hermes-agent/hermes_cli/dashboard_auth/base.py

"""Abstract base + dataclasses + exceptions for dashboard auth providers."""
from __future__ import annotations

from abc import ABC, abstractmethod
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Optional


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class Session:
    """A verified interactive identity (from ``complete_login`` / ``verify_session``).

    All fields mandatory; providers without orgs set ``org_id=""``. The tokens
    are opaque to Hermes.
    """

    user_id: str
    email: str
    display_name: str
    org_id: str
    provider: str
    expires_at: int  # unix seconds; the access_token's exp claim
    access_token: str
    refresh_token: str


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class TokenPrincipal:
    """A verified non-interactive (service-to-service) caller — the token analog
    of :class:`Session`: one bearer token on one request, no login/cookie/refresh.

    ``principal`` is an opaque stable caller id; ``scopes`` empty means
    "unscoped" (a route MAY enforce a required scope).
    """

    principal: str
    provider: str
    scopes: tuple[str, ...] = ()


@dataclass(frozen=True)
class LoginStart:
    """First leg of the OAuth round trip.

    ``redirect_url`` is the IDP's authorize endpoint; ``cookie_payload`` maps
    cookie name -> serialised PKCE/CSRF state that the auth route sets
    (HttpOnly, Secure over HTTPS, TTL <= 10 min, ``SameSite=None`` over HTTPS
    so it survives the cross-site redirect chain — see ``cookies.set_pkce_cookie``).
    """

    redirect_url: str
    cookie_payload: dict[str, str]


class ProviderError(Exception):
    """IDP unreachable / transient failure. Middleware -> HTTP 503."""


class InvalidCodeError(Exception):
    """OAuth callback ``code``/``state`` failed validation. Middleware -> HTTP 400."""


class InvalidCredentialsError(Exception):
    """Username/password rejected. The route answers a generic 401 (never
    distinguishing unknown user from wrong password — no username oracle)."""


class RefreshExpiredError(Exception):
    """This provider rejects the refresh token. Not proof of ownership in a
    multi-provider deployment, so middleware tries the remaining providers and
    forces re-login only after every reachable one rejects it."""


def classify_jwks_lookup_error(exc: BaseException) -> Exception:
    """Map a ``PyJWKClient.get_signing_key_from_jwt`` failure to the protocol.

    Only a genuine transport failure (``PyJWKClientConnectionError``, or an
    unexpected JWKS shape) is a :class:`ProviderError` (503, never forces logout).
    A non-JWT bearer (``DecodeError``), a JWKS with no key for this ``kid``
    (``PyJWKSetError``) or any other invalid token is simply not verifiable by this
    provider -> :class:`InvalidCodeError` (``verify_session`` returns ``None``).
    Folding "cannot parse" into "cannot reach" once made every opaque bearer a
    fast 503 against a healthy Portal.
    """
    try:
        import jwt
    except Exception:  # pragma: no cover - jwt is a hard dep of these providers
        return ProviderError(f"JWKS lookup failed: {exc!r}")
    # Order matters: DecodeError/PyJWKSetError are checked before their
    # PyJWKClientError / InvalidTokenError parents.
    if isinstance(exc, jwt.PyJWKClientConnectionError):
        return ProviderError(f"JWKS lookup failed: {exc}")
    if isinstance(exc, (jwt.DecodeError, jwt.PyJWKSetError)):
        return InvalidCodeError(f"token not verifiable by this provider: {exc}")
    if isinstance(exc, jwt.PyJWKClientError):
        return ProviderError(f"JWKS lookup failed: {exc}")
    if isinstance(exc, jwt.InvalidTokenError):
        return InvalidCodeError(f"token not verifiable by this provider: {exc}")
    return ProviderError(f"JWKS lookup failed: {exc!r}")


class DashboardAuthProvider(ABC):
    """Protocol every dashboard-auth provider plugin implements.

    Lifecycle: ``start_login`` (redirect URL + PKCE state) -> IDP ->
    ``complete_login`` (code + verifier -> Session) -> ``verify_session`` per
    request -> ``refresh_session`` near expiry -> ``revoke_session`` on logout
    (best-effort, must not raise).

    Failure semantics:
      * ``start_login`` / ``complete_login`` raise ``ProviderError`` when the IDP
        is unreachable; ``complete_login`` raises ``InvalidCodeError`` on a bad
        code/state.
      * ``verify_session`` returns ``None`` for expired/unknown tokens (middleware
        refreshes) and raises ``ProviderError`` when unreachable (503).
      * ``refresh_session`` raises ``RefreshExpiredError`` when the token is invalid
        for that provider (an opaque foreign token looks expired, so middleware
        tries the rest) and ``ProviderError`` on network failure (503, cookies kept).

    Subclasses MUST set ``name`` (stable lowercase id) and ``display_name``.
    Capability flags: ``supports_password`` (credential form +
    ``complete_password_login``; OAuth methods may be ``NotImplementedError``
    stubs), ``supports_token`` (``verify_token`` for the token-auth seam),
    ``supports_session`` (False for token-only credentials such as drain, never
    offered a login). Everything downstream of login is identical for every session.
    """

    name: str = ""
    display_name: str = ""
    supports_password: bool = False
    supports_token: bool = False
    supports_session: bool = True

    @abstractmethod
    def start_login(self, *, redirect_uri: str) -> LoginStart: ...

    @abstractmethod
    def complete_login(
        self, *, code: str, state: str, code_verifier: str, redirect_uri: str,
    ) -> Session: ...

    @abstractmethod
    def verify_session(self, *, access_token: str) -> Optional[Session]: ...

    @abstractmethod
    def refresh_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> Session: ...

    @abstractmethod
    def revoke_session(self, *, refresh_token: str) -> None: ...

    def complete_password_login(self, *, username: str, password: str) -> "Session":
        """Verify a username/password pair and mint a :class:`Session`.

        Only called when ``supports_password`` is True. Raise
        ``InvalidCredentialsError`` on rejection (SHOULD be constant time for
        unknown users — no timing oracle) and ``ProviderError`` when the store is
        unreachable. The default raises so a mis-flagged provider fails loudly.
        """
        raise NotImplementedError(
            f"{type(self).__name__} does not support password login "
            "(set supports_password = True and override "
            "complete_password_login)")

    def verify_token(self, *, token: str) -> "Optional[TokenPrincipal]":
        """Verify a non-interactive bearer token; return its principal.

        Mirrors ``verify_session``: return ``None`` (never raise) for an
        unrecognised token so the seam falls through; raise ``ProviderError`` ONLY
        for a genuine backing-store outage. Shared secrets MUST be compared with
        ``hmac.compare_digest``. The default raises so a mis-flagged provider fails
        loudly.
        """
        raise NotImplementedError(
            f"{type(self).__name__} does not support token auth "
            "(set supports_token = True and override verify_token)")


def assert_protocol_compliance(cls: type) -> None:
    """Raise ``TypeError`` if ``cls`` doesn't fully implement the provider protocol
    (call it from every provider plugin's unit tests)."""
    for attr in ("name", "display_name"):
        if not getattr(cls, attr, ""):
            raise TypeError(f"{cls.__name__} missing or empty attribute: {attr!r}")
    for method in ("start_login", "complete_login", "verify_session", "refresh_session",
                   "revoke_session"):
        if not callable(getattr(cls, method, None)):
            raise TypeError(f"{cls.__name__} missing method: {method}")
    if getattr(cls, "__abstractmethods__", None):
        raise TypeError(
            f"{cls.__name__} has unimplemented abstract methods: {sorted(cls.__abstractmethods__)}")