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hermes-agent/gateway/delivery_ledger.py
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Teknium 2776813df3 compat(plugins): temporary import-path shims for external plugins — ONE commit, revert on schedule
The Sep 2026 decomposition (PR #102117) makes internal import paths a non-API: names now live in
the focused modules that define them. This commit is the ONLY thing keeping the old paths alive,
so external plugins have time to update. It is deliberately a single, unsquashed commit:

    git revert <this sha>

removes every shim, stub and manifest at once on the announced date. Nothing in-tree may depend on
these pointers: scripts/check_compat_pointers.py (wired into lint.yml) fails CI if it does.

What it adds (see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md, compat_manifest.json):
- 332 facade modules get one delimited `PLUGIN-COMPAT` block appended at the end of the file
- 1,172 moved names resolved lazily via a module `__getattr__` (PEP 562) — never a top-level import,
  so no import cycles; facades that already had `__getattr__` get a chained one
- 592 third-party/stdlib names the old modules used to expose, with their original import statements
- 266 public definitions that had been deleted as unused, restored byte-for-byte from the pre-decomposition
  tree (+40 private helpers and 16 imports pulled in only because a restored definition needs them)
- 3 deleted modules recreated as re-export stubs (gateway/startup_watchdog, hermes_cli/observability/
  relay_runtime, tools/environments/modal_utils)
- private names (`_x`) get no pointer: they were never API (3,792 skipped)

Verified: all 335 touched modules import under a fresh HERMES_HOME and every manifest name resolves;
the lint reports zero in-tree uses; ruff clean; targeted suites unchanged.
2026-09-03 17:13:22 -07:00

385 lines
19 KiB
Python

"""Durable delivery-obligation ledger for gateway final responses (rows in the shared ``state.db``;
WAL, owner pid + process-start liveness, bounded retention) so a crash between finalize and
platform ACK cannot lose a response silently. Checkpoints: record_obligation() 'pending' before
any send | mark_attempting() 'attempting' right before the await | mark_delivered() 'delivered'
only on SendResult.success | mark_failed() 'failed' on a definitive rejection. Crash semantics
(never silently resend an ambiguous send): pending = never started, redeliver plainly; attempting
= crashed mid-await, platform MAY have it, redeliver WITH a visible recovered marker; failed =
rejected once, restart is a retry boundary, also marked; delivered = prune. Attempts are capped
and stale rows expire, both -> 'abandoned' (kept briefly, then pruned). Everything is
best-effort: ledger failures must never block a send; callers wrap every call in try/except.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import hashlib
import logging
import os
import sqlite3
import threading
import time
from contextlib import closing, contextmanager
from typing import Any, Dict, Iterator, List, Optional
from hermes_constants import get_hermes_home
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
_DB_LOCK = threading.Lock()
# Redelivery policy knobs (deliberately not config — the ledger is gated by
# ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` and these only matter in the rare recovery path).
MAX_ATTEMPTS = 3
STALE_AFTER_SECONDS = 24 * 60 * 60
_RETENTION_SECONDS = 7 * 24 * 60 * 60
_MAX_ROWS = 500
# Visible prefixes for redeliveries that might duplicate an already-received message (crash mid-send /
# post-rejection retry) — honest at-least-once. Runtime recovery uses a distinct marker: no restart
# occurred, but a network rejection's acknowledgement can still have been lost independently.
RECOVERED_MARKER = "♻️ Recovered reply — the gateway restarted during delivery, so this may be a duplicate:\n\n"
RECONNECTED_MARKER = ("♻️ Recovered reply — the messaging platform reconnected after the original "
"delivery failed, so this may be a duplicate:\n\n")
# Runtime replay is fail-closed: only errors whose send contract proves they are transient reconnect
# failures. Permanent rejects (blocked bot, bad auth, missing chat) must not be retried on reconnect.
_RUNTIME_RETRYABLE_ERRORS = frozenset({"send_path_degraded"})
def _db_path():
return get_hermes_home() / "state.db"
def _connect() -> sqlite3.Connection:
path = _db_path()
path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
conn = sqlite3.connect(path, timeout=10)
try:
_initialize_schema(conn)
except Exception:
conn.close() # a PRAGMA/DDL failure after connect() must not leak the connection
raise
return conn
def _initialize_schema(conn: sqlite3.Connection) -> None:
from hermes_state_wal import apply_wal_with_fallback
apply_wal_with_fallback(conn, db_label="state.db (delivery_ledger)")
conn.execute(
"""CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS delivery_obligations (
obligation_id TEXT PRIMARY KEY,
session_key TEXT NOT NULL,
platform TEXT NOT NULL,
chat_id TEXT NOT NULL,
thread_id TEXT,
content TEXT NOT NULL,
state TEXT NOT NULL,
attempts INTEGER NOT NULL DEFAULT 0,
created_at REAL NOT NULL,
updated_at REAL NOT NULL,
owner_pid INTEGER,
owner_started_at INTEGER,
last_error TEXT,
adapter_profile TEXT
)"""
)
if "adapter_profile" not in {row[1] for row in conn.execute("PRAGMA table_info(delivery_obligations)")}:
try:
conn.execute("ALTER TABLE delivery_obligations ADD COLUMN adapter_profile TEXT")
except sqlite3.OperationalError as exc:
# Concurrent first-use connections can both observe the old schema.
if "duplicate column" not in str(exc).lower():
raise
@contextmanager
def _transaction() -> Iterator[sqlite3.Connection]:
"""Open a connection, commit/rollback on exit, and ALWAYS close it: ``sqlite3.Connection`` as a
context manager only commits/rolls back, so ``with _connect()`` alone leaks a connection (and its
WAL/SHM fds) per call — ``record_obligation`` runs on every final response; exhausts RLIMIT_NOFILE.
On a long-running gateway that exhausts ``RLIMIT_NOFILE`` (the cron-ledger sibling of this bug was
#69567 / PR #69594). ``record_obligation`` runs on every outbound final response, so this ledger is the
highest-frequency leaker.
"""
conn = _connect()
with closing(conn), conn:
yield conn
def _start_time(pid: int) -> Optional[int]:
try:
from gateway.status import get_process_start_time # lazy: tests monkeypatch gateway.status
return get_process_start_time(pid)
except Exception:
return None
def _owner_stamp() -> tuple[int, Optional[int]]:
pid = os.getpid()
return pid, _start_time(pid)
def _owner_alive(pid: Any, started_at: Any) -> bool:
"""True when the recorded owning process still exists (pid + start time)."""
if not pid:
return False
try:
pid = int(pid)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return False
current_start = _start_time(pid)
if current_start is None:
# Start time unreadable: alive iff the pid exists. Route through the cross-platform probe — on Windows
# ``os.kill(pid, 0)`` is NOT a no-op (bpo-14484: it maps to ``GenerateConsoleCtrlEvent(0, pid)`` and could
# Ctrl+C the gateway's own console group). ``_pid_exists`` keeps EPERM-means-alive (pid owned by another user).
try:
from gateway.status import _pid_exists
except Exception:
if os.name == "nt":
return False # never fall back to a raw sig-0 probe on Windows
try:
os.kill(pid, 0) # windows-footgun: ok — POSIX-only fallback branch
return True
except OSError as exc: # incl. ProcessLookupError; EPERM means the pid exists
return isinstance(exc, PermissionError)
try:
return bool(_pid_exists(pid))
except Exception:
return False
try:
return started_at is None or int(current_start) == int(started_at)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return True
def compute_obligation_id(session_key: str, message_ref: str, content: str) -> str:
"""Stable id: same turn + same content re-records idempotently, while distinct threads/topics on one
chat never collide (session_key carries platform/chat/thread; ``message_ref`` = inbound message id)."""
return hashlib.sha256(f"{session_key}|{message_ref}|{content}".encode("utf-8", "replace")).hexdigest()[:24]
def record_obligation(*, obligation_id: str, session_key: str, platform: str, chat_id: str,
thread_id: Optional[str], content: str, adapter_profile: Optional[str] = None) -> None:
"""Record a final response as owed to the platform (state='pending')."""
now, (pid, started) = time.time(), _owner_stamp()
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""INSERT OR REPLACE INTO delivery_obligations
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, state, attempts, created_at, updated_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile)
VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', 0, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)""",
(obligation_id, session_key, platform, str(chat_id), str(thread_id) if thread_id else None,
content, now, now, pid, started, str(adapter_profile).strip() if adapter_profile else "default"))
_prune()
def mark_attempting(obligation_id: str) -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "attempting")
def mark_delivered(obligation_id: str) -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "delivered")
def mark_failed(obligation_id: str, error: str = "") -> None:
_update_state(obligation_id, "failed", error=error)
def release_runtime_claim(obligation_id: str, error: str = "") -> bool:
"""Return an unsent runtime claim to ``failed`` without spending an attempt.
Runtime recovery claims before clearing ``resume_pending`` so two reconnect paths cannot send the
same row; if the flag cannot be cleared no send was attempted and the claim must not consume the
redelivery budget. Fail-closed to the exact current process instance and ``attempting`` state."""
pid, started = _owner_stamp()
if started is None:
return False
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='failed', attempts=CASE
WHEN attempts > 0 THEN attempts - 1 ELSE 0 END,
updated_at=?, last_error=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='attempting'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""",
(time.time(), error[:500] if error else None, obligation_id, pid, started))
return bool(cursor.rowcount)
def _update_state(obligation_id: str, state: str, error: str = "") -> None:
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state=?, updated_at=?, last_error=?
WHERE obligation_id=?""",
(state, time.time(), error[:500] if error else None, obligation_id))
def _claimed_row(oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts, profile, *,
needs_marker: bool, runtime: bool = False) -> Dict[str, Any]:
"""Claimed-row dict handed back for redelivery; ``runtime`` adds the reconnect-marker fields."""
return {"obligation_id": oid, "session_key": session_key, "platform": platform, "chat_id": chat_id,
"thread_id": thread_id, "content": content, "needs_marker": needs_marker,
**({"marker": RECONNECTED_MARKER} if runtime else {}), "profile": profile,
**({"runtime_recovery": True} if runtime else {}), "attempts": attempts + 1}
def sweep_recoverable(now: Optional[float] = None, *, deliverable_platforms: Optional[set] = None,
deliverable_targets: Optional[set] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Claim undelivered rows owned by dead processes; return them for redelivery.
Claiming atomically re-stamps the owner to THIS process and increments ``attempts`` (the UPDATE is
guarded on the previous owner stamp, so a second gateway racing the same sweep cannot double-claim).
Rows over the attempts cap or stale cutoff become 'abandoned'. ``deliverable_platforms`` restricts
claiming to platforms the caller can send on this boot: ``attempts`` is the redelivery budget and
must only be spent on a real send, else a platform that failed to connect burns one attempt per boot
and hits the cap having never been sent once (the stale cutoff still bounds untouched rows).
``deliverable_targets`` further scopes multiplexed gateways by exact ``(platform, adapter_profile)``
so one connected bot cannot spend another disconnected bot's retry budget."""
now, (pid, started) = now if now is not None else time.time(), _owner_stamp()
claimed: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, state, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile
FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state IN ('pending', 'attempting', 'failed')"""
).fetchall()
for (oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, state, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, adapter_profile) in rows:
if _owner_alive(owner_pid, owner_started_at):
continue # a live gateway still owns this row
if attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS: # exhausted -> abandoned
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='abandoned', updated_at=? WHERE obligation_id=?""", (now, oid))
continue
if ((deliverable_platforms is not None and platform not in deliverable_platforms)
or (deliverable_targets is not None and (platform, adapter_profile) not in deliverable_targets)):
continue # no adapter this boot — claiming would spend an attempt on a no-op
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET owner_pid=?, owner_started_at=?, attempts=attempts+1,
updated_at=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND (owner_pid IS ? OR owner_pid=?)""",
(pid, started, now, oid, owner_pid, owner_pid))
if cursor.rowcount: # pending = never started, redeliver plainly; else carry marker
claimed.append(_claimed_row(oid, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts,
adapter_profile, needs_marker=state != "pending"))
return claimed
def sweep_failed_for_runtime(platform: str, now: Optional[float] = None, *,
profile: Optional[str] = None) -> List[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Claim this process's reconnect-retryable failed rows for one adapter.
``profile`` scopes multiplexed gateways to the bot identity that owned the failed send (``None`` =
primary/default adapter); unowned rows and rows owned by another process are left for the
startup/dead-owner sweep. Startup recovery ignores rows owned by a live gateway, so a response
rejected with ``send_path_degraded`` would stay stranded when only the adapter reconnects; this closes
that gap without weakening ownership: only rows stamped to this exact process instance, only
allowlisted transient errors, same attempts/staleness bounds, every update guarded by the prior owner
stamp and ``failed`` state. Claimed rows always carry the reconnect marker (the failed send's ack is
not safe to infer)."""
now, (pid, started) = now if now is not None else time.time(), _owner_stamp()
if started is None: # PID alone cannot distinguish this process from a stale row left after PID
return [] # reuse; runtime replay is optional, so fail closed (startup recovery remains).
expected_profile = "default" if not profile or profile == "default" else str(profile)
claimed: List[Dict[str, Any]] = []
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, platform, chat_id, thread_id,
content, attempts, created_at, owner_pid,
owner_started_at, last_error, adapter_profile
FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state='failed' AND platform=?""", (platform,)).fetchall()
for (oid, session_key, row_platform, chat_id, thread_id, content, attempts, created_at,
owner_pid, owner_started_at, last_error, adapter_profile) in rows:
# Exact process-start matching prevents PID reuse from stealing work.
if (adapter_profile != expected_profile or owner_pid != pid or owner_started_at != started
or str(last_error or "").strip().lower() not in _RUNTIME_RETRYABLE_ERRORS):
continue
owner_guard = (now, oid, owner_pid, owner_started_at)
if attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS or (now - created_at) > STALE_AFTER_SECONDS: # exhausted -> abandoned
conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='abandoned', updated_at=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='failed'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""", owner_guard)
continue
cursor = conn.execute(
"""UPDATE delivery_obligations
SET state='attempting', attempts=attempts+1, updated_at=?
WHERE obligation_id=? AND state='failed'
AND owner_pid IS ? AND owner_started_at IS ?""", owner_guard)
if cursor.rowcount:
claimed.append(_claimed_row(oid, session_key, row_platform, chat_id, thread_id, content,
attempts, adapter_profile, needs_marker=True, runtime=True))
return claimed
def _prune(now: Optional[float] = None) -> None:
now = now if now is not None else time.time()
try:
with _transaction() as conn:
conn.execute(
"""DELETE FROM delivery_obligations
WHERE state IN ('delivered', 'abandoned') AND updated_at < ?""", (now - _RETENTION_SECONDS,))
total = conn.execute("SELECT COUNT(*) FROM delivery_obligations").fetchone()[0]
if total > _MAX_ROWS:
conn.execute(
"""DELETE FROM delivery_obligations WHERE obligation_id IN (
SELECT obligation_id FROM delivery_obligations
ORDER BY CASE state
WHEN 'delivered' THEN 0
WHEN 'abandoned' THEN 1
ELSE 2
END, updated_at ASC
LIMIT ?)""", (total - _MAX_ROWS,))
except Exception:
logger.debug("delivery ledger prune failed", exc_info=True)
def ledger_enabled(config: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> bool:
"""Read the ``gateway.delivery_ledger`` config gate (default on)."""
try:
if config is None:
from hermes_cli.config import load_config
config = load_config()
value = (config.get("gateway") or {}).get("delivery_ledger", True)
return value.strip().lower() not in {"false", "0", "no", "off"} if isinstance(value, str) else bool(value)
except Exception:
return True
# ---- BEGIN PLUGIN-COMPAT (revert-scheduled; see COMPAT_MANIFEST.md) ----
# Names external plugins imported from this module before the Sep 2026 decomposition.
# Internal code MUST NOT use these (scripts/check_compat_pointers.py fails CI if it does).
# The whole block is removed by reverting the commit that added it.
import json # noqa: F401,E402
import json # noqa: F401,E402
def debug_rows(limit: int = 20) -> str:
"""Human-readable dump for ad-hoc inspection (sqlite3-free path)."""
with _DB_LOCK, _transaction() as conn:
rows = conn.execute(
"""SELECT obligation_id, session_key, state, attempts,
created_at, updated_at, last_error
FROM delivery_obligations
ORDER BY updated_at DESC LIMIT ?""",
(limit,),
).fetchall()
return json.dumps(
[
{
"id": r[0], "session": r[1], "state": r[2], "attempts": r[3],
"created_at": r[4], "updated_at": r[5], "last_error": r[6],
}
for r in rows
],
indent=2,
)
# ---- END PLUGIN-COMPAT ----