Real-profile browsing routes all in-page browser work through the Browser Use
CLI (browser_exec), which obsoletes the cua-driver typed-browser surface baked
into computer_use. Remove it so computer_use is a pure DESKTOP-control tool
(screenshots / mouse / keyboard / window management) and every call's schema
drops ~24 browser-only params + 9 actions.
- schema.py: 9 cua_browser_* actions and the typed-browser param block removed;
14 desktop actions + shared params kept; description drops the browser rung.
- tool.py: cua_browser entries out of _SAFE/_DESTRUCTIVE_ACTIONS; the whole
cua_browser dispatch block deleted; {"type","cua_browser_type"} → "type"
(desktop typing untouched); _config_preauthorized (browser-prepare-only, a
no-op for every desktop action) and the browser-page escalation hint removed.
- browser_route.py deleted (no importers outside the package); cua_backend.py
drops the import + typed_browser_* methods; backend.py drops the non-abstract
defaults.
- tests: browser-route/contract suites removed; browser assertions trimmed.
Desktop control unchanged. 233 computer_use tests pass; the 1 remaining failure
(test_gateway_session_key_yolo_maps_to_unrestricted_mode) is a pre-existing
cross-test state leak — fails identically on origin/main, passes in isolation.
The verify_fresh_state verdict now carries an optional human hint; assert
the decision + additive-field absence instead of the exact dict shape
(same contract loosening as test_computer_use_delivery_ladder.py).
`cua_browser_state` has two branches, chosen implicitly: any call carrying
pid or window_id is a *binding* (browser_route.py:252), anything else is a
*snapshot*. A binding clears session state, mints fresh tab_ids, returns
binding metadata with no page content, and sets verification_required.
Nothing in the response says that. A caller that keeps passing pid/window_id
- the natural reading of "bind to this window, then read it" - re-binds
forever: the tab_id it just received is unbound by the next bind, so every
cua_browser_navigate comes back browser_verification_required, and the
refusal ("take a fresh snapshot") points at the same call that just re-bound.
Observed live as 11 consecutive refused navigates before the model gave up
and fell back to foreground SendInput on the address bar.
The same confusion silently swallowed include_screenshot: both calls that
requested one were bindings, which carry no page content, so the flag had
nothing to attach to and was dropped without comment.
A binding response now reports snapshot_required, next_step
(fresh_browser_state, matching the existing token convention) and a hint
naming the exact next call; requesting a screenshot on a binding reports
screenshot_deferred instead of dropping it. The verification refusal now
says to call cua_browser_state WITHOUT pid/window_id and why re-sending them
does not help. The schema documents that include_screenshot applies to
snapshots.
Behavior of the bind and snapshot branches themselves is unchanged - this is
purely about making the split legible to the caller.
Unit-tested. Not verified end to end on the reporting host: the driver
refuses the bind upstream there (`browser_requires_setup: no owned DevTools
endpoint`, and it does not accept a user-launched --remote-debugging-port),
so the typed route never reaches this branch. That attach failure is a
separate cua-driver issue.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Regression test for the _ref_map merge (salvaged from #79515): the live
0.19.3 driver splits action refs into refs[] while content_refs re-lists
every node with empty actions; the empty entries must not clobber the
action-bearing ones. Caught live: every typed click refused with
browser_ref_stale until the merge fix.
Completes the typed cua_browser_* route (PR #74166 lineage) with the
authorization surface that makes existing-profile attachment and
repeatable bounded automation reachable by real users:
- hermes computer-use browser-approve: CLI passthrough that mints
cua-driver's five-minute single-use attachment token for one exact
(pid, window_id). The user, never the model, is the token source.
- approval_token passthrough on cua_browser_prepare (schema + dispatch +
browser_route), forwarded only for existing_profile and only as a
non-empty string.
- computer_use.permission_mode: bounded + capability_manifest config:
private per-session embedded daemon launched with
--capability-manifest/--approve-capability-manifest; missing manifest
fails loudly. 'unrestricted' is deliberately NOT a config value —
it stays bound to the explicit per-session YOLO toggle.
- Skill + system-prompt + docs guidance for the three authorization
rungs and the isolated-profile-first default.
E2E-verified against a temp HERMES_HOME: real config resolution to
bounded, loud failure without a manifest, real argparse path driving a
fake cua-driver binary, standard default preserved.
Teknium