Simplify-pass follow-up on the #69653 salvage: the original code built
these patterns from a name loop; hand-expanding them into 10 literals
lost that single source. Tag-name tuples restore it (adding a 6th
reasoning tag is now a one-place change), and the gnarly named-function
pattern regained a pointer to its step-1c rationale. Byte-equivalence
of every rebuilt pattern verified programmatically (alternation-order
neutrality probed: the \b and > anchors make order irrelevant).
strip_think_blocks passed the same response-scrubbing strings through
re's pattern dispatcher on every response. Skills Guard repeated the
same work for 121 patterns against every scanned line.
Compile the existing expressions once and reuse Pattern.sub/search. Keep
each generic tool-call tag in its own paired expression so mismatched
openers retain their payload while existing stray-closer cleanup remains
unchanged.
Part of #33208
Salvaged from #32713 by @ErnestHysa.
Co-authored-by: ErnestHysa <takis312@hotmail.com>
A session's YOLO bypass lived only in the in-memory
tools.approval._session_yolo set (or the process-frozen --yolo env
var), so resuming a session in a fresh process silently reverted the
user's /yolo ON — dangerous commands started prompting again.
Persist a yolo_mode flag in the session row's model_config JSON and
restore it on every CLI resume path:
- SessionDB.set_session_yolo() merges the flag into model_config
(same lineage-preserving merge as update_session_runtime_lock);
SessionDB.session_yolo_enabled() reads it back, false on any parse
failure.
- /yolo toggle persists ON and OFF through the new helper; the
compression/branch session-id rotation carries the flag onto the
continuation row.
- --yolo launches record the flag at session creation (agent_init),
and a /yolo toggled before the lazily-created row exists is carried
into the creation-time model_config (_ensure_db_session).
- HermesCLI._restore_session_yolo() re-enables the bypass on startup
--resume/-c, the deferred init path, and mid-chat /resume, with a
visible '⚡ YOLO mode restored from session' notice. No-op under a
frozen process-wide --yolo and never enables on absent/garbage flags.
When an approval prompt expired without a response, every CLI-side path
collapsed the timeout into the same 'deny' choice as an explicit user
refusal, so the agent was told the user denied the action when the user
simply never answered. The gateway wait already distinguished the two
('timed out without user response... Silence is not consent.'); this
brings the CLI/TUI/ACP surfaces to parity.
- prompt_dangerous_approval(): input()-path expiry now returns a distinct
'timeout' choice (still fail-closed).
- cli.py _approval_callback + hermes_cli/callbacks.py approval_callback:
deadline expiry returns 'timeout' instead of 'deny'.
- check_all_command_guards / _run_approval_gate CLI tails: 'timeout' maps
to outcome='timeout' with a 'timed out without user response... Silence
is not consent.' BLOCKED message (matching the gateway wording);
explicit deny keeps outcome='denied' and gains user_consent=False for
shape parity.
- computer_use: 'timeout' verdict threads through the CLI adapter and
yields a 'prompt timed out — the user did not respond' error instead of
'denied by user'.
- ACP permissions bridge: FutureTimeout returns 'timeout' (other failures
still 'deny'); elicitation maps 'timeout' to 'cancel' like the gateway's
unresolved outcome; codex wire mapping documents deny/timeout→decline.
- write_approval already treats unknown choices as 'stage, not drop', so
a timeout now stages the memory write instead of silently refusing it.
Every timeout path remains fail-closed — the action never runs; only the
classification reported to the agent changes.
The fail-fast admission path (bounded compress pool, F6) only logged a
WARNING; in the compression-attempt telemetry stream a wedged pool
looked like compression simply stopped being attempted. Emit the
existing attempt telemetry with failure_class='pool_saturated'
(commit_status=aborted, split_status=aborted) on refusal, following
_emit_compression_attempt_telemetry's existing call shape. Regression
extends the F6 saturation test (sabotage-verified).
The fence-cancel poll loops (sync host wait in conversation_compression,
async hygiene wait in gateway/run) spun at 1kHz while the worker held
the fence through its lock-setup window — which rides SessionDB write
patience and can last seconds. 25ms keeps sub-tick cancel latency
without the spin.
The compression heartbeat's terminal 'context compression completed'
stamp force-persists against the PARENT session id (agent.session_id at
stamp time). After the out-of-place rotation the parent is archived but
kept advertising a fresh last_activity_at + terminal label forever.
Clear the parent row's activity labels best-effort after a committed
rotation (keeps last_activity_at so idle clocks stay continuous; the
child carries live labels). Regression asserts the archived parent's
labels are cleared while the child's lineage is intact
(sabotage-verified).
revoke_commit_admission() used to invoke the holder-qualified lease
release unconditionally — including while an admitted commit was still
mutating SessionDB — letting a second compressor acquire the durable
lock mid-commit and interleave with the first commit's writes.
The admission_revoked flag store stays lock-free, but the lease-release
decision now coordinates with the fence lock:
- revoke acquires the fence lock non-blocking; on success no commit can
be in flight (an admitted commit retains the lock until finish_commit)
and the release runs immediately, still under the lock so a racing
begin_commit cannot slip between the check and the release.
- on failure the release is deferred: finish_commit() re-checks
_admission_revoked and performs it AFTER the commit completes (prompt
even if the worker thread is later parked), and the begin_commit
refusal path does the same for a revoke that lost the race to a
transient lock-setup/cancel boundary. All paths are idempotent with
the worker's own outer cleanup (DB release is holder-qualified).
Invariant encoded + tested: no second compressor can acquire the durable
lock while an admitted commit is still mutating; after a post-revoke
commit finishes the lease is released promptly. Both regressions
(revoke-during-commit deferral, revoke-before-commit immediate release +
refused begin_commit) are sabotage-verified.
Rebase onto origin/main brought in 'let explicit interrupts cancel safely',
which predates this branch's pooled progress-timeout + F1-F6 fence rework.
Reconcile the two:
- begin_commit(cancel_event) re-checks the hard-cancel Event under the
fence lock again (lost in the mechanical rebase).
- compress_context: restore aux_interrupt_protection around the summary
call, the post-return frozen-cause AuxiliaryExplicitCancellation check,
and the full rollback/telemetry handler for explicit interrupts.
- run_agent._compress_context: recreate the per-attempt fence registration
(_active_compression_commit_fence) that hard_interrupt() uses to
serialize cancel admission, and thread that exact fence through both
the direct and pooled paths (run_compress_context_with_progress_timeout
now accepts an external fence).
- test: the pooled worker isolates the live transcript (F3), so the
hard-interrupt rollback regression mutates the engine's input snapshot
rather than reaching around it to the caller's list.
Both progress-aware waits (sync compress wrapper and gateway session
hygiene) slept a FULL idle interval and only then compared progress, so
progress early in an interval let silence approach 2x the configured
idle timeout before the waiter noticed. Compute each wait slice as
idle_timeout - elapsed_since_last_progress instead.
Regression: a worker that reports progress early and then goes silent is
timed out in ~1x the idle budget, not ~2x.
PR #76354 review, 'idle timeout can allow nearly twice that silence'.
The process-wide 4-worker pool retained the stdlib executor's unbounded
queue: four hung summaries wedged every slot, a fifth compression queued
silently, waited out its whole budget without starting, and remained
eligible to run later as an expensive stale job whose fence was already
cancelled (the first fence check used to sit AFTER the summary call).
- Bounded admission: submission fails fast (messages returned unchanged,
loud warning) when all pool slots are occupied; slots are freed by a
future done-callback. Recovery contract documented at the constant: new
work fails fast while wedged, wedged workers are fence-cancelled and
restore service when they return; a worker that never returns costs its
slot — bounded, observable degradation instead of unbounded queueing.
- Not-yet-started futures are cancel()ed on timeout.
- The cancelled fence is checked BEFORE any expensive summary work, both
in the pooled wrapper (stale queued job) and inside compress_context
(pre-summary gate), so a stale job never burns an LLM call or acquires
session state.
Saturation regression: 4 event-blocked summaries wedge the pool, a 5th
submission fails fast (asserted while the four are provably still
blocked), the refused job never runs after worker recovery, and a fresh
submission after recovery succeeds.
PR #76354 review, blocking finding 6 / merge gate 7.
A host timeout previously left the timed-out worker holding the durable
per-session compression lock AND refreshing its lease indefinitely, so a
truly hung summary blocked every later compression attempt; and a LATE
successful summary could clear the failure cooldown the host had just
recorded.
Transplant the lease-cancellation invariants from PR #71569
(@ciabata-git): the worker publishes an idempotent, holder-scoped release
hook on the fence once it owns the durable lock (begin_lock_setup /
register_cancelled_lock_release close the acquire→publish race), the
refresher start is serialized against the release path, and the host
invokes the hook on idle timeout, hygiene timeout, and every unwind
(revoke_commit_admission now also releases). ABA safety: the SessionDB
release is holder-qualified (DELETE ... WHERE holder = ?), so a stale
release can never free a replacement holder's lease.
State ordering: the compressor consults a fence-cancellation check BEFORE
clearing the failure cooldown, so a late worker cannot undo the host's
timeout cooldown; the check is installed only for the fenced call and
removed in a finally.
Regression implements the reviewer's exact 5-step scenario: summary
blocked indefinitely → host timeout → a NEW compressor acquires the
durable lock while the old summary is STILL blocked → old worker released
→ it cannot clear cooldown, release the new holder's lease, or publish
stale state.
PR #76354 review, blocking finding 4 / merge gates 4 + 5.
Co-authored-by: ciabata-git <ciabata-git@users.noreply.github.com>
The pooled worker closure captured the caller's live `messages` list and
compress_context explicitly supports plugin/legacy context engines that
mutate that list in place — so after a host timeout, a late engine could
rewrite the live conversation (roles, ordering, persisted content)
concurrently with the resumed turn.
The worker now deep-snapshots the transcript on the worker thread before
any engine code runs; the caller's list object is never handed to pooled
code. Results reach caller-visible state only through the returned value
of an ADMITTED commit (the host discards results on timeout/cancel), and
durable SessionDB mutation was already gated behind the commit fence.
No-op passes map the unchanged snapshot back to the caller's original
list so identity-based no-op detection and flush dedup keep working.
Document the thread-safety contract for context-engine and
memory-provider extension points (they now run on pooled threads) in the
module docstring and the context-engine plugin guide.
Regression: an in-place-mutating engine plus host timeout proves the
caller's live transcript is byte-identical WHILE the worker is still
blocked inside the engine (released only after the assertions).
PR #76354 review, blocking finding 3 / merge gate 3.
The sync compress wrapper only handled concurrent.futures.TimeoutError;
KeyboardInterrupt, task cancellation, or any other exception while
waiting let the host unwind while the detached worker kept full commit
authority — it could later enter the commit fence and mutate durable
state (in-place archival, session rotation) behind the caller's back.
Wrap the whole host wait in try/finally: any exit that did not settle the
worker (returned result or won the fence race) revokes future commit
admission via a new lock-free CompressionCommitFence.revoke_commit_admission()
(begin_commit re-checks the flag under the fence lock, so no admitted
commit is ever abandoned mid-mutation). The gateway hygiene wait gets the
same guarantee via a BaseException handler that revokes admission and
defers helper cleanup until the worker actually returns.
Reconciliation with PR #74449 (suparious): that PR routes EXPLICIT host
interrupts into auxiliary-call cancellation; this change is the
complementary host-side guarantee that no unwind — explicit or not —
leaves an unfenced worker. The two compose (fence revocation here is the
outer safety net; #74449's aux cancellation remains the fast path) rather
than duplicating one another.
Regressions: KeyboardInterrupt and generic-exception unwinds assert the
fence is revoked WHILE the worker is still blocked pre-commit, then
release the worker and prove begin_commit() is refused.
PR #76354 review, blocking finding 2 / merge gate 2.
begin_commit() retains the fence lock until finish_commit(), so a hung
SessionDB commit made try_cancel_before_commit() return None forever and
the host spun ahead of the overrun-warning loop — a genuinely hung commit
stayed unbounded AND silent. Add a lock-free phase marker (threading.Event
set inside begin_commit while the lock is held, readable without it) and
break the host spin on commit_in_flight so the bounded overrun loop — and
its WARNING + on_commit_overrun surfacing — is reachable WHILE the commit
is still blocked. Applies to both the sync compress wrapper and the
gateway session-hygiene wait.
Regression asserts the warning and callback fire while the event-gated
fake commit is still blocked; the test releases the worker only after
those assertions (addresses helix4u's released-before-asserting callout).
PR #76354 review, blocking finding 1 / merge gate 1.
Heartbeat write discipline for the durable SessionDB activity projection:
- Pin the cadence in a named constant
(SESSION_ACTIVITY_HEARTBEAT_MIN_INTERVAL_SECONDS = 60s, contract >= 30s,
deliberately config-independent so no compression.*/agent.* setting can
turn the heartbeat into a high-frequency writer on the contended
SessionDB write path).
- The write already rides the standard _execute_write patience path via
SessionDB.touch_session_activity — verified, now documented in the
docstring.
- Best-effort hardening: a failed heartbeat write never raises into the
agent loop; the bare 'pass' becomes an explicit debug log with traceback.
- Tests: direct proof that a heartbeat DB failure doesn't propagate,
the cadence constant is pinned >= 30s, and the rate limiter keys off
the shared constant (boundary tested on both sides of the window).
The post-begin_commit() waiter previously called unbounded future.result(),
so the advertised compression.context_total_ceiling_seconds was silently
unenforced for commit-phase hangs. The commit still must complete (abandoning
an in-flight SessionDB mutation would diverge live messages from durable
state), but the wait is now bounded in increments against the remaining
ceiling: on ceiling breach the overrun is logged (WARNING escalating to
ERROR), surfaced once through the user-visible warning channel via the new
on_commit_overrun callback (wired to _emit_warning in run_agent.py), and the
host keeps waiting in bounded slices until the commit finishes.
Documented guarantee (config comment + docs, en/zh): summary phase bounded
by the ceiling; commit phase logged + surfaced if it exceeds it — never
silently hung, never abandoned mid-commit.
Test updated to assert the surfacing fires (previously accepted a silent
over-ceiling wait); adds coverage that a raising overrun callback cannot
break the commit wait.
Once begin_commit() wins, SessionDB mutation cannot be fence-cancelled;
document that context_total_ceiling_seconds covers the summary phase only
and pin the hang-wait contract in tests.
Host progress timeout leaves compress_context running on a daemon worker while
the live turn continues. Latch heartbeat silence on fence cancel or terminal
timeout/cooldown provenance so a later UNKNOWN stamp cannot re-arm
agent.compression and poison stall clocks.
Three code-reuse fixes applied during salvage:
1. Reuse _relative_time from hermes_cli/main.py instead of duplicating
the relative-time formatting logic in hermes_cli/status.py.
2. Extract _stamp_hygiene_compression_provenance helper in gateway/run.py
to deduplicate the two nearly-identical try/except blocks that stamp
compression timeout/abort provenance in the hygiene path.
3. Add ContextCompressor.record_timeout_failure() method and use it from
the in-agent compress_context timeout callback instead of re-implementing
the (60, 300, 900) cooldown ladder inline. The existing summary-LLM
exception handler already has this ladder — now both paths share one
method.
Three mechanisms to detect and notify when gateway sessions stall silently:
1. Mid-turn activity heartbeats stamped to SessionDB so hermes sessions list
and hermes status show progress during long turns without new message rows.
2. Stall watchdog: when a busy session has pending inbound and the shared
activity clock is idle past agent.session_stall_timeout (default 300),
log a WARNING and notify the user once to try /new. Notify-only; does
not kill the turn.
3. Compaction timeout: fenceless compress_context callers get a progress-aware
host budget (compression.context_timeout_seconds default 120 idle,
compression.context_total_ceiling_seconds default 600 ceiling). On timeout,
cancel via commit fence, skip compaction without dropping messages, and
continue the turn.
Closes#72016 (slices 1-3; slice 4 cumulative SSE stream-retry deadline
remains a follow-up).
Cherry-picked from PR #72424 by @fangliquanflq.
skill_view re-sent full skill content on every call: ~286k tokens of
verbatim repeat views in a 400k-msg production window (one session
loaded the same skill 9 times), and a single repeat view of a large
skill costs ~25k tokens.
Mirrors read_file's proven unchanged-stub pattern: a per-task cache
keyed on (resolved name, file_path) with an mtime+size fingerprint of
the served file. On a repeat view of an UNCHANGED file, return a short
stub pointing at the earlier result. This does NOT violate the
skills-are-loaded-fully rule — the stub only ever replaces content
that is already fully present earlier in the same conversation, and:
- any on-disk change (patch, external edit) invalidates the entry;
- context compression clears the cache (wired next to
reset_file_dedup in conversation_compression.py) so post-compression
re-views return full content;
- setup-needed views are never deduped (readiness can change without
the file changing);
- no task_id -> no dedup; caches are task-isolated; 200-entry cap.
Live E2E: repeat view of hermes-agent-dev 99,739 chars -> 374-char
stub.
The delivery worker is a daemon thread, so a short-lived process
(hermes chat -q, a cron session) could exit right after firing
on_session_end — silently dropping the headline event. Register a
bounded atexit flush (5s) when the worker starts: a dead endpoint can
delay exit slightly, never hang it.
Live-verified: hermes chat -q now delivers on_session_start,
post_tool_call, and on_session_end to a real receiver; regression test
runs a subprocess that exits without flushing (sabotage-verified).
- delivery_id is now generated once per firing and used for both the
X-Hermes-Delivery header and the signed body's delivery_id field —
previously they were two different uuid4s, breaking receiver-side
dedupe as documented.
- 3xx responses are no longer followed: urllib's default redirect
handler converts a redirected POST into a body-less GET, silently
dropping the signed payload. Redirects now log a misconfiguration
warning and count as delivery failure (no retry).
- Docs: receiver-side replay-protection guidance (dedupe on
delivery_id, timestamp freshness window) + redirect semantics.
- Tests: 5xx retry count, redirect-not-followed (sabotage-verified),
header/body delivery_id equality.
The inverse of the inbound webhook platform: hooks.outbound in
config.yaml lists HTTP targets + the plugin-hook events they subscribe
to (on_session_end, subagent_stop, post_tool_call, ...). Each firing
POSTs a JSON payload (same top-level shape as shell hooks' stdin wire)
signed GitHub-style with HMAC-SHA256 (X-Hermes-Signature-256).
Rides the existing hook bus — notify-only callbacks registered on the
plugin manager at the same CLI/gateway/main entry points as shell
hooks. Delivery is fire-and-forget via a bounded queue + single daemon
worker thread, so a dead endpoint can never stall a tool call. Bounded
retries (5xx/conn errors once; 4xx never). secret_env preferred over
inline secret. HERMES_SAFE_MODE skips registration. hermes hooks list
shows outbound targets with signed/UNSIGNED status.
Zero new model tools, zero new subsystems.
The _sync_codex_entry_from_auth_store source guard returned early for
source='manual:device_code', which is the recommended quarantine-safe
configuration (hermes auth add openai-codex produces SOURCE_MANUAL_DEVICE_CODE).
The PR's fix for refresh_token adoption was unreachable for these entries.
Widen the guard to accept both 'device_code' and 'manual:device_code'.
Follow-up to #70111. Issue reporter (imgyf) confirmed this caused a
12-of-16 fleet outage on Aug 1.
Co-authored-by: imgyf <imgyf@users.noreply.github.com>
Two defects in the openai-codex credential pool recovery path:
Defect 1 — adoption path silently no-ops when store_access is empty
_sync_codex_entry_from_auth_store() skipped adoption when the auth
store had no access_token (only last_refresh). When another process
rotated the token pair, the stale profile's entry kept the consumed
refresh_token and replayed it, getting refresh_token_reused and going
terminally DEAD.
Fix: also adopt when store_refresh differs from entry_refresh, even
when store_access is empty. Keep the entry's existing access_token
in that case (store_access or entry.access_token).
Defect 2 — false 'auth refreshed' success log
_try_refresh_codex_client_credentials() returned True whenever
resolve_codex_runtime_credentials() returned any non-empty credentials,
including the same stale token when the underlying refresh failed.
The conversation loop then logged 'auth refreshed after 401' right
before the retry failed with the identical token_expired.
Fix: compare the access token before/after the refresh. If unchanged,
return False so the 401-retry path logs the truth.
Fixes#70097
Completes the cache-parity bug class from #76938: the parent's request
body diverges from the fork's not only at the ephemeral system prompt
but also at prefill messages (inserted right after the system message
at API-call time) and, on OpenRouter, at upstream-provider selection
(prompt caches live per upstream; an unpinned fork can be routed to a
different upstream and miss a byte-identical prefix).
Also hardens the tests: pairwise asserts instead of re-implementing the
production prompt join, and routed-path omission guards for the whole
gated kwarg family.
Re-applied from #50508 onto current main: the executor moved from
tools/ to agent/ and the JSON-error site was refactored away into
_parse_tool_arguments, but these 8 f-string debug calls survived the
move verbatim. Lazy %s formatting skips string interpolation when
DEBUG is off — the Tool-result line interpolates the FULL tool output
(can be 100KB+) on every tool call otherwise.
- Short-circuit the candidate waterfall on HTTP 401/403: an auth wall
proves the endpoint family exists, so probing the alternate URL just
doubles the wasted wait (the reported endpoint takes ~10s to return
401 without a key).
- Stream the probe so 4xx never downloads a slow error body; responses
are closed on every exit path.
- Regression tests: single-call assertion on 401/403 (fails on main),
negative-cache reuse, 404 waterfall preserved, no .json() on 4xx.
Fixes#69905
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
AZURE_CLIENT_SECRET and AZURE_FEDERATED_TOKEN_FILE presence checks in the
Entra diagnostics path now read through the profile secret scope (Slack
pattern) instead of raw os.environ.
Fixes#69379 (v2026.7.20 Docker multiplex regression: the scoped runner
reload dropped API_SERVER_* set via the container environment, silently
losing the api_server platform) by the canonical mechanism — corrects
the direction of #69524, which patched gateway/config._getenv to fall
through to os.environ on EVERY scoped miss, re-opening the
cross-profile borrow for all credentials.
API_SERVER_ENABLED / API_SERVER_HOST / API_SERVER_PORT /
API_SERVER_CORS_ORIGINS are deployment listener settings (Docker
compose environment: block, systemd Environment=), not profile
secrets: they join _GLOBAL_ENV_EXACT so get_secret reads them from
os.environ regardless of scope. API_SERVER_KEY is deliberately NOT
allowlisted — it IS a credential and stays profile-scoped, which keeps
tests/gateway/test_config.py's secondary-profile isolation semantics
intact (a secondary profile without the key still doesn't bind a
listener).
Ports #69524's regression test in the corrected form: container-env
API_SERVER_* stays visible during the scoped runner reload while the
key resolves through the profile scope; plus unit tests locking the
allowlist membership and the deliberate exclusion of API_SERVER_KEY.
Unquoted values truncate only at a # preceded by whitespace (so
KEY=foo#bar stays intact); quoted values scan escape-aware for the
matching close quote, keep through it, and drop a trailing '# ...'
remainder. Verified empirically against python-dotenv 1.2.2 on a
10-case corpus (full parity). Supersedes the approach in #57718, whose
scanner corrupted foo#bar-style values.
save_env_value writes values containing " or \ as escaped
double-quoted strings, and every other .env reader in the repo
(load_env/_parse_env_value, python-dotenv) reverses those escapes.
load_env_file — the parser behind build_profile_secret_scope, which
wraps every cron job and every multiplexed gateway turn — only stripped
the outer quotes, leaving the escapes literal. A credential containing
a double quote or backslash (JSON service-account blobs, generated
secrets) authenticates fine interactively but 401s under scoped
resolution, with no error pointing at the cause. Parse values with the
canonical _parse_env_value so all readers agree byte-for-byte.
Makes interrupt-protected context compression cancellable by an explicit
user or lifecycle stop, without weakening protection against ordinary
incoming messages, voice interjections, or active-turn redirects.
Separates explicit hard cancellation from ordinary interrupt/redirect
state with a dedicated threading.Event; introduces
AuxiliaryExplicitCancellation as an attempt-local frozen-cause signal;
isolates the synchronous provider callback in a bounded daemon worker
during protected compression; atomically linearizes Codex timeout
cleanup against explicit cancellation; propagates hard cancellation
through child agents and explicit stop surfaces; serializes hard-cancel
admission against compression commit admission with
CompressionCommitFence; aborts before session rotation or late DB commit,
restores in-place transcript mutations and compressor state, and releases
the heartbeat and compression lease.
Based on #74449 by @suparious. Resolved merge conflicts in
agent/context_compressor.py (feasibility check + try/except) and
tui_gateway/methods_session.py.
Review follow-up on the #76098 salvage: the 4096-entry count bound alone
doesn't bound MEMORY — write_file/patch argument strings run 100KB+, so
a long-lived gateway process under sustained heavy write workloads could
pin ~800MB of evicted-session strings. A 32MB byte budget extends the
existing FIFO eviction; common-case args (0.5-2KB) never hit it. New
guard test mutation-checked (fails with the byte leg disabled).
The pre-send normalization pass re-canonicalized every historical tool
call's argument JSON on every API-call iteration — quadratic in session
tool-call count. Route it through a bounded value-keyed memo (the
_MSG_TOKENS_CACHE idiom from agent/model_metadata.py): per-iteration
cost is now proportional to new tool calls, not all of them.
Measured (simulated growing session, repo venv): session-total
canonicalization cost 1056 ms -> 58 ms at 500 tool calls x 2 KB args
(18.3x), 5744 ms -> 79 ms at 500 x 16 KB (72.5x). Byte-parity with the
pre-fix logic is asserted at every iteration (unicode, nested,
malformed, empty, non-string args), and a call-count test proves
json.loads invocations went from K(K+1)/2 to K per session.
- Merge _aux_free_only() + _aux_openrouter_model() into single
_aux_openrouter_settings() that reads config once via
load_config_readonly (avoids double deepcopy).
- Remove 15-line block comment and 5-line inline comment that
restated what the code already says.
- Trim module docstring from 10 lines to 3.
- Update test patches to target load_config_readonly.
Follow-ups from review of #76113:
- Extract cache_ttl_means_disabled() as the single disable-synonym
predicate; agent_init and prompt_caching_disabled_from_config both use
it so the two detection sites can no longer drift (drift would recreate
the #76085 bug class).
- Mirror _run_reference's not-None injection guard in
aggregate_moa_context (stamping None was a harmless no-op copy).
- Replace a vacuous trailing test assertion with the intended
input-non-mutation check; drop a stray blank line.
- Add a predicate-parity regression test (unknown TTL values keep
caching enabled, matching historical agent_init semantics).
Absorb the useful deltas from the parallel #76121 approach: a single
blank_cache_policy_stub factory so _cache_disabled cannot be left off
hand-rolled SimpleNamespaces, and pin the live agent disable onto MoA
advisor fan-out and one-shot aggregate_moa_context decoration so those
paths track conversation state rather than a fresh config re-read.
Keeps the earlier tri-state prepared-aggregator no-agent fix. Adds
factory and synthesis/advisor regressions.
Coordinates with #76121 / #76085.
Co-authored-by: JoaoMarcos44 <87440198+JoaoMarcos44@users.noreply.github.com>
Prepared-aggregator facades built via __new__ lack _agent. Accessing
self._agent raised inside the planner try and bool-coercion of a missing
snapshot forced False, suppressing config fallback for cache_ttl=off.
Pass a tri-state value and add a no-agent/config-off regression.
Blank SimpleNamespace stubs used by MoA decoration and
plan_cache_sections_for_destination never set _cache_disabled, so
anthropic_prompt_cache_policy re-injected cache_control markers after
operators turned caching off. Stamp the disable onto those stubs from
an explicit flag or the live config, and pass the agent flag from the
MoA aggregator path.
Fixes#76085
kshitij