Multiplex turns enter _profile_runtime_scope, so get_active_profile_name()
equals the secondary profile and the old authz lookup consulted empty
self.adapters. Prefer _profile_adapters before the active-profile shortcut.
One BUZZ_* read survived the #98738 sweep unscoped: the NIP-42 WebSocket
auth path read BUZZ_AUTH_TAG with a bare os.getenv. Under
gateway.multiplex_profiles the process env holds the default profile's
bridge/.env output, so a scoped secondary profile without its own tag
signed its relay auth event with the default profile's NIP-OA
owner-attestation tag. Reproduced on f3845a72af before the fix; the same
repro now attaches no tag (fail-closed).
The read goes through _get_scoped_secret: scoped multiplex profiles fail
closed to "", while single-profile and unscoped default-profile reads
keep the legacy env behavior. Adversarial coverage added for the leak
itself, the scoped positive control, unscoped precedence, partial-extra
adapter config, scoped validate_config, scoped standalone-send target
resolution, central-authz wildcard/blank-entry/normalization semantics,
and adapter-intake vs central-authz agreement on the same allowlist.
Fixes#98738
Signed-off-by: Kosta Gorod <35299380+KostaGorod@users.noreply.github.com>
The four new #98738 authorization tests failed on CI shards that had
never looked Buzz up: plugin platforms have no static Platform member —
Platform._missing_ creates one on demand and caches it in _member_map_,
so attribute access (Platform.BUZZ) only works after an earlier value
lookup in the same process. Local full-suite runs happened to register
it first, which is why this only surfaced on a fresh shard.
Resolve the member once via Platform("buzz") at module import and use
that constant in the runner/source helpers.
Under gateway.multiplex_profiles the default profile's YAML-to-env bridge
writes BUZZ_* values into os.environ, and every Buzz read gave that env
precedence over the secondary profile's PlatformConfig — so each secondary
adapter connected as the default identity, watched its channels, and
resolved its credentials file (#98738).
- Add _profile_scoped()/_scoped_platform_setting(): inside a secondary
profile scope extra is authoritative and env is not consulted (a missing
key fails closed to its default instead of borrowing the default
profile's value); single-profile and unscoped/default-profile reads keep
the legacy env-over-config precedence.
- Apply the scoped read to BuzzAdapter.__init__ (relay, CLI path, channels,
home channel, poll interval, require_mention, transport, allowed users),
_resolve_private_key (BUZZ_CREDENTIALS_FILE), validate_config,
_standalone_send, and check_requirements (which now consults the
profile's own config.yaml via the scoped home override).
- _env_enablement() returns None inside a profile scope and
_apply_yaml_config() skips the env bridge there, so the default profile's
env cannot fabricate Buzz for a profile that never configured it and a
secondary profile's YAML cannot be pinned into the process env
(first-writer-wins, #72348 Telegram/Discord mirror).
- Central authorization now consults a plugin platform's live-adapter
config.extra.allowed_users (gated on the registry entry declaring
allowed_users_env, with an optional normalize_user_id hook so Buzz npub
entries match hex-pubkey user ids) — under multiplex only the default
profile's list ever reached the env var, so listed secondary-profile
users were default-denied (#82871). Empty/absent lists change nothing;
default-deny is preserved.
WEIXIN_DM_POLICY/ALLOWED_USERS/GROUP_ALLOWED_USERS, YUANBAO's equivalents,
WECOM_DM_POLICY/ALLOWED_USERS/GROUP_POLICY, and the startup guard's
GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS check still read raw os.getenv at adapter
construction time. Under gateway.multiplex_profiles that reads the process
env instead of the per-profile secret scope, so a secondary profile either
silently drops every DM (its own env-only allowlist is invisible) or
inherits the default profile's allow-all/allowlist config.
Route these reads through the existing scoped helpers (_wx_secret,
_get_scoped_secret, gateway.authz_mixin._platform_gate_env, and
gateway.config._getenv) already used for the adjacent credential reads in
the same adapters.
Fixes#93522.
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over
the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker,
dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state,
providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security,
alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept.
Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way:
- tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls
(DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval
mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s.
- test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py
silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed
cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models.
- test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over
shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s).
- test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on
MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents
(22s → 1.0s).
- test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x
(24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps
patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait
5s → 0.5s.
- test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s
with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop
blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in
the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin).
Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh —
2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall.
Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions
(−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s.
A gateway running under a named active profile (e.g. `hermes -p main gateway`)
stamps kanban auto-subscriptions with notifier_profile=main, but
_authorization_adapter() treated any name other than the literal "default"
as a multiplex secondary and consulted only _profile_adapters — empty on
standalone gateway-per-profile deployments. The helper failed closed, the
notifier rewound the claim, and the notification was silently retried
forever (#71340).
Recognize the gateway's own active profile name as primary so its stamped
subscriptions resolve via self.adapters; genuinely secondary profiles keep
the fail-closed lookup.
Salvaged from PR #62380 (the unrelated blocked-reason truncation change is
intentionally not taken).
- honor SendResult(success=False) instead of discarding it, so an adapter
that REPORTS (not raises) a soft send failure — e.g. the Telegram adapter's
"Not connected" mid-reconnect — no longer advances the cursor past an
undelivered event and silently loses the notification. Addresses the
notifier half of #31901.
- add block_loop_detected to the notifier's TERMINAL_KINDS so a task routed to
triage for a human decision (re-blocked past the recurrence limit) actually
pings its subscribers instead of stalling silently.
- raise MAX_SEND_FAILURES 3 -> 12 (~60s at the 5s tick) so a transient
Telegram/API outage does not permanently unsubscribe a live channel now that
reported soft-failures also reach this counter.
- route active-profile-stamped subscriptions via the primary adapter on a
single-profile gateway (self.adapters[platform] when the stamped
notifier_profile equals the active profile). Related to #56802.
Adds test_kanban_notifier_rewinds_claim_on_reported_send_failure asserting a
reported send failure leaves the event unseen (rewound) rather than consumed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Subset of PR #61985: _make_adapter_auth_check gains a profile_name
parameter and secondary-profile adapters (started in
_start_one_profile_adapters) bind it, so the auth callback's
SessionSource resolves the routed profile's adapter and pairing store
instead of silently falling back to the default profile. This is the
gap left open by the #65629 merge — adapter-internal auth checks (e.g.
Slack thread-context fetch) fire outside the wrapped message handler.
The PR's authz_mixin.py hunks are dropped: main's _auth_env (merged via
PR #65629) already covers the scoped allowlist reads they targeted.
Aligns runtime behaviour with SECURITY.md 2.6: externally reachable
messaging adapters must fail closed unless access is explicitly
configured. Closes the confirmed multiplex authorization bypass a
secondary profile's open dm/group policy no longer inherits the default
profile's allowlist trust.
- Own-policy adapters (WhatsApp, WeCom, Weixin, QQBot, Yuanbao) default
dm_policy/group_policy to pairing/allowlist instead of open; open now
requires an explicit GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS or per-platform allow-all.
- Startup guard (_own_policy_open_startup_violation) refuses to boot when
an enabled adapter is open without the allow-all opt-in; the guard now
runs for every secondary profile in multiplex mode too.
- Profile-aware own-policy authorization: _authorization_adapter /
_adapter_for_source resolve the live adapter via SessionSource.profile,
so _is_user_authorized and the ingress/pairing/busy/queue paths read the
originating profile's adapter policy, not the default profile's.
- Fail-closed intake for Email, Feishu P2P, and Discord (blank-principal
denial, empty-allowlist deny, missing-interaction.user deny).
Salvaged from #44073 (external-surface hardening), split into a focused
gateway-authz PR per maintainer request. Follow-up fix by Hermes Agent:
the Discord slash-auth channel bypass now matches DISCORD_ALLOWED_CHANNELS
by the same name-inclusive keys (id + name + #name + parent) the on_message
scope gate uses, so a name-form channel allowlist authorizes slash
interactions consistently (was id-only, breaking #name matching).
Co-authored-by: Hermes Agent <agent@nousresearch.com>
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