidental-disclosure protection, not an execution sandbox.
Desktop: the mid-turn card sends the master password through the owning
session's socket (requestForOwnedSession), never the ambient foreground
gateway; `vault.unlock.expire` clears a stale card; Settings keeps the
master password out of react-query mutation variables (ref consumed by the
mutationFn). One renderer invariant test for the routing.
Live Desktop repro: the fixture model called browser_vault_unlock and got
unlock_unavailable although the renderer was interactive. tool_executor runs
handlers on a propagated worker thread; thread_context only copied the
approval and sudo thread-local callbacks, so the unlock prompt registered by
_wire_callbacks was invisible there and can_prompt_here() said nobody could
answer. The callback table in thread_context now lists every per-thread
prompt (approval, sudo, vault unlock) so a new one cannot silently drop off
worker threads again. After the fix the same turn shows the masked card and
completes.
vault.sources / `hermes vault sources` report a manager as installed when
its configured binary_path exists, not only when it is on PATH.
The browser vault now draws from three login sources behind one handle
shape: the local encrypted vault (vault_…), 1Password Login items (op:…)
and Bitwarden Password Manager logins (bw:…). browser_vault_list aggregates
metadata across them; browser_vault_fill routes by prefix and resolves the
password at fill time only, through the manager CLI.
External managers are locked until the user unlocks them for the current
session. The new browser_vault_unlock tool (and the fill path, implicitly)
asks the surface to show a masked master-password prompt — CLI panel
(reuses the sudo panel state), TUI/Desktop via a vault.unlock.request
blocking card. The password goes to `op signin --raw` / `bw unlock --raw`
on stdin, never argv or env; only the session token is kept, in memory,
with a 30-minute idle TTL, cleared on session close or `vault.lock`.
Headless contexts (cron, webhook, api_server, -q) can never prompt: the
manager is reported as locked with unlock=unavailable_in_this_session and
fill refuses — the same posture approvals take where nobody can answer.
Config: vault.onepassword / vault.bitwarden {enabled, binary_path, …};
a 1Password service-account token skips the prompt for headless use.
RPC: vault.sources, vault.source.set, vault.unlock, vault.lock for Settings.
Tests (2, real subprocess against a fake bw; each proven red by sabotage):
headless never prompts or spawns; unlock feeds stdin only, token never
enters os.environ, fill routes by prefix and the password only reaches the
fill script.
Consolidated re-apply of #96988 onto current main. Ported from
Merit-Systems/OpenInstinct (MIT) opaque-handle autofill design: the model
sees vault handles + login metadata, the password is resolved and filled
server-side over the supervised CDP socket, and filled values are scrubbed
from every browser tool result by an unconditional redaction registry.
Rebase adaptations to the Sep-2026 facade/sibling layout:
- toolsets: one _HERMES_CORE_TOOLS entry (the browser toolset derives from it)
- hermes_cli/main.py: vault parser registered via the subcommand owner table
- file_safety: vault/ joins the _READ_DENIED_DIRS credential-dir table
- redact: registry scrub runs before the redact_secrets early-return
- browser_vault_tool: _run_browser_command now lives in browser_tool_session
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