get_messages_as_conversation, get_resume_conversations, and
get_ancestor_display_prefix still took self._lock — the same global
choke point the read-path split (WAL per-thread read-only connections)
was meant to remove from every recall/browse read. These three are the
hottest reads in the file: every session resume across the gateway,
CLI, and ACP adapter goes through one of them, so a resume racing a
burst of concurrent-session writer flushes still convoys behind them
exactly like the fixed paths used to.
_session_lineage_root_to_tip (the lineage walk shared by all three,
plus get_conversation_root) had its own independent self._lock use and
needed the same conversion — without it the outer functions still
blocked on the very first line.
Verified empirically: a reader thread calling all three functions
while another thread holds self._lock blocked for the writer's full
hold duration before the fix, and returned immediately after (SQLite
3.50.4 in this dev venv falls back to journal_mode=DELETE per the
WAL-reset-bug guard, so the requires_wal-marked regression test is
exercised via a local WAL-forced script instead; it still runs and
passes on any runtime where WAL is actually active).
CI-caught: test_verification_stop_caching and test_tui_gateway_server::test_native_vision_turn_persists_a_renderable_image_ref both assert on append_message.call_args, but the flush loop now calls append_messages_batch. Same class of test-fake fallout fixed in 5 other files — these two were missed.
Simplify-pass folds on the #23254 salvage:
- REUSE (HIGH): append_messages_batch now delegates row serialization to
the pre-existing _insert_message_rows helper (already shared by
replace_messages / archive_and_compact / portability import) instead
of adding a third serialization path (_prepare_message_row +
_MESSAGE_INSERT_SQL are gone). One row-writer for every multi-row
path; the row-ID return was consumed by no production caller, so the
batch returns the inserted count.
- QUALITY (HIGH): the compression-lock + compression-closed admission
guards are extracted into _check_transcript_write_guards, shared by
append_message and append_messages_batch (previously duplicated 23
lines that had already needed targeted fixes, #74478). The role-gated
reasoning filtering is no longer duplicated in run_agent.py — it
lives at its one site inside _insert_message_rows.
- EFFICIENCY (MEDIUM, measured): unbounded seed copies hold one BEGIN
IMMEDIATE for seconds (10k rows ~= 2.4s; FTS triggers dominate) and
monopolize the in-process write lock. append_messages_batch grows a
chunk_rows param; all seed/copy call sites use chunk_rows=500. Same
recovery semantics as the old per-row loops, bounded lock holds.
- REUSE (MEDIUM): the two remaining per-row branch-copy loops found by
the pass (gateway/slash_commands.py /branch, hermes_cli
cli_commands_mixin.py branch) are converted to chunked batches too
(AsyncSessionDB's generic to_thread forwarder covers the async site).
Turn-flush benchmark unchanged after the refactor: 2.43 -> 0.87 ms
median per 5-message flush (64% faster).
The flush now goes through append_messages_batch; MagicMock-based
assertions and barrier fakes that hooked append_message observed
nothing (the flush's try/except swallowed the AttributeError). Assert
on the batch payload instead.
Sibling sites of the per-message flush pattern: both branch-seed
paths (session.branch in methods_session.py and the lazy seed persist
in server.py) copied the parent history row-by-row -- one transaction
per row, and a branch seed can be hundreds of rows. Route both through
SessionDB.append_messages_batch. The server.py path also gains real
atomicity: _branch_seed_persisted assumed every row landed, which the
per-row loop could not guarantee.
Re-derivation of #23254 (@devsart95) on today's flush loop. The turn
flush in _flush_messages_to_session_db wrote one BEGIN IMMEDIATE
transaction per message row; a typical agent turn (user + assistant +
tool results) paid 3-8 transactions -- and, off WAL (the default on
macOS while the WAL-reset guard is active), 3-8 fsyncs -- per turn.
Adds SessionDB.append_messages_batch: same row shape as append_message
(shared _prepare_message_row serializer + _MESSAGE_INSERT_SQL column
list, so the two writers cannot drift), same compression-lock and
compression-closed guards, one aggregated session-counter UPDATE, one
transaction for the whole batch. Row serialization stays outside the
write lock.
The flush loop now collects the turn's new rows and writes them in one
call. All-or-nothing pairs exactly with the persisted-marker stamping:
on failure no rows landed and no markers were stamped, so the next
flush re-writes the whole tail (same recovery contract as before,
minus the partial-prefix case that could double-count).
Measured (same harness, 5-message turn, journal_mode=DELETE,
synchronous=FULL): 2.32ms -> 0.83ms median per turn flush (64% faster,
5 fsyncs -> 1). On WAL the win is smaller but the atomicity fix holds.
SubdirectoryHintTracker re-injected identical context files whenever the same
AGENTS.md was reachable through more than one path. Symlinked shared
workspaces, hardlinks, and timestamped backup copies all alias a single file,
so a normal session could ship the same 8KB of instructions two or three
times. Nothing deduped it and nothing excluded directories that only ever
hold copies.
Two changes:
* Track a sha256 of every injected hint body. Repeat content is skipped, and
the working directory's own context file is seeded at construction so the
copy prompt_builder already loaded at startup is never sent again.
* Skip directories that hold copies rather than authoritative context
(backups, node_modules, venv, site-packages, .git, .Trash, vendor, caches).
Screening is relative to working_dir, so a project that legitimately lives
under vendor/ keeps discovering its own subdirectory hints.
Measured on a real session that touched a symlinked shared workspace:
3 injections / ~24,000 chars before, 1 injection / 8,112 chars after.
14 new tests cover symlink aliasing, byte-identical copies, working-dir
seeding, distinct content still being injected, each excluded directory name,
excluded ancestors, and the working-dir-inside-excluded-name case.
OpenViking is_available() only consulted env vars and use_ovcli_config, so an
endpoint saved to config.yaml (e.g. by the Dashboard) reported needs_config;
_resolve_connection_settings() likewise never folded config.yaml's non-secret
fields into its chain. RetainDB initialize() read base_url/project from the
environment only, ignoring the values the Dashboard writes to config.yaml.
Both now resolve non-secret fields as env -> (ovcli ->) config.yaml -> default;
secrets still come from the environment. Adds regression tests for both.
Fixes#68209
(cherry picked from commit dca57915b97b5705b30927a062e1d0f2f23d3841)
Review feedback: the previous test called _mark_session_committed
directly, so it verified the guard's behavior but not the wiring that
sets it — a future break in the commit_memory_session -> same-id
compression-boundary path would not be caught.
Add a lifecycle regression that drives the real sequence: on_session_end
commits through the actual path, on_session_switch(same id,
reason="compression") crosses the boundary, sync_turn records a genuinely
new turn, and a second on_session_end must produce a second commit POST.
Without the fix it fails showing exactly one commit call, which is the
reported data loss: every turn after the first compression is dropped.
The rotation and /undo tests stay as scope guards.
(cherry picked from commit 0ca5a330630a30b105cbbc32e8a23f2c5ffe0eab)
`_committed_session_ids` is a permanent per-sid latch, and
`_session_needs_commit` checks it before the turn counter by design — a
racing sync_turn can re-increment `_turn_count` after commit+reset, so
the guard must win to stop a double-commit.
That is correct for a session being left behind. It is wrong for one
that keeps its id. `compress_context()` commits before rewriting the
transcript in both modes, and with `compression.in_place: true` (the
default) `on_session_switch` receives the same id and does not rotate.
The latch then rejects every later commit for a still-live session — the
next compression, /new, normal session end, startup recovery — so every
post-compression turn is silently never extracted.
Rotation mode is unaffected because a fresh child id is minted and
starts clean, which is what confirms the latch's intent was only ever to
dedupe the departing id.
Clear the latch when compression completes without rotation. Turns
arriving after that point are genuinely new, and this is a defined
moment rather than a race. The rotation path is untouched, so the old
id stays latched and its _finalize_session_async still dedupes against
the compression commit.
Fixes#74695
(cherry picked from commit d1e5c3dc33ef0d43d021662674e1a7cd5e43eecd)
The provider used to disable OpenViking permanently when the server was
unreachable. That was fixed: `_ensure_client()` now reconnects lazily,
with a 30s cooldown gate in `_ensure_client_locked`.
Only one of the seven user-facing warnings was updated to match. The
other six still told the user memory was "disabled for this Hermes run",
which is no longer true — every one of those paths is retried on the next
access. A user who reads the old message has no reason to retry, which is
very likely how #5721 ("never recovers") came to be filed against
behaviour that already recovers.
All six sites were traced to confirm none is terminal for the run: the
`initialize()`-time and waiter-thread failures never arm `_failed_refresh`
(only line 2439 does), so they retry on the very next access with no
cooldown at all.
The replacement wording deliberately omits the "(after cooldown)"
parenthetical used at the already-correct site — that detail is only
accurate where `_failed_refresh` was just armed. The neutral phrasing is
true at all six.
Also promotes two clause separators to periods to avoid "…; …disabled;"
collisions.
(cherry picked from commit 8346403a4b97af503d26b0f7905ff513828d821e)
`_start_local_openviking_server()` spawned `openviking-server`
unconditionally. Both callers — `initialize()` and the runtime
unreachable handler — reach it from a health probe, and that probe can
time out client-side while the server is up and serving. The spawned
process then loses the data-directory lock and exits immediately with
`DataDirectoryLocked`; because the probe keeps timing out, the cycle
repeats every cooldown window (~5 min observed).
The existing 30s `_failed_refresh` cooldown paces the loop but cannot
stop it, since it expires while the underlying condition persists.
Probe the target host:port before spawning and treat an occupied port as
already-started. This guards both call sites at their single convergence
point. The probe deliberately tests only that a listener owns the port —
enough to know a second server would lose the lock — and says nothing
about that listener's health.
The parse/probe now precedes the PATH lookup, so a reachable server is
reported as running even when `openviking-server` is not on PATH.
Fixes#74846
(cherry picked from commit b49427d85fd6628eb4a7fe099e5c390c5c4cc935)
## Summary
- Normalize OpenViking endpoints through `is_always_blocked_url` and fall back to the default local endpoint when poisoned.
- Keep intentional loopback / LAN self-host working.
- Add focused unit tests.
## Salvage / credit
Memory-provider endpoint floor sibling of RetainDB/Supermemory always-blocked hardening (avoids over-broad #4984-style private-IP bans).
(cherry picked from commit 8fa607d0aedb8c5fca398d7f112b1b25ade54fa2)
_ensure_fts_cjk_schema never raises on OperationalError; post-condition
after dropping messages_fts_cjk_update now requires a narrowed UPDATE
trigger or durable fts_cjk_stale + unavailable. Covers the production
soft-fail path the raise-only handler missed.
Retarget #73639 onto the SessionDB mixin split (hermes_state_common /
hermes_state_schema). Fresh installs create UPDATE OF content/tool_*
triggers; existing broad AFTER UPDATE triggers are inspected and
replaced under schema init without an FTS rebuild (WHEN clauses already
guarded content correctness; OF skips non-content status writes that
saturated disk I/O on large state.db).
Tests: tests/test_fts_update_of_narrowing.py (4)
E2E guard for the salvaged PR #71755: database.cache_size/mmap_size/
temp_store from config.yaml must reach the writer connection, the
read-only cross-profile attach, and the WAL per-thread reader — and a
default install (no database: keys) must keep byte-identical SQLite
defaults on every connection type. Also covers integer-coercion
rejection of garbage values for the three new keys.
cache_size uses -16000 (not the doc example -2000) because -2000 is
SQLite's compiled-in default and would not discriminate a regression.
Cross-PR interaction fix: #77714 (salvage of #71775) changed
_available_entries to return (available, pending_refresh) while #77631
(salvage of #67642) added next_available_at() which still truthiness-
tests the bare return. A non-empty tuple is always truthy — even
([], []) — so the reset-aware gate silently returned None ('no wait
info') for every exhausted pool, disabling the feature #77631 shipped.
Unpack the tuple and test the available list.
Also adapts the lock-probe test for the RLock introduced by #77714
(same-thread non-blocking acquire always succeeds on an RLock; probe
from a helper thread instead).
```
Error: optimization failed: no such table: messages_fts_trigram
No data was lost. Re-run to resume.
```
on any install where the trigram FTS index is legitimately absent. The failure is
deterministic — re-running can never make progress, because the crash happens at the same
point every time — so the database is permanently stuck on the legacy high-footprint FTS
layout with no supported way forward.
Observed on a 5.4 GB production `state.db`. After the fix the same database optimized
successfully and shrank to 3.3 GB.
The trigram index is absent whenever the runtime cannot maintain it. On a SQLite build
without the `trigram` tokenizer, `_ensure_fts_schema()` returns `False`, so `__init__`
leaves `self._trigram_available = False` and no `messages_fts_trigram` table on disk. This
is a **supported degraded runtime**, not damage — CJK/substring search falls back to
`LIKE` and everything else works normally. `_is_fts5_unavailable_error()` and
`_warn_trigram_unavailable()` exist specifically to make this path graceful.
Two code paths write the boundary sweep for the deferred FTS rebuild, and only one of them
respects that flag:
| Function | Trigram `INSERT` guarded? |
|---|---|
| `fts_rebuild_step()` | ✅ `if include_trigram:` where `include_trigram = self._trigram_available` |
| `_fts_rebuild_finish()` | ❌ unconditional |
`_fts_rebuild_finish()` runs the boundary sweep at the *end* of the backfill. Its
unguarded `INSERT INTO messages_fts_trigram …` raises `OperationalError`, which propagates
out of `optimize_fts_storage()` and aborts the entire optimization — *after* the backfill
has already completed. Hence the characteristic output showing 100% progress immediately
before the error:
```
Rebuilding index: 100% (909,671/909,671)
Error: optimization failed: no such table: messages_fts_trigram
```
There is a second, quieter consequence. The teardown phase that reclaims the demoted
`fts_v22_trash_*` shadow tables runs *after* the backfill phase in
`optimize_fts_storage()`. Because the crash happens before teardown is ever reached, those
tables are never emptied or dropped — so the space the migration was supposed to reclaim
stays allocated indefinitely, and the leftover trash tables look (misleadingly) like
evidence of a half-finished migration.
Build a populated v23 database, set the deferred-rebuild markers, then reopen it on a
runtime where `_ensure_fts_schema('messages_fts_trigram', …)` returns `False` (exactly
what a SQLite build without the trigram tokenizer produces) and call
`optimize_fts_storage()`:
```
[precondition] trigram absent, _trigram_available=False, rebuild pending ✓
RED ✗ optimize_fts_storage raised OperationalError: no such table: messages_fts_trigram
```
With this patch applied, unchanged harness:
```
optimize_fts_storage returned {'ok': True, 'vacuumed': None}
GREEN ✓ optimize ok; markers cleared; base FTS 'zebra' -> 200 hits
```
Full harness and transcripts in `TEST-EVIDENCE.md`.
Gate the sweep on `self._trigram_available`, exactly as `fts_rebuild_step()` already does:
```python
include_trigram = self._trigram_available
def _do(conn):
...
if include_trigram:
conn.execute("INSERT INTO messages_fts_trigram(...) ...")
```
The base `messages_fts` sweep and the marker cleanup are untouched, so the rebuild still
finalizes correctly and the index remains complete for every row it is responsible for.
The fix does not disable or weaken search to dodge the error — the regression tests assert
that base FTS still returns results afterwards.
`TestFtsRebuildFinishWithoutTrigram` in `tests/test_hermes_state.py`:
- `test_rebuild_finish_skips_trigram_when_unavailable` — drives `_fts_rebuild_finish()`
directly on a trigram-less runtime; asserts it completes, clears both rebuild markers,
and leaves base FTS searchable.
- `test_optimize_fts_storage_succeeds_without_trigram` — end-to-end through the public
`optimize_fts_storage()` entry point; asserts `ok=True`, markers cleared, search intact.
Both use the existing `_NoTrigramConnection` helper already in the file. Both fail on
`main` with `no such table: messages_fts_trigram` and pass with this patch.
`tests/test_hermes_state.py` passes in full (463 tests → 465 with these two). `ruff` clean.
This PR is the crash only.
A companion PR narrows `_db_opens_cleanly()` so that
`hermes sessions repair --check-only` stops reporting a write-broken FTS schema as
healthy — the gap that makes this class of problem hard to diagnose in the first place.
The two are independent and can land in either order.
Review folds on the #71775 salvage (dossier findings 1+2):
- self._lock becomes an RLock and the mutation primitives
(_replace_entry, _persist) are now self-locking, so the deferred
single-use-token refresh path — which deliberately runs its
cross-process flock + OAuth network I/O OUTSIDE the pool lock —
still serializes its pool mutations against concurrent
select()/rotation. In-lock callers re-acquire reentrantly.
- Dropped _refresh_pending_entries' redundant second _replace_entry:
_refresh_entry already merges the refreshed entry internally.
Adds tests/agent/test_credential_pool_deferred_refresh.py pinning both
invariants: select() must NOT hold the lock during the refresh window
(the PR's whole point), and the post-refresh mutations MUST contend on
the lock (blocking-thread probe).
select() and acquire_lease() held self._lock during the entire
_available_entries() loop, which for openai-codex and xai-oauth providers
includes a cross-process file lock (_auth_store_lock) plus OAuth token
refresh HTTP POST. The lock timeout can exceed 20 seconds, blocking all
credential pool consumers across every gateway thread and subagent.
Collect single-use-token refresh entries under the lock, then execute the
refreshes outside it. On success the refreshed entry is merged back into
the pool and re-selected. Non-single-use providers (anthropic, nous)
continue refreshing inside the lock since their refresh is a simple HTTP
POST with no cross-process coordination.
Review fold on the #67642 salvage: next_available_at() called
_available_entries() — which prunes DEAD entries, syncs tokens, and
persists — and iterated self._entries with no lock, racing concurrent
select()/rotation exactly as has_available()'s comment warns. Wrap the
method body in self._lock and pin it with a non-blocking-acquire probe
test.
restore_primary_runtime retries the primary every turn once the 60s
transient cooldown clears. For subscription-window limits (Claude
Pro/Max 5h windows, Codex weekly caps) the reset is hours or days away,
so every retry is a guaranteed failure costing two provider switches
and two prompt-cache invalidations per turn.
Add CredentialPool.next_available_at() (earliest reset across exhausted
entries; None when available now or no reset info) and gate the restore
on it: skip while the primary's pool says nobody can serve, restore on
the first turn after the reset elapses. Fail-open: any gate error or
missing reset info falls through to the existing per-turn retry, so
recovery can never be later than today. Cross-provider fallbacks
consult the PRIMARY's pool (not the attached fallback pool), reusing
the loaded pool for the existing rebind to keep auth reads at one per
restore.
Every hashed bundle chunk under /assets/ was served with no caching
directives, so each dashboard load re-fetched (or at best revalidated)
every JS/CSS chunk. Those filenames carry a Vite content hash — the
bytes behind a given URL can never change; a rebuild mints new
filenames referenced by a freshly served index.html.
Mark them Cache-Control: public, max-age=31536000, immutable:
- the /assets StaticFiles mount, via a subclass that stamps the header
on 200s only (404s stay uncached — a rebuild can create the file),
- serve_css, preserving its X-Forwarded-Prefix url() rewrites for
/fonts/, /fonts-terminal/, /ds-assets/, /assets/.
index.html keeps no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate — it is the
mutable entry point that binds users to the current hashes.
The original PR also added hand-rolled per-request gzip compression of
asset responses; that part is deliberately dropped. This server is a
localhost-default dashboard backend: compressing every response on the
CPU to save loopback bandwidth is a pessimization, and callers that
front it with a real proxy already get compression there.
Salvaged from PR #28543 (idea by @sea-monsters; gzip groups dropped as
described above).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
le=100 would 422 real desktop callers: sessions-settings fetches
archived at limit=200, the command palette lists at 200, and the
electron remote-merge over-fetches limit+offset (exceeds 100 at
offset>=81, and its .catch(()=>null) silently drops remote sessions).
Clamp must sit above real client maxima. New test pins limit=200 w/
offset.
Re-derivation of aydnOktay's twin clamp PRs onto current main (the
session-list endpoints moved into web_routers/; the analytics endpoints
gained asyncio.to_thread wrappers since the originals):
- limit le=100 on /api/sessions, /api/sessions/search and the
/api/profiles/sessions fan-out (one unbounded request could drag every
session row + correlated-subquery preview work out of SQLite, times
every profile's state.db on the fan-out).
- days ge=1 le=365 on /api/analytics/usage + /api/analytics/models
(huge or non-positive values force full-history InsightsEngine work or
inverted windows; the UI only offers 7/30/90 presets).
FastAPI Query bounds reject at the validation layer (422). 8 new tests;
both clamp classes mutation-checked (clamp removed -> its tests fail).
The 2-line alias had zero production consumers (web_server calls
get_usage_breakdown directly). Tests rewired onto the real API; the
contracts they pin are unchanged. Stale test docstring fixed.
On dashboard-only sessions nothing else executes check_fn warmers (they
live only in the tool-schema build), so the hub's read-only cache lookup
would report auth_required=False forever. On a cache miss, schedule a
deduplicated daemon-thread probe off the request path; the short hub TTL
surfaces the verdict on the next fetch.
The curator LLM review loop (_run_llm_review) built its AIAgent without
enabled_toolsets, so it advertised the full default catalog (~30 tools plus the
context_engine lcm_* family) on every call. The fork uses only four tools, fixed
by its own system prompt, with no dispatch path to the rest, so ~26 tool schemas
shipped on every request as dead weight: ~7K input tokens per call on a loop that
makes 50-100 calls per consolidation pass.
Restrict the fork to enabled_toolsets=["skills", "terminal"], the same tools the
prompt already names. Behavior-neutral: the prompt held the model to these tools
and nothing routed calls to the others. Mirrors the background_review fork
(background_review.py:788-794). Call-site only; AIAgent already forwards the kwarg.
Adds test_review_fork_restricts_toolsets_to_skills_and_terminal (captures the
constructor kwarg) and test_review_fork_toolset_surface_is_skills_plus_terminal
(pins the resolved surface).
Rebase fold on the salvaged gate:
- is_trivial_prompt/TRIVIAL_PROMPT_RE move to agent/memory_provider (the
ABC both the core gate and providers already import) — one source of
truth; honcho's _TRIVIAL_PROMPT_RE now aliases it, turn_context and the
queue_prefetch_all warm path (a sibling site main grew after the PR's
base) both use it
- tests: gate tests at the prefetch call site (mutation-checked), shared
classifier tests incl. prefix-collision guards (k8s/yolo/note/supper),
and honcho dialectic-machinery tests re-driven with a substantive prompt
("hello" became trivial by design — those tests exercise thread cadence,
not the classifier)
Salvage of PR #25350 (commits 88ffede2d + 2b848a0b2 + 3136dc63a, squashed
and ported): the run_agent.py prefetch site the PR gated has since moved
into agent/turn_context.py's build_turn_context(), so the trivial-query
gate lands there instead.
- Gate the per-turn memory_manager.prefetch_all() on a trivial-prompt
check so greetings/acknowledgements ('hi!', 'thanks', 'ok') no longer
block the turn on provider network round-trips or inject stale context.
- Extend honcho's _TRIVIAL_PROMPT_RE with greetings and a trailing
punctuation class so 'hey!' / 'hello.' classify as trivial.
- Add honcho classifier tests for greeting forms.
Follow-ups on the salvaged bounded-read fix:
- refresh flow: the non-200 branch reads a STREAMED body, which fails
(ReadError/StreamClosed) once the httpx.Client context has exited —
moved inside the context. Repro + regression test use a real socket
server (MockTransport buffers in memory and cannot catch this).
- truncation guard: >limit bodies end with ...[truncated] (mutation-checked
against the is_stream_consumed fallback).
- test mocks now model the streamed-read surface (is_stream_consumed,
iter_bytes, client.send) so non-200 paths exercise the real bounded read.
The as_completed drain + `with` join made the parallel version WORSE than
sequential main in the common case (first endpoint succeeds fast, others
slow/unreachable): main returned at first success, the parallel version
waited for every straggler. Now: after each completion, walk endpoints in
priority order and return as soon as a success is unbeatable (all
higher-priority probes already finished); pool uses shutdown(wait=False) so
losers drain in the background. Mutation-checked: removing the early exit
makes the new timing test fail (8.2s vs <1.5s).
Rebase fold: the original PR predates ZAI_ENDPOINTS growing per-endpoint
probe_models lists; the parallel worker now preserves that candidate-model
fallback loop (was: scalar model). Tests (both mutation-checked):
- candidate-model fallback within one endpoint worker
- ZAI_ENDPOINTS priority order wins over completion order
- all-fail returns None
Follow-up on the salvaged pair: the original guard's `not msg_id` arm let an
id-less internal/synthetic event erase a tracking entry a concurrently-queued
id-bearing message's drain task still needs for recall matching (id-less
events never write entries in _dispatch_inbound_event, so they must never
pop). Tests cover: normal cleanup, id-less non-erasure, overwritten-entry
ownership handoff, TTL eviction + fresh-entry survival.
Adds two regression tests for the #59077 batch: (1) _get_session_rich_rows_batch(compact_rows=True) uses the schema-derived compact projection (no system_prompt, git_branch/git_repo_root kept); (2) list_sessions_rich(compact_rows=True) threads compact_rows through the compression-tip projection call site. Mutation-checked: hardcoding compact_rows=False at the call site fails test 2.
pierrenode