2776813df3
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive, so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit: git revert <this sha> removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does. What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json): - 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file - 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import, so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one - 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements - 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them) - 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/ relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils) - private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped) Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves; the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
285 lines
12 KiB
Python
285 lines
12 KiB
Python
"""BasicAuthProvider — username/password dashboard auth (no OAuth IDP).
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Login is a credential form (``supports_password`` + ``complete_password_login``); cookies,
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verify, refresh, ws-tickets and logout are the shared framework. Sessions are stateless
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HMAC-signed tokens (no IDP, no database); passwords use stdlib scrypt and login always hashes
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even for an unknown username (no username-enumeration timing oracle). Config: ``dashboard.
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basic_auth.{username,password_hash|password,secret,session_ttl_seconds}`` or the
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``HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_*`` env vars (env wins when non-empty; see ``_settings``).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import base64
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import hashlib
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import hmac
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import json
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import logging
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import os
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import secrets
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import time
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from typing import Optional
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from hermes_cli.dashboard_auth import DashboardAuthProvider, InvalidCredentialsError, RefreshExpiredError, Session
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from plugins.dashboard_auth._shared import (
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NonInteractiveMixin, SkipRegistration, load_config_section, register_provider, resolve_env_or_cfg)
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logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
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_TAG = "dashboard-auth-basic"
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# The middleware transparently refreshes via the 30-day refresh token when the
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# access token lapses, so the TTL controls refresh frequency, not login length.
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_DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS = 12 * 60 * 60
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_REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60
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# Interactive-login scrypt parameters (~16 MiB, a few ms); n must be a power of two.
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_SCRYPT_N = 2**14
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_SCRYPT_R = 8
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_SCRYPT_P = 1
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_SCRYPT_DKLEN = 32
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_SCRYPT_SALT_BYTES = 16
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# HMAC-SHA256 digest is appended to signed tokens as a fixed-length suffix
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# (no separator — binary HMAC bytes can't be confused with a delimiter).
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_SIG_LEN = hashlib.sha256().digest_size
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LAST_SKIP_REASON: str = ""
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# ---- Password hashing (stdlib scrypt) ----
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def hash_password(password: str) -> str:
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"""Return a ``scrypt$n$r$p$<salt_b64>$<dk_b64>`` hash string. Public so operators can
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precompute ``password_hash`` for config.yaml (the plaintext then never sits at rest):
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``python -c "from plugins.dashboard_auth.basic import hash_password; print(hash_password('pw'))"``."""
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salt = secrets.token_bytes(_SCRYPT_SALT_BYTES)
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dk = hashlib.scrypt(
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password.encode("utf-8"), salt=salt, n=_SCRYPT_N, r=_SCRYPT_R, p=_SCRYPT_P, dklen=_SCRYPT_DKLEN, maxmem=0)
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salt_b64, dk_b64 = base64.b64encode(salt).decode(), base64.b64encode(dk).decode()
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return f"scrypt${_SCRYPT_N}${_SCRYPT_R}${_SCRYPT_P}${salt_b64}${dk_b64}"
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def _verify_password(password: str, encoded: str) -> bool:
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"""Constant-time scrypt verify. False on any malformed hash string."""
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try:
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scheme, n_s, r_s, p_s, salt_b64, dk_b64 = encoded.split("$")
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if scheme != "scrypt":
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return False
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n, r, p = int(n_s), int(r_s), int(p_s)
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salt = base64.b64decode(salt_b64)
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expected = base64.b64decode(dk_b64)
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except (ValueError, TypeError):
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return False
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try:
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actual = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode("utf-8"), salt=salt, n=n, r=r, p=p, dklen=len(expected), maxmem=0)
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except (ValueError, MemoryError):
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return False
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return hmac.compare_digest(actual, expected)
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# Verified against when the username is unknown so "no such user" and "wrong
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# password" take comparable time.
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_DUMMY_HASH = hash_password("dummy-password-for-constant-time-verify")
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# ---- Token signing (stateless HMAC-signed blobs) ----
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def _sign(payload: dict, secret: bytes) -> str:
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raw = json.dumps(payload, separators=(",", ":")).encode()
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sig = hmac.new(secret, raw, hashlib.sha256).digest()
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return base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw + sig).decode()
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def _unsign(token: str, secret: bytes, kind: str) -> Optional[dict]:
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"""Return the payload if the signature is valid, ``kind`` matches and it
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is unexpired; ``None`` otherwise (including on any decode error)."""
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try:
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blob = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(token.encode())
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if len(blob) <= _SIG_LEN:
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return None
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raw, sig = blob[:-_SIG_LEN], blob[-_SIG_LEN:]
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expected = hmac.new(secret, raw, hashlib.sha256).digest()
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if not hmac.compare_digest(sig, expected):
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return None
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payload = json.loads(raw)
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except Exception:
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return None
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if payload.get("kind") != kind or payload.get("exp", 0) <= int(time.time()):
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return None
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return payload
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# ---- Provider ----
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class BasicAuthProvider(NonInteractiveMixin, DashboardAuthProvider):
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"""Username/password provider with stateless HMAC-signed sessions."""
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name = "basic"
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display_name = "Username & Password"
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supports_password = True
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_NOT_INTERACTIVE = "BasicAuthProvider is password-only; use complete_password_login."
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_NO_START_LOGIN = (
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"BasicAuthProvider is password-only; there is no OAuth redirect flow. "
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"The login page POSTs to /auth/password-login instead.")
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def __init__(self, *, username: str, password_hash: str, secret: bytes, ttl_seconds: int = _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS) -> None:
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if not username:
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raise ValueError("username must be non-empty")
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if not password_hash:
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raise ValueError("password_hash must be non-empty")
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if len(secret) < 16:
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raise ValueError("secret must be at least 16 bytes")
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self._username = username
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self._password_hash = password_hash
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self._secret = secret
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self._ttl = max(60, int(ttl_seconds))
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# ---- password login ----------------------------------------------------
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def complete_password_login(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> Session:
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# Always run a scrypt verify (real hash if the username matches, else the dummy)
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# and compare the username with compare_digest too, so neither the username nor
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# its length leaks via timing.
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username_ok = hmac.compare_digest(username.encode("utf-8"), self._username.encode("utf-8"))
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password_ok = _verify_password(password, self._password_hash if username_ok else _DUMMY_HASH)
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if not (username_ok and password_ok):
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raise InvalidCredentialsError("invalid username or password")
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return self._mint_session(self._username)
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# ---- session lifecycle -------------------------------------------------
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def verify_session(self, *, access_token: str) -> Optional[Session]:
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payload = _unsign(access_token, self._secret, "access")
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if payload is None:
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return None
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return self._session(str(payload.get("sub", "")), int(payload["exp"]), access_token, "")
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def refresh_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> Session:
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if not refresh_token:
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raise RefreshExpiredError("no refresh token present in session")
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payload = _unsign(refresh_token, self._secret, "refresh")
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if payload is None:
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raise RefreshExpiredError("refresh token expired or invalid")
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return self._mint_session(str(payload.get("sub", self._username)))
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def revoke_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> None:
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# Stateless tokens — nothing to revoke server-side; the session expires within its TTL. Must not raise.
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return None
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# ---- internals ---------------------------------------------------------
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def _mint_session(self, user_id: str) -> Session:
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now = int(time.time())
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exp = now + self._ttl
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return self._session(
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user_id, exp,
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_sign({"sub": user_id, "kind": "access", "exp": exp}, self._secret),
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_sign({"sub": user_id, "kind": "refresh", "exp": now + _REFRESH_TTL_SECONDS}, self._secret))
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def _session(self, user_id: str, exp: int, access_token: str, refresh_token: str) -> Session:
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return Session(
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user_id=user_id, email="", display_name=user_id, org_id="", provider=self.name,
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expires_at=exp, access_token=access_token, refresh_token=refresh_token)
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# ---- Plugin entry point ----
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def _load_config_basic_auth_section() -> dict:
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return load_config_section(logger, _TAG, "dashboard", "basic_auth")
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def _resolve_secret(cfg_section: dict) -> bytes:
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"""Resolve the token-signing secret (base64, hex, or raw text). When unset, generates
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a random per-process secret (sessions then don't survive a restart or span multiple
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workers — logged at INFO)."""
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raw = resolve_env_or_cfg("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET", cfg_section.get("secret"))
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if not raw:
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logger.info(
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"dashboard-auth-basic: no 'secret' configured; generating a random "
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"per-process signing key. Sessions will not survive a restart or span "
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"multiple workers. Set dashboard.basic_auth.secret (or "
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"HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_SECRET) for stable sessions.")
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return secrets.token_bytes(32)
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for decoder in (base64.b64decode, bytes.fromhex):
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try:
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decoded = decoder(raw)
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if len(decoded) >= 16:
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return decoded
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except (ValueError, TypeError):
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pass
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return raw.encode("utf-8")
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def _settings() -> dict:
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"""Resolve BasicAuthProvider kwargs from env/config; raises ``SkipRegistration``."""
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section = _load_config_basic_auth_section()
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def setting(env_name: str, cfg_key: str) -> str:
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return resolve_env_or_cfg(env_name, section.get(cfg_key, ""))
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username = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_USERNAME", "username")
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password_hash = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD_HASH", "password_hash")
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plaintext = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD", "password")
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ttl_raw = setting("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_TTL_SECONDS", "session_ttl_seconds")
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if not username:
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raise SkipRegistration(
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"dashboard.basic_auth.username is not set (and HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_USERNAME "
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"is empty). Set a username and a password (or password_hash) under "
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"dashboard.basic_auth in config.yaml to enable username/password dashboard "
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"login, or use the OAuth provider, or pass --insecure to skip the auth gate.")
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if not password_hash and not plaintext:
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raise SkipRegistration(
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"dashboard.basic_auth.username is set but neither password_hash nor password "
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"is configured. Provide one of them (password_hash is preferred — compute it "
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"with plugins.dashboard_auth.basic.hash_password).",
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level="warning")
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# Precedence: env password (hashed in-memory) overrides any config password_hash so
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# operators can rotate without editing config; a config password_hash wins over a
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# config-only plaintext password (preferred at-rest form).
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plaintext_from_env = os.environ.get("HERMES_DASHBOARD_BASIC_AUTH_PASSWORD", "").strip()
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if plaintext_from_env:
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password_hash = hash_password(plaintext_from_env)
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logger.info("dashboard-auth-basic: hashed env-supplied password in-memory (overrides any config password_hash).")
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elif not password_hash:
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password_hash = hash_password(plaintext)
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logger.info(
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"dashboard-auth-basic: hashed plaintext password in-memory. "
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"For production, precompute dashboard.basic_auth.password_hash "
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"and remove the plaintext password from config.")
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try:
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ttl = int(ttl_raw) if ttl_raw else _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS
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except ValueError:
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ttl = _DEFAULT_TTL_SECONDS
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return {"username": username, "password_hash": password_hash, "secret": _resolve_secret(section), "ttl_seconds": ttl}
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def register(ctx) -> None:
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"""Register ``BasicAuthProvider`` when username + (password or
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password_hash) are configured; a no-op for OAuth / ``--insecure`` setups."""
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global LAST_SKIP_REASON
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LAST_SKIP_REASON = ""
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kwargs, LAST_SKIP_REASON = register_provider(ctx, logger, _TAG, BasicAuthProvider, _settings)
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if kwargs is not None:
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logger.info("dashboard-auth-basic: registered password provider (username=%s)", kwargs["username"])
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# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
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# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
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# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
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# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
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from typing import Any # noqa: F401,E402
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_PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY = {
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'LoginStart': ('hermes_cli.dashboard_auth', 'LoginStart'),
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}
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def __getattr__(name): # PEP 562 — lazy so no import cycles
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target = _PLUGIN_COMPAT_LAZY.get(name)
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if target is None:
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raise AttributeError(f"module {__name__!r} has no attribute {name!r}")
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import importlib
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return getattr(importlib.import_module(target[0]), target[1])
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# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----
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