a4c6821218
Buzz platform agents could not use the `buzz` CLI from the terminal tool: the BUZZ_* vars (BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY, BUZZ_AUTH_TAG, BUZZ_RELAY_URL, and the other BUZZ_* names) are added to _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST from the buzz plugin.yaml (messaging category), and env_passthrough refuses to re-allow anything in the blocklist (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). In the reported `hermes acp` scenario the Buzz adapter's register() is never invoked, so the agent runs in-process and its terminal uses _make_run_env directly — there was no path for the platform credentials to reach terminal children. Fix: a terminal-only, first-party carve-out in the scrub paths themselves (not adapter registration). BUZZ_* vars pass through to foreground (_make_run_env) and background/PTY (_sanitize_subprocess_env) terminal children via a new prefix predicate (_TERMINAL_FIRST_PARTY_ENV_PREFIXES). Everything else stays sealed and unchanged: the blocklist itself, the env_passthrough refusal, execute_code scrubbing, hermes_subprocess_env (browser/TUI-host/copilot-executor spawns), and docker children. The GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf seal is preserved because no registration path is opened; skills/config still cannot register these names. Follow-up hardening from review: - First-party matches use the merged env value directly instead of _resolve_passthrough_value: under multiplex with no profile secret scope installed the resolver raised UnscopedSecretError (fail-closed) at call sites like the webhook-filter script runner, a regression where the script previously ran without the var. The vars are the process's own env values and are never scope-resolved. - LocalEnvironment now excludes first-party terminal env names from the shared login-shell snapshot (_additional_profile_scoped_passthrough_names override): BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY can never be in the get_all_passthrough() exclusion set (env_passthrough refuses blocklisted names), so without this a multiplexed gateway would dump profile A's key into hermes-snap-<id>.sh and profile B sharing the collapsed LocalEnvironment would source it — a cross-profile nsec leak. The names are now excluded from the dump and save/restored per command. - Docs now name the _sanitize_subprocess_env consumers (search workers like ddgs, computer-use driver, user-script runners) that also receive first-party platform vars. Fixes #78026 Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>