224e59df52
The QQ adapter read QQ_APP_ID, QQ_CLIENT_SECRET, the QQ_STT_* backend config and the QQ_ALLOW_ALL_USERS policy flag through raw os.getenv, bypassing the active profile secret scope. In multiplex mode a secondary profile whose secret lives in its own .env (installed as an isolated scope, not into os.environ) would silently fall back to the default/primary profile's value — the same cross-profile collision fixed for the WeChat/weixin adapter in #59662. Route these reads through a scope-aware resolver that reads the profile scope when one is installed (secondary profiles and per-turn inbound) and falls back to os.environ otherwise. The fallback is deliberate: the primary/active profile is constructed without a scope and owns os.environ, so a bare get_secret would raise UnscopedSecretError and break its startup. Mirrors gateway.config._getenv. Adds regression tests including active-profile-no-scope construction (the fail-closed case), plus scope-wins-over-environ, two-profile isolation, single-profile fallback, explicit-config precedence and STT key scoping.