Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
Teknium 3371814034 refactor(hclib): auth — Nous/Copilot/portal auth, credential lifecycle, keepalive simplified 2026-09-02 14:42:18 -07:00
Ben Barclay 6360113a8b fix(cli): read multiplex topology from the default root in enroll warning
sol-reviewer round-4 IMPORTANT (reproduced by execution): the enroll
warning read multiplex_profiles via load_gateway_config() under the
SECONDARY profile's HERMES_HOME, but the flag normally lives in the
DEFAULT root's config.yaml — so the warning never fired in the real
topology, preserving the round-3 defect it claimed to fix.

The topology decision now mirrors the multiplexer-conflict guard in
hermes_cli/gateway.py: secondary detection is the resolved-path
relationship to <default_root>/profiles/ (not a directory-name
heuristic — also fixes the round-4 MINOR false positive on unrelated
dirs named 'profiles'), and the multiplex flag comes from the
GATEWAY_MULTIPLEX_PROFILES env override or a raw read of the default
root's config.yaml. The raw read also avoids running the full
enablement pass (round-4 MINOR: load_gateway_config() emitted the
relay-exclusive sweep's own warnings into enroll output).

The warning now replaces the generic 'restart to pick up the new env'
line instead of following it (round-4 NIT: the two messages were
contradictory), and the helper returns whether it fired.

New test file pins all six topology cases, including the exact
false-negative reproduction (flag in default root only) and env
override in both directions.
2026-08-21 14:13:28 +10:00
Ben Barclay 3d25fd59b9 fix(cli): warn when gateway enroll writes relay URLs to a secondary multiplex profile
sol-reviewer round-3 IMPORTANT: gateway enroll --connector-url /
--wake-url persist GATEWAY_RELAY_URL / GATEWAY_RELAY_WAKE_URL into the
active profile's .env and tell the user a restart activates them. For
a SECONDARY profile of a multiplexed gateway that is silently untrue:
the routing stamps are process-global, and a secondary profile's .env
is loaded into an isolated secret scope, never exported to os.environ,
so the gateway can never read them from there. Enrollment (the
credential exchange) still succeeds and the creds are still valid, so
warn rather than refuse, pointing at the process environment or the
default profile. Single-profile gateways and the launch profile are
unaffected (load_hermes_dotenv exports their .env at startup).
2026-08-21 13:35:20 +10:00
teknium1 5b751dc0ad chore: remove unused imports and dead locals (ruff F401/F841 sweep)
Cleans F401 unused imports and F841 dead local assignments across
root *.py, agent/, hermes_cli/, tools/, gateway/, cron/, tui_gateway/
(tests/, plugins/, skills/ excluded).

Intentionally KEPT (false positives / test-patch surfaces):
- agent/transports/__init__.py package re-exports
- cli.py browser_connect re-exports (DEFAULT_BROWSER_CDP_URL area,
  used by tests/cli/test_cli_browser_connect.py)
- hermes_cli/main.py _prompt_auth_credentials_choice /
  _model_flow_bedrock_api_key (accessed via main_mod attr in tests)
- gateway/run.py aliased replay_cleanup + whatsapp_identity re-exports
  and _PORT_BINDING_PLATFORM_VALUES (test-referenced)
- hermes_cli/web_server.py get_running_pid (tests monkeypatch it) and
  _OAUTH_TOKEN_URL availability probe
- hermes_cli/config.py get_process_hermes_home re-export (noqa'd F811
  chain) and yaml availability-probe import
- hermes_cli/nous_subscription.py managed_nous_tools_enabled
  (tests patch hermes_cli.nous_subscription.managed_nous_tools_enabled)
- try/except ImportError availability probes (env_loader, tts_tool,
  mcp_tool, web_server anthropic OAuth block)
- tools/web_tools.py noqa F401 re-exports
- hermes_cli/setup_whatsapp_cloud.py:263 'proceed' skipped: possible
  missing-guard bug, flagged for separate review
- unused function parameters (signature changes out of scope)

Side-effect RHS calls preserved where only the binding was dead
(e.g. web_server proc = _spawn_hermes_action -> bare call).
2026-07-29 11:53:39 -07:00
Ben Barclay f64e4f4f57 feat(gateway): generic OIDC client-credentials relay provisioning (NAS-free) (#60730)
For air-gapped / self-hosted-IdP deploys with NO Nous Portal, let the gateway
obtain its caller-identity bearer from a generic OAuth2 client_credentials grant
against the operator's own IdP (e.g. Microsoft Entra ID) instead of only
resolve_nous_access_token(). The connector's OIDC tenant resolver reads a claim
(default tid) off that token as the tenant.

- gateway/relay: new canonical _resolve_relay_identity_token() — client_credentials
  when gateway.idp.token_url (or GATEWAY_RELAY_IDP_* env) is set, else Nous Portal
  (unchanged default). Wired into self_provision_relay().
- hermes_cli/gateway_enroll: _resolve_identity_token() delegates to the canonical
  resolver so the enroll CLI and the runtime self-provision path share ONE impl.

Config via gateway.idp.{token_url,client_id,client_secret,scope} in config.yaml
(env override GATEWAY_RELAY_IDP_*). No behaviour change when unset.

Tests: tests/gateway/relay/test_identity_token_resolver.py (6 — mode selection,
request shape, config/env precedence, fail-closed). Relay suite 162 pass.

Validated via the cross-repo gateway<->connector live E2E (provision, managed
self-provision, inbound round-trip, /link) against a connector running the OIDC
tenant resolver with zero NAS config.
2026-07-08 16:55:32 +10:00
Teknium e3c9924b8b fix(cli): correct stale hermes auth login nous hints to hermes auth add nous (#53929)
* fix(cli): correct stale `hermes auth login nous` hints to `hermes auth add nous`

There is no `hermes auth login` subcommand — valid auth verbs are
add/list/remove/reset/status/logout/spotify. Six user-facing strings told
users to run `hermes auth login nous`, which fails with
`invalid choice: 'login'` — the same broken-hint class reported in #28089
for the proxy flow (already fixed there to `hermes auth add nous`).

Sites corrected to `hermes auth add nous`:
- hermes_cli/dashboard_register.py (401 retry hint, not-logged-in hint)
- hermes_cli/gateway_enroll.py (401 retry hint, not-logged-in hint)
- cli-config.yaml.example (two provider-requirement comments)

* docs(infographic): auth login nous hint fix
2026-06-27 21:30:37 -07:00
Ben Barclay 6e88f7b6f7 feat(relay): Phase 5 Unit C — wake primitive (gateway side) (#51595)
Register a per-instance wakeUrl and forward it to the connector at
self-provision so a suspended gateway can be poked awake when buffered
work arrives (pairs with the connector-side WakePoker).

- relay_wake_url() resolver (env GATEWAY_RELAY_WAKE_URL, then
  gateway.relay_wake_url in config.yaml), mirroring relay_instance_id()
- thread wake_url through _post_provision (adds wakeUrl to the body only
  when set) + self_provision_relay (resolve, forward, log)
- hermes gateway enroll --wake-url <url> persists GATEWAY_RELAY_WAKE_URL
- document the §5.2 wake poke in relay-connector-contract.md §3.3
- tests: relay_wake_url resolution (env/config/absent), provision
  forwarding, body-only-when-set (6 new; 130 relay tests pass)

The actual reconnect+drain on wake is Unit B's loop; this unit only
wires the wake SIGNAL. Opt-in: absent wakeUrl => connector never pokes.
2026-06-24 11:00:11 +10:00
Ben Barclay c276b017ad feat(relay): connector⇄gateway channel auth + signed-HTTP inbound receiver + enroll CLI (#48147)
* feat(relay): authenticate the connector⇄gateway WS channel

The relay gateway may be customer-managed and internet-exposed, so the
connector⇄gateway channel is itself authenticated (distinct from the
platform crypto the relay path sheds). Add gateway/relay/auth.py — a
Python port of the connector's HMAC token + delivery-signature schemes
(relayAuthToken.ts / deliverySigning.ts), verified byte-for-byte against
the connector's compiled TypeScript via cross-language test vectors.

Present an Authorization bearer on the /relay WS upgrade keyed by the
per-gateway secret (resolved from GATEWAY_RELAY_ID / GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET
in env or config). The connector rejects an unauthenticated/invalid/
revoked upgrade with close 4401.

* feat(relay): signed-HTTP inbound delivery receiver

The connector delivers normalized inbound events to a tenant's gateway
over a signed HTTP POST, not the outbound /relay WS: the connector
instance owning a platform socket is generally not the instance a given
gateway dialed out to, so inbound targets a tenant endpoint that may
load-balance across gateway instances.

Add gateway/relay/inbound_receiver.py — verifies x-relay-signature /
x-relay-timestamp over the EXACT raw request bytes (re-serializing would
break the HMAC: JS JSON.stringify is compact, Python json.dumps spaces)
against the per-tenant delivery key verify list within a 300s replay
window, then dispatches messages to handle_message and interrupts to the
interrupt handler. Wire it into the adapter lifecycle (start in connect()
when a delivery key + bind port are configured, tear down in disconnect();
a purely-outbound dev gateway runs without it).

Refine test_relay_sheds_crypto to distinguish PLATFORM crypto (Discord
ed25519, Twilio/WeCom HMAC — still shed) from the connector⇄gateway
CHANNEL auth (intended): auth.py / inbound_receiver.py are exempt from
the platform-symbol scan but still banned from importing platform-crypto
modules, plus a positive guard that auth.py uses only stdlib hmac/hashlib.

* feat(relay): hermes gateway enroll CLI

Add the gateway half of zero-touch enrollment. `hermes gateway enroll`
resolves a fresh Nous Portal access token (the tenant-proving identity),
POSTs {enrollmentToken, gatewayId} to the connector's /relay/enroll, and
persists GATEWAY_RELAY_ID / GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET / GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY
to ~/.hermes/.env. The per-gateway secret authenticates the WS upgrade;
the per-tenant delivery key verifies signed inbound deliveries.

Refuses under is_managed() (hosted installs get the secret stamped in by
the orchestrator). Added as an 'enroll' subcommand on the existing
gateway subparser — not a new top-level command.

* docs(relay): inbound is signed HTTP, not WS; document channel auth

Fix the stale contract: §3/§5 said inbound rode the WS socket (single-
instance only, predates the multi-instance socket-ownership + channel-auth
model). Inbound + connector→gateway interrupt are signed HTTP POSTs to the
tenant endpoint. Add §6.1 documenting the two channel-auth schemes (per-
gateway WS-upgrade secret, per-tenant inbound delivery key) and how they
differ from the platform crypto the relay path sheds.

* test(relay): update build_gateway_parser callers for cmd_gateway_enroll

The enroll subcommand added cmd_gateway_enroll as a required keyword-only
arg to build_gateway_parser, but two existing parser-extraction tests still
called it with only cmd_gateway/cmd_proxy — failing CI with TypeError.
Thread the new handler through both call sites and add a test asserting
`gateway enroll` dispatches to cmd_gateway_enroll with its flags parsed.
2026-06-18 12:01:54 +10:00