Teknium
460 lines
20 KiB
Python
460 lines
20 KiB
Python
"""Sudo password plumbing and shell-command rewrites for the terminal tool: the per-scope
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interactive password cache, the /dev/tty prompt, the quote-aware shell scanner behind the
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real-sudo rewrite (``sudo -S -p ''``) and the compound-background brace-group rewrite, and
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the NOPASSWD probe.
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Split out of ``tools/terminal_tool.py``; every public/patched name is re-imported there,
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so ``tools.terminal_tool.<name>`` keeps resolving (and monkeypatching) as before.
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"""
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import logging
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import os
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import platform
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import re
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import subprocess
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import sys
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import threading
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import time
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from collections.abc import Iterator
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from utils import env_var_enabled
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# Log-record parity with the origin module.
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logger = logging.getLogger("tools.terminal_tool")
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# Interactive sudo password cache, scoped to the session key when present, else callback
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# identity (ACP / CLI), else the current thread — so one session can never reuse another's
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# cached password in a long-lived process.
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_sudo_password_cache: dict[str, str] = {}
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_sudo_password_cache_lock = threading.Lock()
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def _get_sudo_password_cache_scope() -> str:
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"""Return the cache scope for interactive sudo passwords."""
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from tools.terminal_tool import _current_session_key, _get_sudo_password_callback
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session_key = _current_session_key()
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if session_key:
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return f"session:{session_key}"
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callback = _get_sudo_password_callback()
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if callback is None:
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return f"thread:{threading.get_ident()}"
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owner = getattr(callback, "__self__", None)
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func = getattr(callback, "__func__", None)
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if owner is not None and func is not None:
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return f"callback-owner:{id(owner)}:{id(func)}"
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return f"callback:{id(callback)}"
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def _get_cached_sudo_password() -> str:
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"""Return the cached sudo password for the current scope."""
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scope = _get_sudo_password_cache_scope()
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with _sudo_password_cache_lock:
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return _sudo_password_cache.get(scope, "")
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def _set_cached_sudo_password(password: str) -> None:
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"""Persist a sudo password for the current scope ("" drops the entry)."""
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scope = _get_sudo_password_cache_scope()
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with _sudo_password_cache_lock:
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if password:
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_sudo_password_cache[scope] = password
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else:
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_sudo_password_cache.pop(scope, None)
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def _reset_cached_sudo_passwords() -> None:
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"""Clear all cached sudo passwords (tests / process teardown)."""
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with _sudo_password_cache_lock:
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_sudo_password_cache.clear()
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def _in_delegated_child_context() -> bool:
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"""True while running inside a delegate_task child.
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Subagents run on parent-process worker threads and inherit process-wide
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``HERMES_INTERACTIVE=1``, which does NOT mean this context can reach the user: a raw
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``/dev/tty`` sudo prompt from a child races the TUI for the tty and blocks the child for
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the full timeout. Children must always be headless for sudo prompting. The ContextVar is
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set by ``delegated_child_context()`` and propagates via ``copy_context``.
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"""
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try:
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from agent.delegation_context import is_delegated_child_context
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return is_delegated_child_context()
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except Exception:
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return False
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_SUDO_HEADLESS_FAILURES = ("sudo: a password is required", "sudo: no tty present", "sudo: a terminal is required")
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def _handle_sudo_failure(output: str, env_type: str) -> str:
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"""Append a SUDO_PASSWORD tip when sudo failed in a headless context
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(gateway session or delegate_task child); otherwise return *output* as is."""
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is_gateway = env_var_enabled("HERMES_GATEWAY_SESSION")
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is_delegated_child = _in_delegated_child_context()
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if not (is_gateway or is_delegated_child) or not any(f in output for f in _SUDO_HEADLESS_FAILURES):
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return output
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from hermes_constants import display_hermes_home as _dhh
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if is_delegated_child:
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return output + (
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"\n\n💡 Tip: Subagents cannot prompt for a sudo password. "
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f"Add SUDO_PASSWORD to {_dhh()}/.env on the agent machine, "
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"or run the command without sudo."
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)
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return output + f"\n\n💡 Tip: To enable sudo over messaging, add SUDO_PASSWORD to {_dhh()}/.env on the agent machine."
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# sudo -S rejects a bad cached/interactive password with these messages.
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_SUDO_WRONG_PASSWORD_MARKERS = (
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"sudo: authentication failed",
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"sudo: incorrect password attempt",
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"sudo: maximum 3 incorrect authentication attempts",
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"sudo: 3 incorrect password attempts",
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)
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def _sudo_wrong_password_failure(output: str) -> bool:
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"""Return True when sudo rejected a piped password."""
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lowered = (output or "").lower()
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return any(marker in lowered for marker in _SUDO_WRONG_PASSWORD_MARKERS)
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def _invalidate_cached_sudo_on_auth_failure(command: str | None, output: str) -> bool:
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"""Drop a session-cached sudo password after sudo rejects it. Env-configured
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``SUDO_PASSWORD`` is left alone — an explicit operator choice, not a cache entry."""
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from tools.terminal_tool import _count_real_sudo_invocations, _sudo_wrong_password_failure
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if (
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"SUDO_PASSWORD" in os.environ
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or not _sudo_wrong_password_failure(output)
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or _count_real_sudo_invocations(command or "") == 0
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or not _get_cached_sudo_password()
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):
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return False
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_set_cached_sudo_password("")
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return True
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def _release_tty(tty_fd, old_attrs) -> None:
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"""Restore echo and close the /dev/tty fd opened by the password reader (best effort)."""
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if tty_fd is None:
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return
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if old_attrs is not None:
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try:
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import termios as _termios
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_termios.tcsetattr(tty_fd, _termios.TCSAFLUSH, old_attrs)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.debug("Failed to restore terminal attributes: %s", e)
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try:
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os.close(tty_fd)
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except Exception as e:
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logger.debug("Failed to close tty fd: %s", e)
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def _read_hidden_password(result: dict) -> None:
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"""Read one line with echo disabled into ``result``. Uses msvcrt on Windows, /dev/tty on Unix."""
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tty_fd = old_attrs = None
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try:
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chars = []
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if platform.system() == "Windows":
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import msvcrt
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while (c := msvcrt.getwch()) not in {"\r", "\n"}:
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if c == "\x03":
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raise KeyboardInterrupt
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chars.append(c)
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result["password"] = "".join(chars)
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else:
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import termios
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tty_fd = os.open("/dev/tty", os.O_RDONLY)
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old_attrs = termios.tcgetattr(tty_fd)
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new_attrs = termios.tcgetattr(tty_fd)
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new_attrs[3] = new_attrs[3] & ~termios.ECHO
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termios.tcsetattr(tty_fd, termios.TCSAFLUSH, new_attrs)
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while (b := os.read(tty_fd, 1)) and b not in {b"\n", b"\r"}:
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chars.append(b)
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result["password"] = b"".join(chars).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
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except (KeyboardInterrupt, Exception):
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result["password"] = ""
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finally:
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_release_tty(tty_fd, old_attrs)
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result["done"] = True
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def _prompt_for_sudo_password(timeout_seconds: int = 45) -> str:
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"""Prompt for a sudo password; "" on skip (empty Enter), timeout, or error.
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Prefers the CLI-registered callback (prompt_toolkit-integrated); otherwise reads
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/dev/tty (msvcrt on Windows) with echo disabled. Time spent waiting on the human is
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excluded from tool deadlines via ``human_wait_window``.
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"""
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from tools.terminal_tool import _get_sudo_password_callback
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_sudo_cb = _get_sudo_password_callback()
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if _sudo_cb is not None:
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try:
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from tools.approval import human_wait_window
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with human_wait_window():
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return _sudo_cb() or ""
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except Exception:
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return ""
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result = {"password": None, "done": False}
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try:
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os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"] = "1"
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time.sleep(0.2)
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print("\n".join((
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"",
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"┌" + "─" * 58 + "┐",
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"│ 🔐 SUDO PASSWORD REQUIRED" + " " * 30 + "│",
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"├" + "─" * 58 + "┤",
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"│ Enter password below (input is hidden), or: │",
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"│ • Press Enter to skip (command fails gracefully) │",
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f"│ • Wait {timeout_seconds}s to auto-skip" + " " * 27 + "│",
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"└" + "─" * 58 + "┘",
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"",
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)))
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print(" Password (hidden): ", end="", flush=True)
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password_thread = threading.Thread(target=_read_hidden_password, args=(result,), daemon=True)
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password_thread.start()
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from tools.approval import human_wait_window
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with human_wait_window():
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password_thread.join(timeout=timeout_seconds)
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if not result["done"]:
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print("\n ⏱ Timeout - continuing without sudo\n (Press Enter to dismiss)\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
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return ""
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password = result["password"] or ""
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# Newline after the hidden input, then the outcome line.
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if password:
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print("\n ✓ Password received (cached for this session)\n")
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else:
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print("\n ⏭ Skipped - continuing without sudo\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
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return password
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except (EOFError, KeyboardInterrupt):
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print("\n ⏭ Cancelled - continuing without sudo\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
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return ""
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except Exception as e:
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print(f"\n [sudo prompt error: {e}] - continuing without sudo\n")
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sys.stdout.flush()
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return ""
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finally:
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if "HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE" in os.environ:
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del os.environ["HERMES_SPINNER_PAUSE"]
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def _looks_like_env_assignment(token: str) -> bool:
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"""Return True when *token* is a leading shell environment assignment."""
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if "=" not in token or token.startswith("="):
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return False
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name, _value = token.split("=", 1)
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return bool(re.match(r"^[A-Za-z_][A-Za-z0-9_]*$", name))
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# One shell word: single-quoted run (unterminated ok), double-quoted run with backslash
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# escapes (unterminated ok), a backslash escape (a trailing lone `\` is a plain char), or
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# any char other than whitespace and the metacharacters `;|&()`.
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_SHELL_WORD_RE = re.compile(r"""(?:'[^']*'?|"(?:\\.|[^"])*"?|\\.|[^\s;|&()])*""", re.DOTALL)
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def _read_shell_token(command: str, start: int) -> tuple[str, int]:
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"""Read one shell token, preserving quotes/escapes, starting at *start*."""
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end = _SHELL_WORD_RE.match(command, start).end() # type: ignore[union-attr] (`*` always matches)
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return command[start:end], end
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def _scan_shell(command: str, background: bool = False) -> Iterator[tuple[str, int, int, bool]]:
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"""Quote-aware shell scanner shared by the sudo and compound-background rewriters.
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Yields ``(kind, start, end, at_command_start)`` events that tile *command* exactly:
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``ws`` (one whitespace char), ``comment`` (``#`` up to, not including, the newline),
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``op`` (``&& || ;; ; | & ( )``), ``word`` (one ``_read_shell_token`` token). Comments open
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only at command start (after newline, an operator, or a leading ``VAR=val``) in sudo mode.
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Background mode (compound-background semantics) additionally opens comments anywhere
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outside a token, emits ``escape`` for a bare ``\\x``, ops ``&>``, ``{ `` and a closing
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``}``, and tracks ``(...)``/``{ ... }`` depth: inside a group nothing is an operator, so
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every non-structural char (whitespace included) surfaces as a single ``skip`` event.
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"""
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i, n = 0, len(command)
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at_start = True
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parens = braces = 0
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two_char_ops = ("&&", "||", "&>") if background else ("&&", "||", ";;")
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while i < n:
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ch = command[i]
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grouped = parens or braces
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was_start = at_start
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if ch.isspace():
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kind, end = ("skip" if grouped else "ws"), i + 1
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at_start = at_start or ch == "\n"
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elif ch == "#" and (background or at_start):
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end = command.find("\n", i)
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kind, end = "comment", (n if end == -1 else end)
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elif background and ch == "\\" and i + 1 < n:
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kind, end = "escape", i + 2
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elif background and ch in "'\"":
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kind, end = "word", _read_shell_token(command, i)[1]
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elif background and (
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ch in "()" or (ch == "{" and i + 1 < n and command[i + 1].isspace()) or (ch == "}" and braces)
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):
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parens = max(0, parens + (ch == "(") - (ch == ")"))
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braces += (ch == "{") - (ch == "}")
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kind, end = "op", i + 1
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elif background and grouped:
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kind, end = "skip", i + 1
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elif command.startswith(two_char_ops, i):
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kind, end, at_start = "op", i + 2, True
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elif ch in ";|&()":
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kind, end, at_start = "op", i + 1, ch != ")"
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else:
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token, end = _read_shell_token(command, i)
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kind, at_start = "word", bool(at_start and _looks_like_env_assignment(token))
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yield kind, i, end, was_start
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i = end
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def _rewrite_real_sudo_invocations(command: str) -> tuple[str, int]:
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"""Rewrite only real unquoted sudo command words, not plain text mentions.
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A word is a sudo invocation only at a command-start position (see ``_scan_shell``);
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comments there are copied through verbatim. Returns the rewritten command and the
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number of sudo invocations rewritten.
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"""
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out: list[str] = []
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sudo_count = 0
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for kind, start, end, at_start in _scan_shell(command):
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text = command[start:end]
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if kind == "word" and at_start and text == "sudo":
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text = "sudo -S -p ''"
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sudo_count += 1
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out.append(text)
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return "".join(out), sudo_count
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def _count_real_sudo_invocations(command: str) -> int:
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"""Return how many real sudo command words appear in *command*."""
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return _rewrite_real_sudo_invocations(command)[1]
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def _sudo_nopasswd_works() -> bool:
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"""True when local sudo currently works without prompting.
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Local backend only — Docker/SSH/Modal must not inherit host sudo state. Re-probes every
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call (no cache) so an expired sudo timestamp can't make a later command silently block
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waiting for a password.
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"""
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from tools.terminal_tool import _tenv
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if (_tenv("TERMINAL_ENV", "local").strip().lower() or "local") != "local":
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return False
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try:
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probe = subprocess.run(
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["sudo", "-n", "true"], stdin=subprocess.DEVNULL, stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL,
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stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL, timeout=3, check=False,
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)
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return probe.returncode == 0
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except Exception:
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return False
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def _rewrite_compound_background(command: str) -> str:
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"""Wrap `A && B &` (or `A || B &`) to `A && { B & }` at depth 0.
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Bash binds `&&` tighter than `&`, so `A && B &` backgrounds a subshell that runs B in the
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foreground and waits for it; a long-running B leaves that subshell stuck in ``wait4``
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forever, and its open stdout pipe can keep the terminal tool from returning. The brace
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group keeps `&&`'s skip-B-on-failure semantics without a fork: bash backgrounds B as a
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simple command and exits immediately, orphaning B normally.
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Redirects (``&>``, ``2>&1``), quoted strings, comments and ``(...)``/``{ ... }`` group
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bodies never count as the backgrounding ``&`` (see ``_scan_shell``); tracking brace depth
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also makes the rewrite idempotent. `(...)` subshells have the same bug class but are not
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the common agent pattern; left for a follow-up. Simple ``cmd &`` is left alone — it
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doesn't have the subshell-wait bug.
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"""
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# Position just after the most recent `&&` / `||` at depth 0 in the current statement;
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# -1 when no chain operator is active.
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chain_end = -1
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rewrites: list[tuple[int, int]] = [] # (chain_op_end, amp_pos)
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for kind, start, end, _ in _scan_shell(command, background=True):
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text = command[start:end]
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if kind == "op" and text in ("&&", "||"):
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chain_end = end
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elif kind == "ws" and text == "\n" or kind == "op" and text in (";", "|", "}"):
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# Newline / `;` end a statement, `|` starts a pipeline stage, `}` closes a group.
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chain_end = -1
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elif kind == "op" and text == "&":
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# `&&` and `&>` never reach here; a `>&` / `<&` fd target (look back past
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# whitespace) is a redirect, anything else is the real background operator.
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j = start - 1
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while j >= 0 and command[j].isspace():
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j -= 1
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if j >= 0 and command[j] in "<>":
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continue
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if chain_end >= 0:
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rewrites.append((chain_end, start))
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chain_end = -1
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# Apply rewrites back-to-front so earlier indices remain valid.
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result = command
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for chain_end, amp_pos in reversed(rewrites):
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# Skip whitespace right after the `&&`/`||` so the brace group opens flush against
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# the inner command. `{` needs a trailing space in bash; the closing `}` needs to be
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# preceded by `;` or `&` — we're providing `&` from the backgrounding.
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insert_pos = chain_end
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while insert_pos < amp_pos and result[insert_pos].isspace():
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insert_pos += 1
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result = result[:insert_pos] + "{ " + result[insert_pos:amp_pos] + "& }" + result[amp_pos + 1 :]
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return result
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def _transform_sudo_command(command: str | None) -> tuple[str | None, str | None]:
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"""Rewrite bare ``sudo`` to ``sudo -S -p ''`` when a password is available.
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Shared by every execution environment. Returns ``(command, sudo_stdin)``: ``sudo_stdin``
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is one password line per sudo invocation that the caller must PREPEND to the process
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stdin (sudo -S consumes exactly one line and passes the rest through, so it's safe
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alongside the caller's own stdin_data). Backends that can't pipe stdin (modal, daytona,
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vercel_sandbox) embed the password in the command string themselves. With no password
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available the command is returned unchanged and ``sudo_stdin`` is None, so it fails
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gracefully with "sudo: a password is required". Password sources, in order: configured
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SUDO_PASSWORD, the session cache, then an interactive prompt (45s timeout, cached on
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success) when a UI is reachable.
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"""
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from tools.terminal_tool import _get_sudo_password_callback, _prompt_for_sudo_password, _sudo_nopasswd_works
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if command is None:
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return None, None
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transformed, sudo_count = _rewrite_real_sudo_invocations(command)
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if sudo_count == 0:
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return command, None
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# Scope-aware read: under multiplex the process env may hold another profile's
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# SUDO_PASSWORD; unscoped callers (UnscopedSecretError) keep the os.environ read.
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try:
|
|
from agent.secret_scope import get_secret
|
|
_configured_password = get_secret("SUDO_PASSWORD")
|
|
except Exception:
|
|
_configured_password = os.environ.get("SUDO_PASSWORD")
|
|
has_configured_password = _configured_password is not None
|
|
sudo_password = _configured_password if has_configured_password else _get_cached_sudo_password()
|
|
|
|
# sudoers NOPASSWD hosts must not be forced through the prompt or the -S password pipe
|
|
# (local backend only; re-probed every call).
|
|
if not has_configured_password and not sudo_password and _sudo_nopasswd_works():
|
|
return command, None
|
|
|
|
# delegate_task children inherit HERMES_INTERACTIVE=1 (and possibly a stale
|
|
# thread-local callback on a recycled worker) but have no user on the other side —
|
|
# they always behave as headless; configured password, session cache and the
|
|
# NOPASSWD probe still apply.
|
|
should_prompt_for_sudo = (
|
|
env_var_enabled("HERMES_INTERACTIVE") or _get_sudo_password_callback() is not None
|
|
) and not _in_delegated_child_context()
|
|
if not has_configured_password and not sudo_password and should_prompt_for_sudo:
|
|
sudo_password = _prompt_for_sudo_password(timeout_seconds=45)
|
|
if sudo_password:
|
|
_set_cached_sudo_password(sudo_password)
|
|
|
|
if has_configured_password or sudo_password:
|
|
# Trailing newline is required: sudo -S reads one line per invocation. Compound
|
|
# commands (`sudo a && sudo b`) need one password line each.
|
|
return transformed, (sudo_password + "\n") * sudo_count
|
|
return command, None
|