The manager resolved one user peer in `get_or_create` and froze it onto the
session, then `_flush_session` chose between it and the assistant peer by
role. Every user turn in a shared session landed on that one peer, so the
first person to message the agent collected everyone else's facts — and a
Honcho conclusion, once derived, is not self-correcting.
`resolve_author_peer_id` maps the turn's author onto its own peer using the
alias-then-prefix order `_resolve_user_peer_id` already applies, so an
aliased account reaches the same peer whichever turn it wrote. `sync_turn`
resolves it before starting the write thread, so a following turn cannot
retag a queued write. `_flush_session` then writes each user message under
that peer.
A shared session's roster is open — people and other agents arrive after
the session exists — so `_author_peer_for_session` joins a peer when it
first writes instead of enumerating participants at init. Joins are
remembered per session, and a failed join still writes under the right
peer, losing only the observe config.
Three cases return None and keep the session's own peer: no author named,
the author IS the session's peer, and `pinPeerName` set — that flag is an
explicit request to unify identities, so it still collapses authors in a
shared chat.
An unnamed author stays unattributed rather than defaulting to the owner.
That preserves today's behavior for the transports that send no author, so
those turns still reach the session peer; #83500 owner-gated the memory-file
migration for the same reason.
Display names never become peer IDs — they are attacker-influenceable on
any platform where participants set their own name.
Erosika
6aff2fc65b