Manager tokens: lock generation fence (a Lock acknowledged while `bw unlock`
/ `op signin` is still running discards the late token); tokens record the
unlocking gateway session and are released when THAT session ends, not when
any sibling session in the profile is torn down.
1Password: OP_CONNECT_HOST/TOKEN come from the profile's scoped secret store
like the service token (Connect outranks a service token inside op), never
from the launch environment.
Vault RPCs bind params.profile (home + secret scope) so a shared remote
backend serving several profiles locks/lists/unlocks the requested one;
unknown profile → RPC error, not a crash.
Fill target: inspection stamps are `<nonce>:<index>`; a fill resolves only
its own inspection's stamps, so an interleaved second inspection can no
longer redirect A's password into a newly mounted field (real Chrome: 0
filled, both fields empty).
Desktop Settings: every RPC goes through the owner profile's socket
(requestGatewayForProfile), query keys carry (connection, profile), an owner
change closes dialogs and wipes drafts (a master password typed for A is
never submitted to B; a late list from A never paints under B), and vault.add
secrets travel in a ref consumed by the mutationFn instead of mutation
variables. Three owner-routing invariant tests on the real component.
Docs/PR body: session-scoped release, lock-race semantics, bw --passwordenv.
Teknium
dedc99ec6c