Startup only quarantined a 0-byte / all-NUL state.db. A file whose first page
was clobbered with record bytes (#102198) went straight to sqlite3.connect,
which raised "file is not a database" and deleted the -wal sidecar — the one
piece of evidence that could have been recovered.
`has_invalid_sqlite_header_preopen` generalises the zeroed probe (zeroed is a
subset of "no SQLite header"; same live-connection contract, never raises).
`quarantine_invalid_state_db` moves the file AND its -wal/-shm aside as
`state.db.<zeroed|notadb>-<ts>-<pid>.bak` before anything opens it; a fresh
DB is created as before.
Re-authored on current main (the quarantine helpers moved to
hermes_state_dbfile.py in d15c61b5dc); one regression test proves the
notadb case is quarantined with its sidecars and the new DB passes
integrity_check.
Refs #102198 (the write-after-SIGTERM that clobbers page 0 is not addressed
here; this preserves the evidence instead of destroying it).
The overflow-terminal path ends the turn without reaching finalize_turn, so
a transcript that overflowed right after a tool batch ended on a raw tool
result; strict providers reject the next user turn (tool -> user). Close it
with the same final text, mirroring the truncated-tool-call terminal above.
Also: classify once before either log so an overflow no longer emits a
"so the loop can continue" WARNING followed by the contradicting "NOT
seeding" one; reset the stale-streak breaker once for both branches; drop
the "compression could not recover it" wording (this path never reached
compression); trim the test file to the three tests that bind behaviour
(stream -> terminal stub; 413 stays non-terminal; the terminal ends the
turn, closes the tool tail, carries compression_exhausted).
Address review P1s (andrexibiza) on #106266:
1. The overflow-terminal exit in recover_from_truncation now forwards the
#98722 typed compression_exhausted bit (partial_result/end_turn gained the
flag) so the gateway resets/moves future input to a clean session instead
of leaving the bloated durable session authoritative for the next turn.
2. _overflow_terminal is scoped to FailoverReason.context_overflow ONLY.
payload_too_large (413) has its own byte-scored recovery owner
(turn_overflow._recover_payload_too_large, #88960/#47339) that must not be
bypassed; a post-delta 413 keeps its normal continuation stub. Regression
covers both lanes.
Tests: unit asserts result compression_exhausted=True on the marker; a
real streamed partial hitting a 413 payload-too-large error keeps content and
is not terminal. 50 streaming/continuation/gateway regressions pass.
When a stream delivered text and then died on a context-overflow /
payload-too-large error, the partial content (often tens of KB) was seeded as
a length-continuation stub, growing the transcript monotonically. In a
session whose transcript cannot be compressed back under budget
(protect_last_n covers everything -> no_progress, or the summary would
itself be larger -> would_grow), every later request is larger than the one
that just failed — an unrecoverable loop where the user sees a 30+ minute
fake hang and the only remedy is killing the session (#106260).
classify_api_error already labels these errors context_overflow /
payload_too_large (should_compress=True). _partial_stream_stub now returns
an EMPTY stub marked _overflow_terminal for that class instead of seeding
the recovered text, and recover_from_truncation treats the marker as
terminal: the turn ends via the recovery contract with a clear message
(start /new) and the transcript is not polluted with the partial.
Normal partials (network stall, output-cap truncation, tool-call drops) are
unchanged — only the overflow error class changes behavior.
Tests: stub marker + empty content; a real streamed partial hitting a
'maximum context length' error returns the terminal stub; recover_from_
truncation ends the turn (no fragment/nudge appended) on the marker while a
normal stub still runs the continuation path. 67 streaming/continuation
regressions pass.
_maybe_inject_run_budget_wrapup() appends its wrap-up notice to the newest
role:"tool" message in place, with no _DB_PERSISTED_MARKER check. Its sibling,
_maybe_inject_iteration_budget_warning(), got exactly this guard added in the
same recent saga (turn_iteration_prep.py), with the comment "an older turn may
already be cached."
The reachability is structural, not an edge case: _maybe_inject_run_budget_wrapup
is only ever called from prepare_iteration(), at the START of the next iteration
-- strictly after tool_executor.py's _flush_session_db_after_tool_progress has
already flushed and marked the previous iteration's tool row persisted. So every
successful injection was mutating an already-persisted row: the wire request for
that turn carried the notice, but the durable transcript never did, diverging
replay from the live bytes and invalidating the provider's prompt-cache prefix
from that row onward.
Fix:
- Add the same _DB_PERSISTED_MARKER guard to _maybe_inject_run_budget_wrapup,
scoped to the specific tool row the reversed scan lands on (not just
messages[-1], since this function -- unlike its sibling -- scans backward for
the newest tool row rather than only checking the tail).
- Wire _maybe_inject_run_budget_wrapup into _flush_session_db_after_tool_progress
(pre-flush), mirroring exactly how _maybe_inject_iteration_budget_warning is
wired in both places. Without this, the guard alone would make the notice stop
firing in the common case, since prepare_iteration's call site almost always
hits an already-persisted row -- the pre-flush call site is what actually lets
it land in durable bytes.
Verified empirically: read the real call graph (tool_executor.py's three
_flush_session_db_after_tool_progress call sites cover every tool-completion
path) to confirm the guard's premise, then added an end-to-end test using a real
AIAgent + SessionDB that flushes and checks the persisted row for the notice
text. Mutation-verified: reverting the two production files drops exactly the 2
new/updated assertions (28 pass, 2 fail); reapplying restores green (30 passed).
Also ran the sibling iteration-budget-warning and /steer suites (71 passed) to
check for interaction regressions -- none.
The old tests encoded the skip (agent never constructed, [drift_skip] text,
alert-once bit). New invariants, proven red on origin/main: an unpinned job
with model_snapshot=A / provider_snapshot=P runs with AIAgent(model=A) and
resolve_runtime_provider(requested=P) after the global default moved to B/Q;
an explicit job pin still beats the snapshot; cron.model / cron.model_provider
still beat the snapshot; a legacy job without a snapshot follows the global
default. test_cron_drift_alert_once.py is deleted with the bit it tested; the
config-notice and impact-summary tests drop guard_enabled / model_drift_guard;
the desktop toast test asserts the informational copy.
Cron jobs are scheduled work bound to the source profile and its origin
channel. A clone that inherited cron/jobs.json fired every job twice: two
gateways with identical job ids running the same weekly jobs in parallel
(double spend, duplicate deliveries) until one gateway died.
Root cause: `cron` was not in _CLONE_ALL_HISTORY_EXCLUDE_ROOT, so the
copytree in _clone_all_into carried jobs.json along. Add it to the
per-profile history exclude set (applies to any source, CLI, dashboard
and TUI/desktop RPC all funnel through create_profile), recreate the
_PROFILE_DIRS skeleton after the copy so the clone still has an empty
cron/ (and sessions/), and say so in the CLI summary line and docs.
--clone (config-only) never copied cron; export/backup keep cron as
before (an archive is a portable snapshot, not a second live profile).
Drop the bare "tool.content" pattern (any 400 mentioning tool.content in a
non-list context would be sent through the image-strip path) and the profile
flag snapshot test; the behaviour tests (classifier verdict + proactive
downgrade) already pin the contract.
- Declare `supports_vision_tool_messages=False` and `supports_vision=True` on `opencode_go` provider profile in `plugins/model-providers/opencode-zen/__init__.py`
- Route HTTP 422 errors through `_IMAGE_TOOL_RULES` and add `tool.content.str`, `tool.content`, and `input should be a valid string` patterns to `_MULTIMODAL_TOOL_CONTENT_PATTERNS` in `agent/error_classifier.py`
- Add unit tests for OpenCode Go proactive tool result downgrade, HTTP 422 Console Go classification, and profile capability contract in `tests/run_agent/test_multimodal_tool_content_recovery.py` and `tests/plugins/model_providers/test_opencode_go_profile.py`
run_backup() previously wrote "hermes-backup-<timestamp>.zip" on every
invocation without deleting old ones. Hourly callers accumulated 157 zips
(14 GiB). Add _prune_run_backups() to keep the newest N (default 3,
configurable via backup.run_backup_keep or --keep CLI flag).
Two picker-freshness defects in cached_fetch_api_models():
1. The disk cache row was keyed on base_url only, with the credential
fingerprint stored inside the row. N custom_providers entries sharing
one proxy URL with different keys (#106184) took turns overwriting the
single slot; every sibling then failed the fingerprint check, got an
empty catalog, and disappeared from the Desktop pickers (which hide
zero-model rows). Key on url#fingerprint so each credential owns a row.
2. cache_only opens (Desktop model.options without refresh) served a
past-TTL row for up to 7 days without ever revalidating, so a model
loaded on a non-current local endpoint stayed invisible until the user
found "Refresh Models". Serve the stale row AND spawn the same
off-thread SWR refresh the blocking path uses; the caller still never
waits on the network.
Live repro (two rows, one URL, keys A/B; real loopback /v1/models):
GUI no-probe open before {'proxy-a': ['model-A1'], 'proxy-b': ['model-B1']}
after {'proxy-a': ['model-A1','model-A2'], 'proxy-b': ['model-B1']}
`hermes setup --reset` calls `save_config(copy.deepcopy(DEFAULT_CONFIG))`,
which writes `get_hermes_home()/config.yaml` — the exact file the backup
block a few lines below copies to `config.yaml.bak.<timestamp>`. Because the
copy ran after the reset, the backup captured the defaults that had just been
written, not the user's config. The one invocation where a backup matters most
produced a worthless one, and the original was unrecoverable.
The block's own comment already claimed it runs "before setup modifies it";
on the --reset path that was false. Move it above the --reset branch so it
captures the true pre-setup state on every path.
Also report the backup location on the --reset path. --reset is destructive
and can leave the wizard early (the non-interactive return exits before the
end-of-setup notice), so a user who just lost their config was never told
where the copy is. The end-of-setup notice is unchanged for the normal path
and is suppressed only when it has already been shown, so no run prints it
twice; the shared wording now lives in one helper.
Behaviour otherwise preserved: `copy2` (config.yaml holds secrets, so mode is
preserved), the try/except fallback to `_backup_path = None`, and the existing
notice for the full-setup path.
Follow-ups deliberately out of scope: pruning accumulated `.bak.*` files, and
printing the notice on the other early-return paths (--portal, section runs).
Refs #3522
Four writers each dropped their own uniquely-named copy of config.yaml next to
the real file and none of them ever deleted anything: hermes setup
(config.yaml.bak.YYYYMMDD_HHMMSS, one per run even with no change), the
corrupt-YAML snapshot (config.yaml.corrupt.<ts>.bak), hermes migrate xai
(config.yaml.bak-pre-migrate-xai-<ts>) and the Docker boot migration
(config.yaml.bak-<ts>, .env.bak-<ts>). A home dir accumulated a dozen variants
with no way to tell which mattered.
hermes_cli/config_backups.py::backup_config is now the single writer:
backups/config/config.yaml.<reason>.<YYYYMMDD-HHMMSS>, skipped when the newest
copy for that reason is byte-identical, rotated to the newest five per reason.
backups/ is already excluded from full backups so nothing nests. Legacy
siblings written by the old schemes are moved into the dir on first use;
hand-named copies (config.yaml.bak-my-note) are left alone.
Live: three `hermes setup --non-interactive` runs against an unchanged config
went from three .bak files in HERMES_HOME to one pre-setup copy under
backups/config/; repeated loads of broken YAML produce one corrupt copy
instead of one per process (deduped by content).
The ledger in verification_evidence.db exists only to feed the verify-on-stop
guard, but the recorder kept running on every foreground terminal command and
every file edit after #53552 turned the guard off by default. Users who never
opted in still accumulated a multi-MB database (7 MB / 4.6k rows on one install).
Every ledger entry point (record_terminal_result, record_verify_run,
mark_workspace_edited, verification_status) now checks verify_on_stop_enabled()
first and returns without opening or creating the database when the guard is
off. verification_status reports {"status": "disabled"} in that case; no client
consumes the verification.status RPC yet, so nothing downstream changes.
Existing ledger tests pin HERMES_VERIFY_ON_STOP=1 since they exercise the ledger
itself; the new test proves the off path never creates the file (red on base).
A Desktop-owned `hermes serve --isolated --ssh-session-token-file ...` child
is spawned with an explicit `--profile <name>` when the connection names a
remote profile, and with no flag for the remote root home. Without the flag,
`_apply_profile_override` read the remote host's sticky `active_profile`
file and re-homed the backend into whatever profile the user last selected
on that machine's CLI. Settings then read one config.yaml while the remote
gateway wrote another, so model picks and toggles "didn't stick".
Treat the SSH token flag as a fixed-identity marker, the same way
supervisor-launched gateway children are (#74872): a Desktop backend's
profile is chosen by the client, never by the host.
Live repro (before/after, temp HERMES_HOME with active_profile=foo):
serve --isolated --ssh-session-token-file ... hermes_home=<root>/profiles/foo -> <root>
same + --profile foo hermes_home=<root>/profiles/foo (unchanged)
serve (no token file, user CLI) hermes_home=<root>/profiles/foo (unchanged)
`slash.exec` runs on the RPC pool, outside any turn, so `/review` dispatched the
reviewer with no HERMES_UI_SESSION_ID and no steer authority bound. delegate_task
registered the child with `owner_session_id=None`, `subagent.list` (owner-scoped)
returned nothing for the parent session, and the Desktop status stack's 5s
snapshot poll reconciled the live `subagent.start` row away — the user saw only
"Review started. Results will return here." with no subagent card.
Bind the same session identity a turn binds (`_set_session_context(...,
ui_session_id=sid)` + `_current_runtime_session_record`) around `start_review`,
and clear it after. The reviewer now registers under the parent sid with the
request transport as authority, so `subagent.list`, steer, stop and the Desktop
roster all see it.
Live repro (tui_gateway stdio, real OpenRouter reviewer):
before: registry owner_session_id=None, owner_transport=NoneType;
subagent.list -> {"subagents": []}
after: owner_session_id=<parent sid>, owner_transport=StdioTransport;
subagent.list -> [{"goal": "Review recent work", "status": "running", ...}]
With account-identity matching gone, the providers.<id> block consolidation
only fired on shared token material. A historical fork (same copied pool-row
id, profile rotated, both pairs diverged) then healed the pool row into root
but left root's providers.openai-codex block on the spent pair; root's next
load_pool() re-seeds its device_code row FROM that block and undid the heal.
_HealPass now records that a profile pool row matched root by copied id or
shared tokens and passes that verdict to _heal_forked_provider_block, which
accepts it as lineage proof. No account-identity guessing is restored; an
independent same-account grant (no id/token match) is still left alone.
Follow-up to simpolism's #106177.
A quarantined/replaced/split-generation handle must never run a full-file rewrite or an FTS5
'optimize': both read damaged or foreign pages and commit the result back, turning contained,
diagnosable corruption into an amplified one. Same guard _execute_write applies to every write.
Salvaged from #102092 onto current main: the _try_wal_checkpoint half landed via #106315's
_quarantine_reason(), so only the two rewrite sites remain.
Follow-up to #106317. Typing the steer row (display_kind="steer") for the renderer and the
alternation-repair guard collided with the convention that any display_kind on a user row means
scaffolding: is_user_originated_turn / _is_actionable_user_turn / split_user_originated_turn
returned False for it (tail anchoring, auto-focus, dispatcher views, resume counts) while
_is_real_user_message returned True (anchor restoration) — the two predicate families disagreed
on the same row, and list_recent_user_messages (/undo, /rewind) skipped it in SQL. A steer
carries full user authority; the steer kind is now whitelisted in all four.
Also: the pre-API drain's requeue tail reuses _requeue_pending_steer instead of a copy; the TUI
history projection compares against STEER_DISPLAY_KIND; the steer() docstring describes the row.
Follow-up to #106315. vacuum() ran PRAGMA wal_checkpoint + VACUUM + wal_checkpoint(TRUNCATE) on
self._conn with no quarantine check; the only guard it inherited (optimize_fts raising
DeletedWalGenerationError) was swallowed by its own try/except and the rewrite proceeded on the
split-brain handle. Mutation on main: vacuum() returned 2 and rewrote pages after the write stop.
Follow-up to #106316. send_final_ledgered resolved the live adapter internally and
_send_final_text resolved it a second time for _schedule_ephemeral_delete; a reconnect between
the two sent the delete to a transport that never owned result.message_id (the ownership rule
_final_delivery_adapter documents). The bracket now returns (result, adapter).
The queued lane carried the ledger identity through MessageEvent.message_id while the PR added
ledger_message_id for exactly that; it now uses the typed field, and the ledger read is
getattr-tolerant of duck-typed events (a missing attribute was swallowed as "ledger skipped").
Follow-up to #106312. _preflight_timeout_result carries the prior history without this turn's
user row (#7100); with a repeated prompt ("continue") the verbatim scan resolved to the
historical copy and exported it as this turn's proven boundary — the exact relabeling the export
exists to prevent. Nothing is exported for that envelope now.
The trailing `agent._persist_user_message_idx = idx` ran after finalize_turn had already flushed
the transcript, so it never influenced a persist and the next turn reset it: dead state, removed.
`kwargs.get("target") is sched._run_callback` is always False (a bound method is a fresh object
per access), so the fake never returned Boom and the _dispatch failure branch went untested;
the test passed on the normal worker. Compare with == and assert the interception happened
(mutation: retiring the handle on start failure now fails the test).
The thread-count assertions sampled while per-fire workers were still live; quiesce every
handle with cancel(wait=) before sampling so the count is deterministic (AGENTS.md: timing tests
must not assume a quiet runner).
Follow-up to #106308.
_apply_stored_session_runtime was a line-for-line copy of the first half of
_restore_session_model (stored-model guard, session_gateway_runtime, bare-custom heal,
model/provider-changed check). Extract that pure decision into
cli_model_switch_mixin.stored_session_route and have both resume paths call it; the
one-shot keeps only the _ModelChoice mapping and the drop-ambient-key rule.
main.py stops re-normalising `resume` — _resolve_chat_session_args already did.
Tests trimmed from 20 to 13: near-duplicate unit tests of the private helpers go, the
end-to-end _run_agent contracts (stored runtime + reopen; explicit --model wins) and the
empty-session-keeps-id case stay.
Review fixes (#105957):
- A resumed one-shot ignored the session's stored model/provider runtime:
_resolve_model_and_provider()/resolve_runtime_provider() ran before
_load_resume_target(), which only loaded the session id + transcript, so an
ambient config (e.g. openrouter/ambient-model) served the resumed transcript
instead of the stored route (custom:stored/stored-model). The stored runtime
is now applied before runtime resolution, with the same contract as the
interactive _restore_session_model(): stored model/provider/base_url/api_mode
replace the ambient choice unless --model was passed explicitly, and a
changed provider drops the ambient api_key so resolution re-fetches
credentials for the restored endpoint.
- Passing the resumed id to AIAgent did not reopen the already-ended session
row: end_session() only writes rows whose ended_at is null and the
existing-row upsert never clears the end fields, so the resumed turn was
recorded under a session that stayed closed and its new lifecycle boundary
was lost. _load_resume_target() now reopens the row (best effort), same as
the interactive resume does before continuing.
Review finding on #105957: `_load_resume_target` returned None for a
resolved session with no stored messages, so `hermes -z "hello" -c <title>
--create-if-missing` recorded the turn under a freshly minted session id and
the just-created titled session stayed empty. Preserve `resolved` unconditionally — the interactive /resume path keeps the selected id for an
empty session too; only the history replay is empty. Regression tests pin the
durable id for both a plain empty session and an empty compression-chain head.
The -z exit path accepted --resume/-c in the parser but never forwarded
args.resume: every resumed one-shot turn silently started a fresh session,
so each wire request carried only [system, current user] and the model
lost all prior context (reported against Ollama/custom OpenAI-compatible
endpoints, but provider-independent).
Normalize session args (latest/title/--continue/--in + cwd restore) via
the chat path's _resolve_chat_session_args before the oneshot exit path
takes over, then load the resumed transcript in _run_agent through the
same contract the interactive CLI uses (compression-chain redirect,
safe-resume guard, session_meta filtering) and continue the existing
session id instead of creating a new one. An explicit --resume of an
unknown session now fails loudly instead of starting fresh.
"hermes" matches the profile-id regex, so canonicalising it unconditionally at the RPC
boundary misrouted a genuine <root>/profiles/hermes to the default profile. Alias only
when no such named profile exists; ".hermes" can never be a real id and stays aliased.
Also: profile_name_for_home collapses its duplicated pre/post-resolve block into one
loop over (path, resolved path) and drops the bare "parent named profiles" fallback
that bypassed named_profile_home's root check; _profile_home goes back to main's
single resolve() comparison; the symlink-loop assertion in the target-unavailable
test is no longer wrapped in a try/except that could silently skip it.
Both steer sites now build the row through one helper, prompt_builder.steer_user_row:
a role:user row with display_kind="steer" and no leading blank lines. The alternation
repair (_merge_consecutive_users) skips a steer-typed prev row, so a run that ended
right after a steered batch (Ctrl-C, interrupt) does not get the next real prompt
merged INTO the already-persisted steer row — which would have rewritten it in place
and re-broken live≠replay parity, the exact class this PR fixes.
TUI/desktop history projects the steer row as the user's own words instead of the
model-facing marker wrapper; 'steer' joins the display_kind union. The compression
anchor scan keeps its tool-row branch for transcripts persisted before this change and
its docstring says so.
Second site of the same bug class #104444 fixes in apply_pending_steer_to_tool_results:
_inject_steer_into_newest_tool_result (the drain that runs when a /steer lands during an
API call) mutated the newest role:tool row in place. That row was already flushed
append-only, so the replayed history diverged from the live request bytes at the
injection point and broke the prompt cache exactly like the post-batch path.
Deliver it the same way: a standalone user row inserted right after the newest tool
result (not yet persisted, so the next flush writes it to the transcript). Restash when
there is no tool row yet, unchanged. Stale comments claiming steer lands "in the newest
tool result" and agent/AGENTS.md's alternation rule now describe the real shape.
The cherry-picked commit carried an unrelated hunk repointing three patch()
targets back to run_agent.* — those are PLUGIN-COMPAT re-exports, off limits
in-tree (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py; removed 2026-09-14). Keep main's
model_tools.* / agent.process_bootstrap.OpenAI targets.
`apply_pending_steer_to_tool_results` used to smear the steer text onto
the last `role:tool` message's content. That tool row had already been
flushed to the session store and carries `_DB_PERSISTED_MARKER`; the
append-only persistence never rewrites it, so the replayable transcript
diverged from the live request bytes at the injection point — resumed
sessions (surface switch / process restart / background-review close)
missed the provider prompt cache (75-85% hit) and the user's mid-run
instructions were never part of the durable history.
The steer is now emitted as a standalone `role:user` message (marker
text preserved):
- role alternation stays legal: assistant(tool_calls) -> tool -> user is
the documented 'user jumped in mid-run' pattern that
`repair_message_sequence` deliberately keeps;
- the appended dict carries no `_DB_PERSISTED_MARKER`, so the next
`_flush_messages_to_session_db` writes it to the session store —
transcript bytes and replayed history finally agree, and the steer
becomes searchable/retrievable like any other user message;
- the no-tool-result fallback (interrupt) still requeues the steer, which
the caller then delivers as a normal next-turn user message.
Tests: TestSteerInjection updated for the new shape plus a persistability
assertion (no marker => flushable); tool-batch-segmentation malformed
scenario updated. steer + segmentation suites: 67 passed, 1 skipped.
retry_deferred_fts_recovery gated only on _db_corrupt ("mirrors _try_wal_checkpoint /
close") — after this PR it no longer mirrored them: on a replaced/lost-generation handle
the periodic housekeeping tick still ran FTS DDL/DML + commit, the same split-brain write
class as the #105670 checkpoint. One SessionDB._quarantine_reason() now decides for the
periodic checkpoint, close(), and the FTS retry, with the halt path's precedence
(replaced before generation loss) and the operator wording in one place.
Test: the periodic-checkpoint case folds into the close test (same setup), which now
also proves the FTS retry returns False without touching the file; the mutation with
main's schema sibling swapped in returns True (a rebuild ran).
AGENTS.md: a bare skipif(sys.platform != linux) is never listed by
scripts/ci/list_os_marked_tests.py, so the tests would run nowhere on the
OS lanes. The marker is the contract.
- close() and _try_wal_checkpoint() now skip when _db_replaced or _db_wal_generation_lost
(previously only _db_corrupt was checked) — prevents checkpointing stale-generation frames
into the main DB, which is the shutdown-time damage reported in #105670
- _halt_if_db_generation_changed() calls _disable_close_time_checkpoint() alongside the flag
set (3.12+: disables SQLite internal last-connection checkpoint too)
- Regression tests: halted handle must not run explicit PRAGMA checkpoint on close(),
halt must call setconfig(NO_CKPT_ON_CLOSE), periodic _try_wal_checkpoint() must skip
The queued lane re-implemented _send_final_text's record / send-with-retry / finalize
sequence by duck-typing four private adapter members from gateway/. Lift the bracket
into a public BasePlatformAdapter.send_final_ledgered(event, session_key, text,
metadata, *, reply_to, is_ephemeral_response); _send_final_text keeps only the
ephemeral-delete tail on top, the queued lane calls it with the inbound-id ledger event.
ledger_message_id is a real dataclass field now, read directly.
Tests trimmed from 18 to 8 invariants (bracket recorded+delivered; flood refusal stays a
failed ledger row; forum-topic identity; plain adapter keeps plain send; normal-lane
parity; chained/terminal/deeper-chain inbound ids). Still 6 red with main's
run_notifications.py swapped in.
The outer final send is bracketed by the adapter against the event that OPENED
the chain, so a terminal reply was recorded under the first message's id. When
two turns of one chain answered with the same text, the terminal reply computed
the earlier row's obligation id, replaced its outstanding row and marked it
delivered, so a first reply the platform had refused was never redelivered.
MessageEvent gains a documented ledger_message_id that the obligation hash
prefers, the queued follow-up returns the terminal turn's inbound id (innermost
wins on nested chains), and the handler sets it before the adapter brackets the
send. Reply routing is untouched: the anchor still comes from the event.
Three of the four new tests fail without this change; the whole tests/gateway
suite shows the same failure set before and after.
Now that a queued follow-up carries its raw inbound id, the gateway passes
persist_user_platform_id to run_conversation for that turn (run_turn_runner.py
only adds it when inbound_message_id is set). The real AIAgent accepts it; the
test's fake did not. Accept **kwargs, matching the real signature.
Round-2 review. _run_agent_deliver_first_response passed the turn's inbound id to
the queued lane, but the recursive _run_agent for a chained follow-up did not, so
the chained turn ran with inbound_message_id=None. In a Telegram forum topic (no
reply anchor) two chained follow-ups answering with the same text would then key
their queued-final obligations on None and collide. The recursive call now carries
pending_event's raw message id, with a test on the chained path.
The queued lane's ledger bracket used the reply anchor as the obligation's
message reference. The anchor is None wherever replies are not used (Telegram
forum topics, Slack reaction handoffs), so two turns in one topic answering
with the same text shared an obligation id and the second record overwrote
the first's outstanding row; the id also differed from the normal lane's.
The lane now runs the adapter's record / send-with-retry / finalize sequence
itself, keyed on turn_ctx.inbound_message_id like the normal lane, while the
anchor stays the reply target. Tests cover the forum-topic identity, the row
being `attempting` while the send is in flight, and the call site passing
both ids.
When a follow-up is queued behind a turn, the first response is delivered by
the queued lane before the follow-up runs. That lane called adapter.send bare
and discarded the result: no delivery-ledger obligation was recorded, so a
final refused there (flood control, a transport that had just died) was lost
for good. Neither the boot sweep nor the runtime redelivery could see it and
the follow-up ran as if the answer had landed.
Route the queued lane's text send through the adapter's _send_final_text, the
same ledger-bracketed method the normal lane uses: the obligation is recorded
before the send under the id the normal lane would compute for the same turn,
the result finalizes it, and the reply is marked notify-worthy like every
other final. The reconcile-by-edit path is unchanged; adapters without the
base contract and sends without a session key keep the plain send.
_same_server_route compared config_fingerprint alone, which by design excludes
env/headers/auth (so the schema cache survives a token rotation). Profile B with the
same URL but different headers/env therefore adopted profile A's live connection and
called tools as A. _connection_identity = route fingerprint + env + headers + auth mode,
used by both the adopt and the stale-removal checks.
Also collapses the three writers of _server_tool_scopes to two: the adoption loop
re-implemented in mcp_tool_discovery._select_new_servers is dropped —
register_connected_into_current_scope (which runs first in register_mcp_servers) is
the single adopter, and _register_candidates records scope for freshly registered tools.
The salvaged regression test exercised only repair_message_sequence and
reanchor_current_turn_user_idx — pre-existing helpers — so reverting the fix left it
green. It now drives prepare_iteration on a real AIAgent with adjacent user rows and
asserts the returned index addresses this turn's row and mirrors into
_persist_user_message_idx (red without the re-anchor: IndexError).
Both re-anchor sites (repair and compression restart) call
turn_context_compaction._reanchor instead of inlining "reanchor + mirror", so they
cannot drift. The export tests fold into one parametrized invariant plus the
run_conversation envelope test; the WHAT-restating comment shrinks to the WHY.
Hosts that settle their own transcript by index (hermes-webui) cannot prove which
row of result["messages"] is the current user turn once this loop rewrote history
(alternation repair, compaction, post-turn micro-compaction): the instance-side
_persist_user_message_idx predates those rewrites, and a text match relabels an
identical historical prompt and claims its old answer. Only the producer can
assert the coordinate against the exact list it returns.
run_conversation now wraps the turn (_run_conversation_turn) and stamps the pair
through export_current_turn_boundary on every envelope that leaves the loop
(success, partial/error, interrupt, retry-exhausted, tool-limit, preflight
timeout, codex runtime), computed on the final messages after finalize_turn and
micro-compaction. The pair is exported only when the addressed row is this turn's
user message verbatim (reanchor's last-match rule); a rewritten row exports
nothing so hosts fail closed. The final index is mirrored into
_persist_user_message_idx for the persist override.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_013gp366ijf39n4UUtJhZuMh