00c75cea33
Steps 4, 5 and 7 of the shared-metrics exporter: the send logic, the consent gate, and backoff plus multi-process claiming. These arrive together because the sender is not correct without all three. Contract handling: 202 marks sent; 400 is permanent and never retried; 429 honours Retry-After (clamped to a day so a bogus value cannot park a package); 5xx, timeouts and transport errors retry three times in-process with 1s/5s/25s full-jitter backoff, then defer to a later pass. Consent is gated on the package's PERIOD, not its creation time. A period is split across packages created on different days, so a created-at gate would send a period's tail while dropping its head and silently undercount the opt-in day — data that looks complete and is wrong. The opt-in day is recorded once and never moves, so toggling sending off and on does not re-open the pre-consent backlog. Rows are claimed in a write transaction, which is what stops two Hermes processes sharing one database from sending the same package twice. next_attempt_at persists backoff across restarts, so a hard-down service is not retried on every task completion. The body is recomputed from payload_json rather than stored a second time: json.dumps is deterministic here (verified against the real outbox — 11 of 11 files reproduce byte-for-byte), and the only mutable input, the derived identity, is frozen on the row at first attempt. That keeps retries byte-identical across a salt rotation for ~36 bytes instead of a duplicate ~11 KB payload. The outbox directory is never written to or deleted from. A 202 updates SQLite only, because those files are the user's 30-day local history and retention already owns their lifecycle. Tests: 33. Two of them caught real defects in this commit — an unreadable row aborted the claim transaction and blocked every package behind it, and the compression assertions were passing through an injected fake that bypassed the code under test.