Files
hermes-agent/tools/managed_tool_gateway.py
T
Siddharth Balyan a2db110ccc feat(auth): Nous free tier: free inference and connectors out of the box, one command to sign in (#105258)
* feat(auth): Nous free tier core: anonymous identity minted on first use, welcome inference, shared-store scoping

A fresh install with no provider sets up a free Nous identity (anonymous auth method of the nous
provider) instead of forcing the setup wizard. The identity is persisted through the same path a
real login uses, so the resolver ladder is unchanged. Two seams differ: token acquisition
re-exchanges the anon credential (no refresh token), and routing pins the welcome host's single
model nous/welcome. One identity per shared store; nous.guest: false turns the free tier off.

* test(auth): free tier core contracts: lifecycle, resolver precedence, exchange seam, model pin

* docs(user-guide): free tier and signing in

New page explaining what a fresh install gets before any key or sign-in
(free inference on nous/welcome plus connectors), how the free tier
coexists with a user's own API key, how to sign in with hermes auth
upgrade and keep connectors, how to turn the free tier off with
nous.guest, what hermes logout does in each state, a troubleshooting
table, and a plain privacy note. Wired into the Using Hermes sidebar.

* fix(auth): logout leaves the free tier alone and clears the shared store for a real Nous account

Logging out of the free tier is a no-op: it is not a login, so nothing is cleared and the user
is told they were never signed in. Logging out of a real Nous account now also clears the
cross-profile store, so a profile logout is not silently re-adopted on the next boot.

* fix(model): switching off the free tier points at signing in, never hops providers

* Name the free tier in the gateway startup notice and tell explicit-provider installs about it once

* Render the Nous free tier as free tier on auth status, auth list, hermes status and portal info, short-circuit billing copy for it, and skip the keepalive when there is no refresh token

* fix(auth): free tier is set up where nothing is configured: resolver last rung and first-run check

Both the provider resolver's terminal rung and the CLI first-run check now try to set up the free
tier before declaring nothing configured. On a fresh install the first command lands in chat on
nous/welcome; a failed setup still falls through to the existing guidance.

* Add hermes auth upgrade: sign the free tier into a Nous account while keeping its connectors

The device-code flow runs as usual, with a promotion intent registered on the portal between the
code request and the token poll so the account that approves the code inherits the free tier's
connectors. The promotion status decides the outcome: only a completed one is followed by the
token grant, which is persisted over the free-tier singleton and the shared store. Declined,
superseded, retired and busy outcomes each print their own plain copy, and a retired identity is
cleared so the next use sets up a fresh one. User-facing text never names the free tier's internals.

* Show the Nous free tier as one picker row with nous/welcome and hide it when nous.guest is off

* fix(auth): upgrade opens the consent page for this sign-in; one mint attempt per process; forced free tier wins the first-run check

The browser leg of hermes auth upgrade now prints and opens the promotion claim URL with the
claim code, not the generic device page. A failed mint is attempted once per process so several
bootstrap sites cannot hit a closed gate or a 429 twice; a retired credential resets that so
re-minting still happens. HERMES_FORCE_GUEST is honoured ahead of the first-run provider check.

* fix(auth): pin the welcome model on the selected route, not on profile state; background setup retries after a failure

A credential-pool entry can select a paid Nous key while the profile singleton is still the free
tier. The model pin now keys on the resolved endpoint (welcome host) in agent init and /model, and
the pin in model normalization is removed since it had no route to look at. A failed background
identity setup releases its latch so a later attempt in the same process can try again.

* fix(auth): decide the Nous model together with the route on every credential-pool swap

The credential pool can move a Nous agent between the welcome host and the portal host after
init. One helper, pin_model_for_route, now runs at init and inside every pool swap, so the
welcome host always carries nous/welcome and a paid endpoint always keeps the caller's model.

* fix(auth): apply the route model policy on every wire mode during a pool swap; release the setup latch if the thread cannot start

* fix(auth): free-tier lifecycle takes profile then shared lock, reconciles with the shared store, persists the mint before exchanging, and clears only the identity that died

The shared store is the identity of record for a Hermes root: a profile holding a stale free-tier
identity adopts a sibling's newer sign-in instead of keeping the guest, and never overwrites the
shared account. Locks are taken in the documented order (profile, then shared). A minted credential
is stored as soon as create succeeds, so a rate-limited or timed-out exchange does not lose it and
trigger a second mint. Retiring a dead credential removes only that credential from both stores.
Guest exchange uses the resolver's canonical portal URL.

* fix(auth): a credential rotation never rewrites the conversation model; connectors honour the off switch and replace a retired free-tier credential

The welcome host serves one model, so a rotation onto it is refused for any conversation on another
model instead of silently switching that conversation to nous/welcome (the model pin applies only
when a route is first chosen). The connector token path now treats the free tier as absent when
nous.guest is false, including cached tokens, and shares the one dead-credential rule with
inference: a retired identity is replaced once rather than returning its stale token.

* fix(auth): plain login never imports the free tier as OAuth credentials; the gateway startup line reads persisted state only

A free-tier identity in the shared store is not an OAuth credential to offer for import; a real
sign-in replaces it. The gateway's startup notice now answers provider precedence from persisted
state (no token refresh at boot), so an expired free-tier token cannot stall the online message.
2026-09-11 03:45:31 +05:30

392 lines
16 KiB
Python

"""Generic managed-tool gateway helpers for Nous-hosted vendor passthroughs."""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import logging
import os
from datetime import datetime, timezone
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Callable, Optional
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
from tools.tool_backend_helpers import managed_nous_tools_enabled
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DEFAULT_TOOL_GATEWAY_DOMAIN = "nousresearch.com"
_DEFAULT_TOOL_GATEWAY_SCHEME = "https"
_NOUS_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS = 120
@dataclass(frozen=True)
class ManagedToolGatewayConfig:
vendor: str
gateway_origin: str
nous_user_token: str
managed_mode: bool
def _clean(value: object) -> Optional[str]:
"""*value* stripped when it is a non-blank string, else None."""
return value.strip() if isinstance(value, str) and value.strip() else None
def auth_json_path():
"""Return the Hermes auth store path, respecting HERMES_HOME overrides."""
return get_hermes_home() / "auth.json"
def _read_nous_provider_state() -> Optional[dict]:
"""The profile's Nous state, or None. A free-tier identity counts only while the free tier is on:
with ``nous.guest: false`` it is invisible here, so no cached or refreshed token of it is ever
attached to a request."""
try:
path = auth_json_path()
if not path.is_file():
return None
providers = json.loads(path.read_text(encoding="utf-8-sig")).get("providers", {})
nous_provider = providers.get("nous", {}) if isinstance(providers, dict) else None
if not isinstance(nous_provider, dict):
return None
from hermes_cli.anon_auth import guest_enabled, is_guest_state
if is_guest_state(nous_provider) and not guest_enabled():
return None
return nous_provider
except Exception:
return None
def _parse_timestamp(value: object) -> Optional[datetime]:
normalized = _clean(value)
if normalized is None:
return None
try:
parsed = datetime.fromisoformat(normalized[:-1] + "+00:00" if normalized.endswith("Z") else normalized)
except ValueError:
return None
return (parsed if parsed.tzinfo is not None else parsed.replace(tzinfo=timezone.utc)).astimezone(timezone.utc)
def _access_token_is_expiring(expires_at: object, skew_seconds: int) -> bool:
expires = _parse_timestamp(expires_at)
return expires is None or (expires - datetime.now(timezone.utc)).total_seconds() <= max(0, int(skew_seconds))
def _read_user_token_override() -> Optional[str]:
"""Read the TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN override through the secret scope. Scope verdict is authoritative
when installed (a scoped miss must NOT borrow the process env under multiplex); ``os.environ`` only when unscoped."""
try:
from agent.secret_scope import UnscopedSecretError, get_secret
try:
explicit = get_secret("TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN")
except UnscopedSecretError:
explicit = os.getenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN")
except Exception:
explicit = os.getenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_USER_TOKEN")
return _clean(explicit)
def peek_nous_access_token() -> Optional[str]:
"""Cheap token probe: env override or cached auth-store token, no expiry check and no network —
availability scans must stay off the synchronous OAuth refresh path (:func:`read_nous_access_token`)."""
return _read_user_token_override() or _clean((_read_nous_provider_state() or {}).get("access_token"))
def read_nous_access_token() -> Optional[str]:
"""Read a Nous Subscriber OAuth access token from auth store or env override.
With no Nous identity at all, the free tier is set up here (blocking, short timeout): this is
the guarantee that managed-tool and connector calls always have a bearer once the free tier is
on, whichever surface booted the process.
"""
if explicit := _read_user_token_override():
return explicit
nous_provider = _read_nous_provider_state() or {}
if not nous_provider:
try:
from hermes_cli.anon_auth import ensure_portal_identity
nous_provider = ensure_portal_identity(blocking=True) or {}
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Nous free tier setup from tool gateway skipped: %s", exc)
nous_provider = {}
if not nous_provider:
return None
cached_token = peek_nous_access_token()
if cached_token and not _access_token_is_expiring(nous_provider.get("expires_at"), _NOUS_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS):
return cached_token
try:
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_access_token
if refreshed_token := _clean(resolve_nous_access_token(refresh_skew_seconds=_NOUS_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS)):
return refreshed_token
except Exception as exc:
# Same dead-credential rule as inference (one place decides it: anon_auth): a retired free-tier
# identity is replaced once, here, instead of handing back its stale token forever.
from hermes_cli.anon_auth import AnonCredentialDead
if isinstance(exc, AnonCredentialDead):
return _replace_dead_guest_token(nous_provider)
logger.debug("Nous access token refresh failed: %s", exc)
return cached_token
def _replace_dead_guest_token(dead_state: dict) -> Optional[str]:
from hermes_cli.anon_auth import clear_dead_guest, ensure_portal_identity
from hermes_cli.auth import resolve_nous_access_token
clear_dead_guest("anon_credential_dead", dead_token=dead_state.get("anon_token"))
try:
if ensure_portal_identity(blocking=True) is None:
return None
return _clean(resolve_nous_access_token(refresh_skew_seconds=_NOUS_ACCESS_TOKEN_REFRESH_SKEW_SECONDS))
except Exception as exc:
logger.debug("Nous free tier replacement after a retired credential failed: %s", exc)
return None
def get_tool_gateway_scheme() -> str:
"""Return configured shared gateway URL scheme."""
scheme = os.getenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_SCHEME", "").strip().lower() or _DEFAULT_TOOL_GATEWAY_SCHEME
if scheme not in {"http", "https"}:
raise ValueError("TOOL_GATEWAY_SCHEME must be 'http' or 'https'")
return scheme
def build_vendor_gateway_url(vendor: str) -> str:
"""Return the gateway origin for a specific vendor."""
if explicit_vendor_url := os.getenv(f"{vendor.upper().replace('-', '_')}_GATEWAY_URL", "").strip().rstrip("/"):
return explicit_vendor_url
shared_domain = os.getenv("TOOL_GATEWAY_DOMAIN", "").strip().strip("/") or _DEFAULT_TOOL_GATEWAY_DOMAIN
return f"{get_tool_gateway_scheme()}://{vendor}-gateway.{shared_domain}"
def resolve_managed_tool_gateway(
vendor: str, gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
token_reader: Optional[Callable[[], Optional[str]]] = None) -> Optional[ManagedToolGatewayConfig]:
"""Resolve shared managed-tool gateway config for a vendor."""
if not managed_nous_tools_enabled():
return None
gateway_origin = (gateway_builder or build_vendor_gateway_url)(vendor)
nous_user_token = (token_reader or read_nous_access_token)()
if not gateway_origin or not nous_user_token:
return None
return ManagedToolGatewayConfig(vendor=vendor, gateway_origin=gateway_origin, nous_user_token=nous_user_token, managed_mode=True)
def is_managed_tool_gateway_ready(
vendor: str, gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
token_reader: Optional[Callable[[], Optional[str]]] = None) -> bool:
"""True when a gateway URL and a likely-usable Nous token are present. Defaults to
:func:`peek_nous_access_token` (no OAuth refresh); callers about to make a real request use
:func:`resolve_managed_tool_gateway` instead."""
return resolve_managed_tool_gateway(vendor, gateway_builder=gateway_builder, token_reader=token_reader or peek_nous_access_token) is not None
# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
from urllib.parse import urlsplit # noqa: F401,E402
from urllib.parse import urlsplit # noqa: F401,E402
_MANAGED_GATEWAY_VENDOR = "tool"
def is_managed_nous_gateway_url(
url: object,
gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
) -> bool:
"""True when ``url`` is on the Nous tool-gateway origin this client builds.
Anything granting a URL extra trust — our bearer, reading files off disk to
upload — must gate on this rather than on a name, so an arbitrary URL can
never inherit that trust.
"""
if not isinstance(url, str) or not url.strip():
return False
builder = gateway_builder or build_vendor_gateway_url
try:
expected = urlsplit(builder(_MANAGED_GATEWAY_VENDOR))
actual = urlsplit(url.strip())
except ValueError:
return False
return bool(actual.scheme) and (actual.scheme, actual.netloc) == (expected.scheme, expected.netloc)
def managed_gateway_auth_headers(
url: object,
gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
token_reader: Optional[Callable[[], Optional[str]]] = None,
) -> dict:
"""Live auth headers for a managed gateway URL, or ``{}`` when not managed.
Read fresh on every call rather than cached: a Nous access token expires
within the hour, and a long session would otherwise keep presenting a dead
bearer. Returns ``{}`` rather than raising when no token is available, so a
caller can report "sign in" instead of sending an unauthenticated request.
"""
if not is_managed_nous_gateway_url(url, gateway_builder):
return {}
resolved_token_reader = token_reader or read_nous_access_token
try:
token = resolved_token_reader()
except Exception as exc: # pragma: no cover — defensive
logger.debug("Managed gateway token read failed for %s: %s", url, exc)
return {}
if not isinstance(token, str) or not token.strip():
return {}
return {"Authorization": f"Bearer {token.strip()}"}
_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PRESIGN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 15.0
_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PUT_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 60.0
_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PUT_WRITE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS = 300.0
def _describe_media_upload_refusal(response) -> str:
"""A model-actionable reason from a gateway refusal, or a generic one.
The gateway's 4xx bodies carry deliberate guidance (rate-limit waits, size
caps, "you could not submit anyway"), so surface `error.message` verbatim
rather than a bare status code.
"""
try:
payload = response.json()
message = payload.get("error", {}).get("message")
if isinstance(message, str) and message.strip():
return message.strip()
except Exception:
pass
return f"the gateway refused the upload (HTTP {response.status_code})"
def build_managed_media_uploader(
server_url: object,
upload_path: object,
gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
token_reader: Optional[Callable[[], Optional[str]]] = None,
) -> Optional[Callable]:
"""Async ``(data, mime) -> argument value`` uploader for one managed vendor.
Returns ``None`` when there is no usable upload endpoint (not a managed
Nous URL, or no ``upload_path``); callers then refuse local paths with a
clear message instead of silently forwarding them.
The three steps of the protocol:
1. POST ``origin + upload_path`` with the declared content type and exact
byte length, using the same live auth headers as the vendor calls.
The gateway answers with a presigned single-object PUT URL (short
expiry; type and length are signed into it) and an upload token.
2. PUT the bytes to that URL. This goes directly to storage — never
through the gateway — which is what removes the request-size ceiling.
3. Return ``nous-upload:<token>`` for the tool argument. The token is
bound to this Nous principal and is redeemable only through the
gateway, so it is inert anywhere else it might end up.
"""
if not is_managed_nous_gateway_url(server_url, gateway_builder):
return None
if not isinstance(upload_path, str) or not upload_path.startswith("/"):
return None
parts = urlsplit(str(server_url).strip())
origin = f"{parts.scheme}://{parts.netloc}"
presign_url = f"{origin}{upload_path}"
async def upload(data: bytes, mime: str) -> str:
import httpx
from tools.url_safety import create_ssrf_safe_async_client
headers = managed_gateway_auth_headers(server_url, gateway_builder, token_reader)
if not headers:
raise RuntimeError("no Nous credential is available for the upload")
# Two clients on purpose, split by whose address we are trusting.
#
# The presign POST goes to `presign_url`, which is entirely determined
# by the managed gateway origin (already validated by
# is_managed_nous_gateway_url) plus the pinned upload_path — the same
# first-party host the vendor calls go to freely. SSRF-guarding it
# protects against nothing and would reject a local gateway on
# 127.0.0.1, so it uses a plain client. The PUT target, by contrast, is
# a URL the gateway *returned*, so it keeps the SSRF-safe client as
# defense in depth (real presigned URLs are public R2, which it allows).
presign_timeout = httpx.Timeout(_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PRESIGN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS)
async with httpx.AsyncClient(timeout=presign_timeout) as client:
presign = await client.post(
presign_url,
headers=headers,
json={"contentType": mime, "contentLength": len(data)},
)
if presign.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(_describe_media_upload_refusal(presign))
try:
payload = presign.json()
except Exception:
payload = None
upload_url = payload.get("uploadUrl") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
token = payload.get("token") if isinstance(payload, dict) else None
if not (isinstance(upload_url, str) and upload_url and isinstance(token, str) and token):
raise RuntimeError("the gateway's upload response was malformed")
put_timeout = httpx.Timeout(
_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PRESIGN_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
read=_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PUT_READ_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
write=_MEDIA_UPLOAD_PUT_WRITE_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
)
async with create_ssrf_safe_async_client(timeout=put_timeout) as client:
# The presigned URL signs the exact Content-Type and Content-Length,
# so this PUT must send precisely what was declared above.
put = await client.put(upload_url, content=data, headers={"Content-Type": mime})
if put.status_code != 200:
raise RuntimeError(f"storage refused the upload (HTTP {put.status_code})")
return f"nous-upload:{token}"
return upload
def managed_vendor_base_path(vendor: str) -> str:
"""Base path for a managed vendor's REST routes on the gateway host."""
return f"/api/{vendor}"
def managed_vendor_upload_path(vendor: str) -> str:
"""Media upload endpoint for a managed vendor, on the same host."""
return f"/api/uploads/{vendor}"
def managed_vendor_endpoints(
vendor: str,
gateway_builder: Optional[Callable[[str], str]] = None,
) -> Optional[dict]:
"""Absolute URLs for a managed vendor, or ``None`` when none resolves.
Address resolution only: entitlement is deliberately not consulted here.
What an account may spend on a managed vendor is the gateway's own
decision, stated in its refusals, and re-deciding it on the client can only
ever disagree with the server. A caller that wants to hide its tools from
users who could not call them at all does that in its ``check_fn``.
``None`` means no origin could be resolved — a misconfigured
``TOOL_GATEWAY_SCHEME`` — so there is nothing to call.
"""
builder = gateway_builder or build_vendor_gateway_url
try:
origin = builder(_MANAGED_GATEWAY_VENDOR).rstrip("/")
except ValueError:
return None
if not origin:
return None
return {
"origin": origin,
"base_url": f"{origin}{managed_vendor_base_path(vendor)}",
"upload_path": managed_vendor_upload_path(vendor),
}
# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----