docs(api-server): MCP trust-gate consent surfaces as approval.request on /v1/runs
Document that an untrusted-server write-capable MCP tool now parks a run in
waiting_for_approval and is resolved through POST /v1/runs/{id}/approval,
the same bridge dangerous-command approvals already use.
Part of #111526
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@@ -538,6 +538,8 @@ running.
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Resolve a pending approval for a run that is waiting on a human decision (for example, a tool call gated behind an approval policy). The body carries the approval decision; the run resumes once the decision is recorded. This endpoint is advertised in `/v1/capabilities` as the `run_approval` feature so external UIs can detect support before surfacing an approval prompt.
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MCP trust-gate consent — a write-capable tool on a server configured `trust: untrusted` — surfaces the same way: the run emits an `approval.request` event and parks in `waiting_for_approval` until this endpoint resolves it (`once` runs the tool, `deny` blocks it).
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## Jobs API (background scheduled work)
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The server exposes a lightweight jobs CRUD surface for managing scheduled / background agent runs from a remote client. All endpoints are gated behind the same bearer auth.
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