cf60ebbdfd264c3fc067b9e3230df8752c50d2ec
7 Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Ben Barclay
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a65a517d04 |
fix(dashboard-auth): url-encode the PKCE cookie value so strict proxy hops stop dropping it (#99176)
The PKCE payload is a flat 'provider=...;state=...;verifier=...;next=...' string. A raw ';' is a cookie-attribute terminator, so Python's http.cookies emits the value in RFC 6265 quoted form with each ';' escaped as the backslash-octal '\073'. Mainstream browsers echo that form back verbatim and Python parsers decode it — the browser round trip is fine. But '"' and '\' are outside the plain cookie-octet set, and non-Python hops that re-serialize the Cookie header reject the value and drop the cookie entirely: Go's net/http (Traefik middleware, Authentik outposts, other gateways) refuses any cookie value containing a backslash. The OIDC callback then 400s with "Missing PKCE state cookie" even though the browser sent the cookie. Field reproduction: support thread "Still unable to use Authentik for signin with traefik" — devtools showed the browser sending the intact quoted \073 cookie on /auth/callback while Hermes logged missing_pkce_cookie behind a Traefik+Authentik chain. Fix: URL-encode the whole payload in set_pkce_cookie (quote(payload, safe='') — ';' becomes '%3B') so the wire value contains only cookie-octets and no parser in the chain has anything to reject, and decode through a single shared inverse, cookies.parse_pkce_payload(), in BOTH readers: the OAuth /auth/callback and the native password-login path (routes.login_submit), whose broker/provider binding check would otherwise parse zero segments from the newly-encoded value and silently disable itself. Regression coverage: the wire-shape test pins the full cookie-octet set (the '"'/'\' assertions are the ones a Go-parser hop fails pre-fix), the round-trip tests drive the real /auth/login → /auth/callback path, and the next= test pins the exact post-login redirect byte shape. Native-flow broker assertions updated to decode through parse_pkce_payload instead of substring-matching the raw wire value. Salvaged from #84065 (rebased onto current main, which gained the SameSite=None PKCE attrs and the RFC 8252 native password flow since the PR branched): kept main's _pkce_attrs cookie shape, extended the fix to the login_submit reader the original PR predated, and reframed the rationale — browsers do NOT truncate at the first ';' (there is no literal ';' on the wire in the quoted form); the failing hop is a strict middlebox cookie parser. Closes #83832 Co-authored-by: Kailigithub <12250313+Kailigithub@users.noreply.github.com> |
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Buff Pesos
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56f1afc834 |
feat(dashboard-auth): extend RFC 8252 native sign-in to password providers (system-browser autofill) (#75808)
* feat(dashboard-auth): extend RFC 8252 native sign-in to password providers The desktop app runs password sign-in for gated gateways in an embedded Electron BrowserWindow, where OS password managers (macOS Passwords / iCloud Keychain autofill) cannot reach the form — Chromium-in-Electron has no bridge to them, so users retype credentials by hand even though the /login form already carries the right autocomplete attributes. The existing RFC 8252 native flow (system browser + loopback + PKCE) solves exactly this for OAuth providers, but was explicitly disabled for password providers on the grounds that they have "no IDP round trip to broker". The brokering is still worth having: it moves the credential form into the system browser, where password-manager autofill just works. Gateway-only change; the desktop needs no changes (runNativeLogin is already page-agnostic), and older desktop builds pick the capability up automatically once the gateway advertises it: * /auth/native/authorize now accepts a supports_password provider: register the pending broker authorization as usual, then 302 the system browser to the interactive /login form with the opaque broker_state in the gateway's PKCE cookie (the same server-controlled channel the OAuth branch uses) instead of an IDP redirect. * /auth/password-login: when the server-set PKCE cookie carries a broker handle, a successful credential check completes the pending authorization exactly like the /auth/callback native branch — mint the one-time loopback code, return the loopback redirect (validated loopback-only at authorize time) as `next`, clear the PKCE cookie, and set NO session cookies. A lapsed broker is a clean 400 telling the user to restart sign-in; a failed credential attempt leaves the pending entry intact so the user can retype. * /api/status now advertises "native_pkce" whenever any interactive session provider is registered (previously only for non-password providers), so the desktop selects the system-browser strategy for password-only gateways. Security posture is unchanged from the existing flow: loopback-literal redirect_uri enforcement, PKCE S256 binding, single-use short-TTL codes, constant-time comparison, and the same rate limiter on password attempts. Tests: full authorize → /login → password-login → loopback → token → bearer round trip, wrong-password keeps the pending entry, lapsed broker → 400, no-broker browser login keeps minting cookies, and the /api/status advertisement for password-only gateways. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * fix(dashboard-auth): bind native password completion to the authorize-time provider Review follow-ups for #75808: * /auth/password-login now enforces that body.provider matches the provider recorded in the server-set PKCE cookie by /auth/native/authorize before completing a pending native authorization. /login renders a form for every session provider, so without this a native flow started for provider A could be completed with provider B's credentials, binding B's session into A's pending entry. The mismatch is rejected BEFORE credential verification (no session minted, no oracle) and preserves both the pending entry and the cookie, so the user can still submit the correct provider's form. Covered by a two-password-provider E2E regression test. * Update the two docs spots that still said password-only providers do not advertise native_pkce (website desktop-native-signin guide and the auth_flows type comment in web/src/lib/api.ts). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> * chore: map contributor email for #75808 (buffpesos) --------- Co-authored-by: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com> Co-authored-by: Brooklyn Nicholson <brooklyn.bb.nicholson@gmail.com> |
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x7peeps
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ed5e17f4b8 |
fix(auth): /auth/native/authorize 空 provider 自动选择不再统计会被拒绝的密码 provider
Fix #78906 当部署同时启用 basic 密码 provider 与一个 OAuth/OIDC session provider 时， list_session_providers() 会把密码 provider 也计入 "exactly one candidate" 判断（密码 provider 虽是 session provider，但下一行就会因 supports_password 被原生 OAuth broker 流程拒绝），导致 len == 2、自动选择被跳过，桌面端 空 provider 登录返回 404 "Unknown provider: ''"。 修复：自动选择只在可 broker 的 provider（supports_session 且非 supports_password）中计数，与 /api/status 的 native_pkce 能力宣告使用同一 "brokerable" 定义；当没有任何可 broker provider 时保留原有选择逻辑， 让显式的 400 错误继续解释密码 provider 不支持原生 OAuth。 新增回归测试：basic+OIDC 并存时自动选中 OIDC、单 OAuth provider 自动 选中、多 OAuth provider 歧义 404、纯密码部署保留 400。 |
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Teknium
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39975613b1 |
test: prune wave 2 + speed fixes — 28,106 → 19,757 test functions, suite wall 315s → 294s
Second, deeper pass over tools/gateway/hermes_cli plus first pass over the trees wave 1 missed (acp, acp_adapter, skills, computer_use, docker, dashboard, conformance, monitoring, secret_sources, hermes_state, providers). Same rubric as wave 1 (AGENTS.md test policy); security, alternation/caching invariants, issue-number regressions, and E2E kept. Real test-quality fixes found and rooted out along the way: - tests/tools/test_command_guards.py made real auxiliary-LLM HTTPS calls (DEFAULT_CONFIG smart-approval leaked in) — pinned approval mode=manual via autouse fixture: 17.4s → 0.4s. - test_model_switch_custom_providers.py / test_user_providers_model_switch.py silently probed live provider catalogs (~2s/test) — stubbed cached_provider_model_ids/provider_model_ids/fetch_api_models. - test_telegram_noise_filter.py: 15-platform copy-paste matrix over shared gateway.run logic → 3 representative platforms (55s → 3.9s). - test_gateway_shutdown.py: stop()'s 5s interrupt-deadline loop spun on MagicMock agents — interrupt.side_effect now clears _running_agents (22s → 1.0s). - test_gateway_inactivity_timeout.py poll-harness timings shrunk 3-5x (24s → 1.1s); test_mcp_stability.py backoff/SIGTERM-grace sleeps patched (15.4s → 2.5s); test_async_delegation.py negative-drain wait 5s → 0.5s. - test_telegram_init_deadline.py: loop-block margin restored to 1.0s with rationale comment — the watchdog-dump assertion needs the loop blocked well past deadline+grace under parallel load (flaked once in the 40-worker verification run at a 0.2s margin). Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2,438 files, 21,718 tests passed, 0 failed, 293.9s wall. Suite totals vs original baseline: 46,820 → 19,757 test functions (−57.8%), wall 583.5s → 293.9s (−50%), subprocess CPU 13,564s → 11,623s. |
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Teknium
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6b81590c55 |
test: prune low-value tests suite-wide (wave 1) — 46,820 → 28,106 test functions
Systematic prune per AGENTS.md test policy, one pass over every major test tree (gateway, hermes_cli, tools, agent, run_agent, plugins, cli, cron, tui_gateway, honcho/openviking, root-level): - DELETE: source-reading tests (read_text/getsource on prod files), change-detector tests (exact catalog counts, model-name snapshots, config version literals), mock-echo tests (assert a mock returns what it was told), assertion-free/trivial tests, near-duplicate parametrizations (boundaries + one representative kept), async/sync twin duplicates, cosmetic within-file variations. - KEEP (mandatory): security/redaction/approval guards, message-role alternation invariants, prompt-caching/deterministic-call-id invariants, issue-number regression tests (deduped), E2E tests. - 6 test files deleted outright (script-style/no-assert or fully redundant); conftest.py, fakes/, fixtures/ untouched. - tests/acp/conftest.py added: autouse fixture stubs the live models.dev/GitHub/Copilot/Anthropic inventory fetches that ACP server tests performed on every session create — test_server.py 147s → 3.4s, and the tests are now genuinely hermetic. - Sleep-based slowness shrunk where safe (codex_ttfb_watchdog, compression_concurrent_fork, etc.); no wall-clock assertion tightened. Verification: full hermetic suite via scripts/run_tests.sh — 2439 files, 31,130 tests passed, 0 failed, 0 flaky retries, 315s wall (baseline: 583s wall, 13,564s subprocess CPU). |
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Teknium
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4d23b2238e |
fix(dashboard-auth): harden the public native-authorize surface
Two tightenings on /auth/native/authorize (a public pre-auth route): - Per-IP pending cap (8): the broker store is capacity-bounded fail-closed at 256 entries with a 600s TTL, so one unauthenticated spammer could fill it and deny native sign-in gateway-wide for the pending window. Pending entries now record the requester IP and each address is capped well above any legitimate concurrent-login count; other addresses keep signing in. - Loopback redirect_uri accepts IP literals only (127.0.0.1 / ::1): 'localhost' can be re-pointed via the hosts file or a hostile resolver (RFC 8252 \u00a78.3 says to use loopback IP literals); the desktop always sends 127.0.0.1, so nothing legitimate used the name. 3 new tests: per-IP cap enforced, cap frees on TTL expiry, localhost redirect rejected at the route. |
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Ben Barclay
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7857d8737c |
feat(dashboard-auth): RFC 8252 native desktop sign-in (system browser + PKCE, no webview/cookies)
The Desktop app can now sign in to a gated gateway using the user's SYSTEM browser and OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps (RFC 8252) instead of an embedded Electron BrowserWindow, and authenticates with bearer tokens it holds itself instead of relying on HttpOnly browser session cookies. Why brokered: the upstream IDP (Nous Portal) binds client_id to the gateway instance and only permits redirect_uris on the gateway's own origin, so a desktop loopback redirect can't be a direct Portal client. The gateway therefore acts as the authorization server TO the desktop and an OAuth client TO the Portal, reusing the existing PKCE start_login/complete_login provider path unchanged. Server (Ben's dashboard-auth lane): - native_flow.py: in-memory broker — binds the desktop's PKCE challenge to a completed Session, mints a single-use, short-TTL, PKCE-verified gateway authorization code. Constant-time compare, single-use (consumed before the PKCE check so a wrong verifier can't be retried), capacity-bounded. - routes.py: GET /auth/native/authorize (starts the brokered PKCE login, loopback-only redirect_uri, S256-only), POST /auth/native/token (loopback code + verifier -> tokens in the JSON body, never Set-Cookie), POST /auth/native/refresh (desktop-held RT rotation). /auth/callback branches to mint a loopback code + 302 to 127.0.0.1 when a broker_state rides the PKCE cookie; the cookie/SPA path is untouched. - middleware.py: the gate accepts Authorization: Bearer <access_token>, verified via the same verify_session provider stack (no cookie set/read), with the same "provider unreachable -> 503, not logout" semantics. - web_server.py /api/status: advertise auth_flows (["cookie","native_pkce"]) so clients can detect the capability; native_pkce only when a brokerable OAuth provider is registered. Desktop (Ben's lane): - native-oauth.ts: pure PKCE/capability/URL/callback/token helpers. - native-oauth-login.ts: loopback-listener orchestration (system browser via openExternal, ephemeral 127.0.0.1 listener, state/PKCE verification), all I/O injected for testability. - main.ts: capability-gated oauth-login IPC — native flow when advertised, automatic fallback to the existing embedded-webview cookie flow otherwise; tokens stored encrypted (safeStorage/OS keychain), REST + ws-ticket authenticated by bearer, transparent refresh, logout clears both shapes. Tests: 18 server pytest (broker unit + full authorize->callback->token E2E + cookieless bearer auth of a gated route + ws-ticket mint + capability advertisement + refresh); desktop node --test/vitest for both pure modules (PKCE, capability detection, callback CSRF, loopback round trip, timeout, browser-open failure). Electron project typechecks clean. Docs: website/docs/guides/desktop-native-signin.md. |