A user typed their root password into the Desktop SSH host field
(root@IP:PASSWORD form). Three failures compounded:
1. validateSshTarget() only checked for option injection (leading dash),
control chars, and port range — commas in an IP, whitespace ("ssh "
prefix pastes), and non-numeric ":<segment>" leftovers all dialed ssh
with garbage and failed silently five times.
2. normalizeSshConfig() only strips a ":<segment>" when it is numeric, so
a pasted password stayed glued to the hostname all the way into ssh
argv and the desktop.log connect line.
3. redactSecrets() had no pattern for ssh targets, so the password landed
verbatim in desktop.log and then in a PUBLIC debug-share paste.
Changes:
- validateSshTarget(): reject whitespace, commas, non-numeric colon
segments (with a "never put a password in the host field" hint that
does NOT echo the credential), and garbage hostnames; still accepts
bare IPv6 (::1, fe80::1%eth0). Reject whitespace/@ in user.
- redactSecrets(): new pattern masks any non-numeric segment where a
port belongs in user@host:... strings — defense in depth so future
parse gaps can't leak credentials into logs or debug shares.
- normalizeSshConfig(): strip a pasted leading "ssh " prefix.
- Tests for all three, including the exact incident shapes.
Teknium
6cca9f3e71