The normalizer writes alias keys into the entry it is given
(entry['key_env'] = entry['api_key_env'] and entry[snake] =
entry[camel]) while building its normalized copy. Two of its three
callers — get_compatible_custom_providers and
providers_dict_to_custom_providers — pass live sub-dicts straight
from load_config_readonly()'s shared cache (only
_custom_provider_entry_to_provider_config defends with dict(entry)).
A config written with the documented camelCase / api_key_env aliases
therefore gets its cached copy polluted with injected duplicate keys,
violating the cache's explicit no-mutation contract; every later
load_config() deepcopy inherits the duplicates, and any
save_config(load_config()) flow (setup wizard, dashboard writes,
model persist) writes them back to config.yaml. The aux-client TLS
resolution runs this on every auxiliary client build, so the
mutation also happens unlocked on worker threads against a shared
object.
Shallow-copy the entry up front; the function's return value is a
separately-built dict, so behavior is otherwise unchanged.
golldyck
bfe4cbdc2a