"""MCP server config loading and stdio launch environment: ${VAR}/Cursor-style interpolation, hidden-whitespace and suspicious-entry filtering, the filtered subprocess env, command resolution, watchdog wrapping and the shared stderr log.""" import logging import os import re import shutil import sys import threading from datetime import datetime from typing import Any, Dict, List, Optional, Set, Tuple from tools.mcp_tool_common import _env_ref_name, _prepend_path, _core logger = logging.getLogger("tools.mcp_tool") _mcp_stderr_log_fh: Optional[Any] = None _mcp_stderr_log_lock = threading.Lock() def _get_mcp_stderr_log() -> Any: """Shared append-mode handle for MCP subprocess stderr, opened once per process. Must expose a real fd (``fileno()``) because asyncio wires the child's stderr directly to it. Falls back to ``/dev/null``, then real stderr.""" global _mcp_stderr_log_fh with _mcp_stderr_log_lock: if _mcp_stderr_log_fh is not None: return _mcp_stderr_log_fh try: from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home log_dir = get_hermes_home() / "logs" log_dir.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True) # Line-buffered so output lands promptly; errors="replace" tolerates # garbled binary from misbehaving servers. fh = open(log_dir / "mcp-stderr.log", "a", encoding="utf-8", errors="replace", buffering=1) fh.fileno() # confirm a real fd before committing _mcp_stderr_log_fh = fh except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover — best-effort fallback logger.debug("Failed to open MCP stderr log, using devnull: %s", exc) try: _mcp_stderr_log_fh = open(os.devnull, "w", encoding="utf-8") except Exception: _mcp_stderr_log_fh = sys.stderr return _mcp_stderr_log_fh def _write_stderr_log_header(server_name: str) -> None: """Write a session marker so operators can find each server's output in the shared log without per-line prefixes (which would need a pipe + reader thread).""" fh = _core._get_mcp_stderr_log() try: ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S") fh.write(f"\n===== [{ts}] starting MCP server '{server_name}' =====\n") fh.flush() except Exception: pass # Env vars safe to pass to stdio subprocesses (no secrets). _SAFE_ENV_KEYS = frozenset({"PATH", "HOME", "USER", "LANG", "LC_ALL", "TERM", "SHELL", "TMPDIR"}) # Windows process/location vars needed by launcher-style tools (e.g. Docker # Desktop's MCP plugin discovery); none carry secrets. _SAFE_ENV_KEYS_CASE_INSENSITIVE = frozenset({ "ALLUSERSPROFILE", "APPDATA", "COMMONPROGRAMFILES", "COMMONPROGRAMFILES(X86)", "COMMONPROGRAMW6432", "COMPUTERNAME", "COMSPEC", "HOMEDRIVE", "HOMEPATH", "LOCALAPPDATA", "NUMBER_OF_PROCESSORS", "OS", "PATHEXT", "PROCESSOR_ARCHITECTURE", "PROGRAMDATA", "PROGRAMFILES", "PROGRAMFILES(X86)", "PROGRAMW6432", "PUBLIC", "SYSTEMDRIVE", "SYSTEMROOT", "TEMP", "TMP", "USERDOMAIN", "USERNAME", "USERPROFILE", "WINDIR", }) # ${VAR_NAME} interpolation; any non-} chars allowed so MY-VAR / my.var work. _ENV_VAR_PATTERN = re.compile(r"\$\{([^}]+)\}") def _workspace_folder() -> str: """Absolute workspace root for ``${workspaceFolder}``: the session's authoritative root (terminal cwd / task override / $TERMINAL_CWD), else cwd.""" try: from tools.file_tools import _authoritative_workspace_root root = _authoritative_workspace_root() if root: return root except Exception: pass return os.getcwd() def _workspace_basename() -> str: root = _core._workspace_folder() return os.path.basename(root.rstrip("/\\")) or root # Cursor's case-sensitive context vars -> resolver. _CONTEXT_VAR_RESOLVERS = { "userHome": lambda: os.path.expanduser("~"), "workspaceFolder": lambda: _core._workspace_folder(), "workspaceFolderBasename": _workspace_basename, "pathSeparator": lambda: os.sep, "/": lambda: os.sep, } def _context_var_value(ref: str) -> Optional[str]: """Resolve a Cursor context var; None for anything else so it falls through to env-var lookup.""" resolver = _CONTEXT_VAR_RESOLVERS.get(ref) return resolver() if resolver else None def _build_safe_env(user_env: Optional[dict]) -> dict: """Filtered env for stdio subprocesses so API keys/tokens don't leak: only the safe baseline keys, ``XDG_*``, vars injected by an external secret source (users configured that backend precisely so subprocesses can consume them), plus the server config's own ``env``.""" try: from hermes_cli.env_loader import get_secret_source except Exception: # pragma: no cover — early bootstrap/import fallback get_secret_source = None env = { key: value for key, value in os.environ.items() if key in _SAFE_ENV_KEYS or key.upper() in _SAFE_ENV_KEYS_CASE_INSENSITIVE or key.startswith("XDG_") or (get_secret_source is not None and get_secret_source(key)) } if user_env: env.update(user_env) return env def _which_with_config_pathext(command: str, path_arg, env: dict): """``shutil.which`` retried under the config env's PATHEXT (Windows only): ``which(path=...)`` uses the PARENT's PATHEXT, not the config env's.""" cfg_pathext = next((v for k, v in env.items() if k.upper() == "PATHEXT" and isinstance(v, str) and v.strip()), None) if not cfg_pathext or cfg_pathext == os.environ.get("PATHEXT"): return None saved = os.environ.get("PATHEXT") try: os.environ["PATHEXT"] = cfg_pathext return shutil.which(command, path=path_arg) finally: if saved is None: os.environ.pop("PATHEXT", None) else: os.environ["PATHEXT"] = saved def _node_fallback(command: str) -> str: """Well-known Node install locations for bare ``npx``/``npm``/``node`` when PATH lookup failed; returns *command* unchanged when none is executable.""" home = os.path.expanduser("~") hermes_home = os.path.expanduser(os.getenv("HERMES_HOME", os.path.join(home, ".hermes"))) candidates = [ os.path.join(hermes_home, "node", "bin", command), os.path.join(home, ".local", "bin", command), # Canonical Node location for from-source Linux builds, the Hermes Docker # image and Intel Homebrew. Needed when a user's hand-authored env.PATH # omits it: npx's shebang re-execs /usr/bin/env node, so a symlink # workaround fails one layer deeper. os.path.join(os.sep, "usr", "local", "bin", command), ] for candidate in candidates: if os.path.isfile(candidate) and os.access(candidate, os.X_OK): return candidate return command def _resolve_stdio_command(command: str, env: dict) -> tuple[str, dict]: """Resolve a stdio command against the exact subprocess env, mainly so bare ``npx``/``npm``/``node`` work under a filtered PATH.""" resolved_command = os.path.expanduser(str(command).strip()) resolved_env = dict(env or {}) if os.sep not in resolved_command: path_arg = resolved_env.get("PATH") which_hit = shutil.which(resolved_command, path=path_arg) if which_hit is None and sys.platform == "win32" and resolved_env: which_hit = _which_with_config_pathext(resolved_command, path_arg, resolved_env) if which_hit: resolved_command = which_hit elif resolved_command in {"npx", "npm", "node"}: resolved_command = _node_fallback(resolved_command) command_dir = os.path.dirname(resolved_command) if command_dir: resolved_env = _prepend_path(resolved_env, command_dir) return resolved_command, resolved_env def _wrap_command_with_watchdog(command: str, args: list) -> tuple[str, list]: """Wrap a stdio command in the parent-death watchdog (POSIX only — it relies on process groups, same scope as the killpg-based orphan cleanup; the watchdog polls ``getppid()`` against our PID). Unchanged on non-POSIX or if the PID cannot be read — watchdog bookkeeping must never block a connection.""" if os.name != "posix": return command, args try: my_pid = os.getpid() except Exception: return command, args watchdog = os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "mcp_stdio_watchdog.py") return sys.executable, [watchdog, "--ppid", str(my_pid), "--", command, *args] def _interpolate_env_vars(value): """Recursively resolve ``${VAR}`` / Cursor ``${env:VAR}`` placeholders plus the Cursor context vars (``_context_var_value``). Env refs resolve from the active profile's secret scope when multiplexing (so ``${API_KEY}`` picks up the routed profile's value, not another profile's in ``os.environ``). Unset vars keep the literal placeholder.""" from agent.secret_scope import get_secret as _get_secret if isinstance(value, str): def _replace(m): ctx = _context_var_value(m.group(1).strip()) if ctx is not None: return ctx return _get_secret(_env_ref_name(m.group(1)), m.group(0)) or m.group(0) return _ENV_VAR_PATTERN.sub(_replace, value) if isinstance(value, dict): return {k: _interpolate_env_vars(v) for k, v in value.items()} if isinstance(value, list): return [_interpolate_env_vars(v) for v in value] return value # (server_name, dotted key path) pairs already warned about; config loads # happen on every discovery pass, so warn once per process. _whitespace_warned: Set[Tuple[str, str]] = set() def _warn_hidden_whitespace(server_name: str, config: dict) -> List[str]: """Warn once per (server, key path) about string values with leading/trailing whitespace — a pasted newline or leading space causes opaque auth/connect failures and is invisible in config.yaml. Advisory only: values are never mutated (whitespace could be intentional) and never logged (often secrets). Returns the flagged key paths.""" flagged: List[str] = [] def _walk(value: Any, path: str) -> None: if isinstance(value, str): if value != value.strip(): flagged.append(path) elif isinstance(value, dict): for k, v in value.items(): _walk(v, f"{path}.{k}" if path else str(k)) elif isinstance(value, list): for i, v in enumerate(value): _walk(v, f"{path}[{i}]") _walk(config, "") for key_path in flagged: dedupe_key = (server_name, key_path) if dedupe_key in _whitespace_warned: continue _whitespace_warned.add(dedupe_key) logger.warning( "MCP server '%s': config value '%s' has hidden leading or " "trailing whitespace — this often causes authentication or " "connection failures. Check for stray spaces/newlines in " "config.yaml (or the referenced env var).", server_name, key_path, ) return flagged def _filter_suspicious_mcp_servers(servers: Dict[str, dict]) -> Dict[str, dict]: """Drop exfiltration-shaped MCP configs before any stdio spawn path.""" try: from hermes_cli.mcp_security import validate_mcp_server_entry except Exception: return servers safe_servers = {} for name, cfg in servers.items(): issues = validate_mcp_server_entry(name, cfg) if isinstance(cfg, dict) else None if issues: logger.warning("Skipping suspicious MCP server '%s': %s", name, "; ".join(issues)) continue safe_servers[name] = cfg return safe_servers def _portable_mcp_servers(safe_servers: Dict[str, dict]) -> None: """Merge plugin-provided (portable) MCP servers into *safe_servers*; native config wins on a name clash. Never raises.""" try: from hermes_cli.plugins import discover_plugins, get_plugin_manager discover_plugins() portable = get_plugin_manager().get_portable_mcp_servers() for name, cfg in _core._filter_suspicious_mcp_servers(portable).items(): if name in safe_servers: logger.warning("Portable MCP server '%s' conflicts with native config; skipping", name) continue safe_servers[name] = dict(cfg) except Exception: logger.debug("Failed to load portable MCP servers", exc_info=True) def _load_mcp_config() -> Dict[str, dict]: """Read ``mcp_servers`` from config.yaml as ``{name: config}`` (empty on error or in safe mode). Entries carry ``command``/``args``/``env`` (stdio) or ``url``/``headers`` (HTTP) plus optional timeout/auth keys; ``${VAR}`` placeholders are interpolated after ``.env`` is loaded.""" try: from hermes_cli.config import load_config from utils import env_var_enabled as _env_enabled if _env_enabled("HERMES_SAFE_MODE"): return {} servers = load_config().get("mcp_servers") if not isinstance(servers, dict): servers = {} # Ensure .env vars are available for interpolation try: from hermes_cli.env_loader import load_hermes_dotenv load_hermes_dotenv() except Exception: pass safe_servers: Dict[str, dict] = {} for name, cfg in _core._filter_suspicious_mcp_servers(servers).items(): interpolated = _interpolate_env_vars(cfg) if isinstance(interpolated, dict): _warn_hidden_whitespace(name, interpolated) safe_servers[name] = interpolated _portable_mcp_servers(safe_servers) return safe_servers except Exception as exc: logger.debug("Failed to load MCP config: %s", exc) return {}