Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
f-trycua 12b1f0f83d fix(computer-use): align browser guidance and screenshots 2026-08-16 11:34:40 -07:00
Francesco Bonacci 5f049b517b fix(computer-use): make the typed-browser bind/snapshot split discoverable
`cua_browser_state` has two branches, chosen implicitly: any call carrying
pid or window_id is a *binding* (browser_route.py:252), anything else is a
*snapshot*. A binding clears session state, mints fresh tab_ids, returns
binding metadata with no page content, and sets verification_required.

Nothing in the response says that. A caller that keeps passing pid/window_id
- the natural reading of "bind to this window, then read it" - re-binds
forever: the tab_id it just received is unbound by the next bind, so every
cua_browser_navigate comes back browser_verification_required, and the
refusal ("take a fresh snapshot") points at the same call that just re-bound.
Observed live as 11 consecutive refused navigates before the model gave up
and fell back to foreground SendInput on the address bar.

The same confusion silently swallowed include_screenshot: both calls that
requested one were bindings, which carry no page content, so the flag had
nothing to attach to and was dropped without comment.

A binding response now reports snapshot_required, next_step
(fresh_browser_state, matching the existing token convention) and a hint
naming the exact next call; requesting a screenshot on a binding reports
screenshot_deferred instead of dropping it. The verification refusal now
says to call cua_browser_state WITHOUT pid/window_id and why re-sending them
does not help. The schema documents that include_screenshot applies to
snapshots.

Behavior of the bind and snapshot branches themselves is unchanged - this is
purely about making the split legible to the caller.

Unit-tested. Not verified end to end on the reporting host: the driver
refuses the bind upstream there (`browser_requires_setup: no owned DevTools
endpoint`, and it does not accept a user-launched --remote-debugging-port),
so the typed route never reaches this branch. That attach failure is a
separate cua-driver issue.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 11:34:40 -07:00
Francesco Bonacci 9a96fdc5b8 fix(computer-use): enforce existing-profile grant, unblock the opt-in
Live-testing the Cua Driver 0.20 convergence on Windows 11 (session 2,
cua-driver 0.20.0) surfaced three defects in the existing-profile browser
path and in install status.

1. The config grant was silently nullified by an approval bypass.

`--yolo` / `-z` map onto a private unrestricted daemon, which answers every
browser_prepare. Because the host delegated the entire existing-profile
decision to the driver, that bypass also nullified
`computer_use.grant_existing_profile: false`: a plain `hermes -z` attached
to the user's real Chrome profile and read live page content over CDP, with
the driver reporting it as "the approved existing Chromium profile". It was
never approved.

An approval bypass is consent to skip prompts, not consent to read an
existing profile's pages, cookies, and storage. CuaTypedBrowserRoute.prepare
now enforces the key itself, regardless of permission mode. bounded stays
exempt - its reviewed capability manifest is the authorization boundary.
The authorization inputs are resolved in the backend from config and the
backend's immutable mode, never from model-supplied kwargs.

2. The grant, once set, still could not be used.

With `grant_existing_profile: true` the runtime is launched
`--grant existing-profile` correctly, but cua_browser_prepare then hit a
runtime approval prompt anyway - re-asking the user to authorize what the
config already authorized, and making the documented opt-in unusable on any
non-interactive run, where the prompt has nobody to answer it and the call
dies on approval timeout. The durable, file-backed grant now stands in for
that prompt. Scope is narrow: only the existing-profile prepare, only when
the grant is present; isolated launches still prompt and any resolution
failure falls closed to prompting.

3. `computer-use status` hid a custom override and spliced its output.

With HERMES_CUA_DRIVER_CMD pointed at cmd.exe, status printed the child's
multi-line banner and prompt inside the one-line version field, never
mentioned the override, and advised `hermes computer-use install` - which
install itself (correctly) refuses to run against an overridden path. It now
names the override and mirrors install's update-or-unset guidance, and
version output is reduced to one bounded line.

Verified on the reported host: `-z` existing-profile attach now refuses and
names the key; `grant: true` no longer prompts (33s vs a 300s approval
timeout); status names the override and prints one line. No change to the
reconciliation path - driver SHA256 unchanged end to end.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-08-16 11:34:40 -07:00
Francesco Bonacci a403fe6f92 feat(computer-use): support Cua Driver 0.20 runtime contracts 2026-08-16 11:34:40 -07:00
weisiwu bbd3462e25 fix(computer-use): merge refs+content_refs in _ref_map for cua-driver 0.17
cua-driver >= 0.17 splits the semantic_v2 snapshot payload: action-bearing
refs live in the `refs` array while `content_refs` carries every node
with EMPTY action lists. _ref_map only absorbed content_refs, so every
click/pointer/type ref was registered with no declared actions and all
typed-browser mutations failed with browser_ref_stale.

Merge refs + content_refs + snapshot.refs with set union so action info
is never dropped by an empty content entry. Verified against the 0.17
split format, the legacy refs-only format, the transitional dict format,
and the snapshot.refs fallback.
2026-08-15 15:36:19 -07:00
Teknium 48dd9c87cf feat(computer-use): user-facing authorization for cua-driver browser attachment
Completes the typed cua_browser_* route (PR #74166 lineage) with the
authorization surface that makes existing-profile attachment and
repeatable bounded automation reachable by real users:

- hermes computer-use browser-approve: CLI passthrough that mints
  cua-driver's five-minute single-use attachment token for one exact
  (pid, window_id). The user, never the model, is the token source.
- approval_token passthrough on cua_browser_prepare (schema + dispatch +
  browser_route), forwarded only for existing_profile and only as a
  non-empty string.
- computer_use.permission_mode: bounded + capability_manifest config:
  private per-session embedded daemon launched with
  --capability-manifest/--approve-capability-manifest; missing manifest
  fails loudly. 'unrestricted' is deliberately NOT a config value —
  it stays bound to the explicit per-session YOLO toggle.
- Skill + system-prompt + docs guidance for the three authorization
  rungs and the isolated-profile-first default.

E2E-verified against a temp HERMES_HOME: real config resolution to
bounded, loud failure without a manifest, real argparse path driving a
fake cua-driver binary, standard default preserved.
2026-08-15 15:04:32 -07:00
Francesco Bonacci c268397752 feat(computer_use): align cua-driver 0.10 permission modes 2026-07-29 12:19:37 -07:00
Francesco Bonacci 847e401b74 feat(computer_use): align cua-driver 0.9 contracts
Salvaged from PR #67807 by @f-trycua onto current main.

- Foreground gate: discover delivery_mode support from the live tools/list
  inputSchema.properties (fail closed), not the never-shipped
  input.delivery_mode capability token
- bring_to_front: standalone strict-schema MCP tool (inject_session=False),
  separate approval scope, requires foreground
- Verdict precedence: confirmed > unverifiable (verify before retry) >
  suspected_noop/refusal (escalate); surfaced as explicit verdict field
- Typed cua_browser_* route inside computer_use (browser_route.py) with
  exact-binding, adapter-injected session, snapshot-scoped refs
- Per-Hermes-session backend isolation + release_computer_use_session seam
  wired into AIAgent.close()
- Recorded 0.9 tools/list fixture replaces fabricated capability tokens
2026-07-29 12:19:37 -07:00