fix(auth): make the Anthropic refresh commit part of the transaction

Anthropic OAuth refresh tokens are single-use: the POST that returns a new
pair invalidates the one that was sent. The replacement therefore only
becomes real once it reaches its authoritative store -
~/.claude/.credentials.json for claude_code entries,
~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json for hermes_pkce ones. Both writers caught
OSError/IOError, logged at debug level and returned nothing, so no caller
could tell a durable commit from a failed one.

That let a refresh spend the only refresh token, report success, and leave
the consumed pre-rotation pair on disk. _seed_from_singletons() re-reads
those files on every load_pool(), so the next process seeded the spent pair
back over the fresh pool row and the following refresh replayed a consumed
token (invalid_grant / refresh_token_reused) - exactly the failure this PR
set out to remove.

- _write_claude_code_credentials() and _write_hermes_oauth_credentials()
  now raise CredentialPersistError instead of swallowing the write error.
- _refresh_oauth_token() treats a failed commit as a failed refresh and
  returns None rather than handing back an access token whose refresh half
  was lost.
- _refresh_entry_impl() fails closed on both the primary and the recovery
  path: the rotated pair is never marked, persisted or returned, and the
  entry is quarantined DEAD with a credential_persist_failed reason so it
  leaves rotation and surfaces as an explicit re-auth instead of a silent
  fallback to another provider. The retry path now commits to the singleton
  before persisting the pool row.
- _upsert_entry() no longer treats re-seeding a borrowed source as a
  rotation. Borrowed rows (claude_code, env-backed) are written to auth.json
  without their secret, so comparing the re-seeded token against the empty
  stored value reported a rotation on every load and cleared the DEAD state
  the previous process had just written - resurrecting the quarantined,
  already-consumed credential on restart. It now compares the incoming
  token against the row's secret_fingerprint.

Adds failure-injection coverage for both writers, the direct resolver, the
claude_code and hermes_pkce pool paths and the retry path, each asserting
that a reload cannot bring the pre-refresh pair back as a usable credential.
This commit is contained in:
joaomarcos
2026-08-27 05:41:14 -03:00
committed by Teknium
parent 0099f250c2
commit 07faed33bb
4 changed files with 614 additions and 25 deletions
+66 -7
View File
@@ -1022,6 +1022,29 @@ def build_anthropic_bedrock_client(region: str):
)
class CredentialPersistError(RuntimeError):
"""A rotated single-use credential could not be durably committed.
Anthropic OAuth refresh tokens are single-use: a successful refresh POST
consumes the old refresh token server-side and returns a replacement. The
replacement exists only in memory until it reaches its authoritative
on-disk store (``~/.claude/.credentials.json`` for ``claude_code``,
``~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json`` for ``hermes_pkce``).
If that write fails and the caller reports success anyway, the on-disk
(already consumed) pair survives and is re-seeded on the next
``load_pool()``, so the following refresh replays a spent token and fails
with ``invalid_grant`` / ``refresh_token_reused``. Callers must therefore
treat this as a failed refresh, not a successful one, and fail closed.
"""
def __init__(self, path: Any, cause: BaseException) -> None:
super().__init__(
f"failed to durably persist rotated Anthropic credentials to {path}: {cause}"
)
self.path = path
def _read_claude_code_credentials_from_keychain() -> Optional[Dict[str, Any]]:
"""Read Claude Code OAuth credentials from the macOS Keychain.
@@ -1300,16 +1323,35 @@ def _refresh_oauth_token(creds: Dict[str, Any]) -> Optional[str]:
try:
refreshed = refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure(refresh_token, use_json=False)
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Failed to refresh Claude Code token: %s", e)
return None
# The POST above already consumed ``refresh_token`` server-side.
# Writing the replacement pair is the commit step of that
# transaction, not a cache update: if it fails, the rotation is
# unrecoverable and the pair still on disk is spent. Fail closed
# rather than handing back an access token whose refresh half was
# lost — reporting success here is what lets a later load replay
# the consumed token and produce ``invalid_grant``.
try:
_write_claude_code_credentials(
refreshed["access_token"],
refreshed["refresh_token"],
refreshed["expires_at_ms"],
)
logger.debug("Successfully refreshed Claude Code OAuth token")
return refreshed["access_token"]
except Exception as e:
logger.debug("Failed to refresh Claude Code token: %s", e)
logger.error(
"Anthropic OAuth refresh rotated the single-use token but could not "
"commit it to %s (%s) — treating the refresh as failed; "
"re-run 'claude setup-token' to reauthenticate",
claude_code_credentials_path(),
e,
)
return None
logger.debug("Successfully refreshed Claude Code OAuth token")
return refreshed["access_token"]
except Exception as e:
# Lock acquisition/read failures should preserve the resolver's
# existing fail-soft contract rather than taking down agent startup.
@@ -1330,6 +1372,12 @@ def _write_claude_code_credentials(
is persisted so that Claude Code's own auth check recognises the credential
as valid. Claude Code >=2.1.81 gates on the presence of ``"user:inference"``
in the stored scopes before it will use the token.
Raises ``CredentialPersistError`` when the rotated pair does not reach the
file. This write is the commit step of the refresh transaction, not a
best-effort cache update: a swallowed failure leaves the consumed
pre-rotation pair on disk to be re-seeded and replayed (see
``CredentialPersistError``).
"""
cred_path = claude_code_credentials_path()
try:
@@ -1381,8 +1429,12 @@ def _write_claude_code_credentials(
except OSError:
pass
raise
except (OSError, IOError) as e:
logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed credentials: %s", e)
except (OSError, IOError, ValueError) as e:
# ValueError covers a corrupt existing file (JSONDecodeError): the
# merge-read is part of the commit, so failing it means the rotated
# pair never landed either.
logger.error("Failed to write refreshed credentials to %s: %s", cred_path, e)
raise CredentialPersistError(cred_path, e) from e
def _resolve_claude_code_token_from_credentials(creds: Optional[Dict[str, Any]] = None) -> Optional[str]:
@@ -1761,6 +1813,10 @@ def _write_hermes_oauth_credentials(
runs ``_seed_from_singletons()``, which reads the stale file and
overwrites the freshly-rotated pool entry with the pre-refresh (and, for
single-use Anthropic refresh tokens, already-consumed) token pair.
Raises ``CredentialPersistError`` when the rotated pair does not reach the
file, for the same reason ``_write_claude_code_credentials`` does: this is
the commit step of the refresh transaction.
"""
oauth_file = _get_hermes_oauth_file()
try:
@@ -1788,8 +1844,11 @@ def _write_hermes_oauth_credentials(
except OSError:
pass
raise
except (OSError, IOError) as e:
logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed Hermes OAuth credentials: %s", e)
except (OSError, IOError, ValueError) as e:
logger.error(
"Failed to write refreshed Hermes OAuth credentials to %s: %s", oauth_file, e
)
raise CredentialPersistError(oauth_file, e) from e
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+9
View File
@@ -130,6 +130,15 @@ def _fingerprint_value(value: Any) -> str | None:
return f"sha256:{digest[:16]}"
def fingerprint_secret_value(value: Any) -> str | None:
"""Public, non-reversible fingerprint for a single secret value.
Callers that compare a live secret against the ``secret_fingerprint`` left
on a sanitized (borrowed) pool row need the same digest this module writes.
"""
return _fingerprint_value(value)
def _credential_secret_fingerprint(payload: Mapping[str, Any]) -> str | None:
for key in ("agent_key", "access_token", "refresh_token", "api_key", "token", "secret"):
fingerprint = _fingerprint_value(payload.get(key))
+105 -18
View File
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ from hermes_constants import OPENROUTER_BASE_URL
from hermes_cli.config import load_env
from agent.secret_scope import get_secret as _get_secret
from agent.credential_persistence import (
fingerprint_secret_value,
is_borrowed_credential_source,
sanitize_borrowed_credential_payload,
)
@@ -87,6 +88,14 @@ _TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS = frozenset({
"refresh_token_reused", # Single-use refresh token consumed by another process
})
# Locally generated terminal reason (no HTTP status involved): a refresh POST
# rotated a single-use pair but the replacement never reached its
# authoritative store, so the pre-rotation token still on disk is already
# spent and no retry can recover it. Kept out of _TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS —
# that set classifies upstream-reported 401 reasons — and handled explicitly
# in _is_terminal_auth_failure().
CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON = "credential_persist_failed"
# How long a DEAD manual credential is preserved before being pruned.
# Manual entries (``manual:*``) are independent credentials with no singleton
# to re-seed from, so pruning them after a quiet window cleans up dead state
@@ -862,13 +871,18 @@ class CredentialPool:
Returns False for non-401 status codes — 429 rate limits and 402
billing failures are transient by nature and should keep TTL semantics.
The one status-independent case is
``CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON``: no upstream response is involved
at all, the rotated pair simply never became durable and only a
re-auth can recover it.
"""
raw_reason = normalized_error.get("reason")
reason = raw_reason.strip().lower() if isinstance(raw_reason, str) else ""
if reason == CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON:
return True
if status_code != 401:
return False
reason = normalized_error.get("reason")
if not isinstance(reason, str):
return False
return reason.strip().lower() in _TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS
return reason in _TERMINAL_AUTH_REASONS
def _mark_exhausted(
self,
@@ -1497,6 +1511,50 @@ class CredentialPool:
target_path=claude_code_credentials_path(),
)
def _fail_closed_unpersisted_rotation(
self,
entry: PooledCredential,
exc: BaseException,
*,
store: str,
) -> None:
"""Quarantine an entry whose rotated pair never reached its store.
Anthropic refresh tokens are single-use, and for ``claude_code`` /
``hermes_pkce`` sources the singleton file — not ``auth.json`` — is the
authoritative copy: ``_seed_from_singletons()`` re-reads it on every
``load_pool()`` and overwrites the pool entry with whatever it finds.
So when the refresh POST succeeded but the singleton write failed, the
rotation is not durable: the replacement pair exists only in memory,
while the consumed pre-rotation pair survives on disk and would be
re-seeded over any pool row we persisted. Persisting or returning the
rotated entry here would report a success that a restart silently
undoes, and the next refresh would replay the spent token
(``invalid_grant`` / ``refresh_token_reused``).
Fail closed instead: never expose or persist the rotated pair, and mark
the entry terminally so it leaves rotation and surfaces as an explicit
re-auth requirement rather than a silent fallback to another provider.
"""
logger.error(
"Anthropic %s refresh rotated the single-use token but could not commit it "
"to %s (%s) — failing closed and quarantining the credential; "
"re-authenticate to recover",
entry.source,
store,
exc,
)
self._mark_exhausted(
entry,
None,
{
"reason": CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON,
"message": f"rotated credential was not durably written to {store}: {exc}",
},
)
return None
def _single_use_refresh_lock_timeout(self) -> float:
"""Lock timeout for single-use-refresh-token providers.
@@ -1547,7 +1605,14 @@ class CredentialPool:
refreshed["expires_at_ms"],
)
except Exception as wexc:
logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed token to credentials file: %s", wexc)
# Authoritative commit failed: do not mark, persist or
# return the rotation as successful. Returning from
# inside this ``try`` deliberately bypasses the
# ``except Exception`` recovery below — that path
# re-POSTs, and there is nothing left to retry with.
return self._fail_closed_unpersisted_rotation(
entry, wexc, store="~/.claude/.credentials.json"
)
# Same rationale for the singleton source hermes_pkce:
# _seed_from_singletons() reads ~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json
# on every load_pool() and will re-seed the pre-refresh (and
@@ -1565,7 +1630,10 @@ class CredentialPool:
refreshed["expires_at_ms"],
)
except Exception as wexc:
logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed token to Hermes OAuth file: %s", wexc)
# Same transaction rule as claude_code above.
return self._fail_closed_unpersisted_rotation(
entry, wexc, store="~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json"
)
elif self.provider == "openai-codex":
# Adopt fresher tokens from auth.json before spending the
# refresh_token — single-use tokens consumed by another Hermes
@@ -1628,6 +1696,22 @@ class CredentialPool:
synced.refresh_token,
use_json=synced.source.endswith("hermes_pkce"),
)
# Commit to the authoritative singleton BEFORE marking
# or persisting the pool row. The previous order
# persisted an "ok" entry that a failed write left
# unbacked, and the next load_pool() re-seeded the
# consumed pair straight over it.
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _write_claude_code_credentials
_write_claude_code_credentials(
refreshed["access_token"],
refreshed["refresh_token"],
refreshed["expires_at_ms"],
)
except Exception as wexc:
return self._fail_closed_unpersisted_rotation(
synced, wexc, store="~/.claude/.credentials.json"
)
updated = replace(
synced,
access_token=refreshed["access_token"],
@@ -1639,15 +1723,6 @@ class CredentialPool:
)
self._replace_entry(synced, updated)
self._persist()
try:
from agent.anthropic_adapter import _write_claude_code_credentials
_write_claude_code_credentials(
refreshed["access_token"],
refreshed["refresh_token"],
refreshed["expires_at_ms"],
)
except Exception as wexc:
logger.debug("Failed to write refreshed token to credentials file (retry path): %s", wexc)
return updated
except Exception as retry_exc:
logger.debug("Retry refresh also failed: %s", retry_exc)
@@ -2626,11 +2701,23 @@ def _upsert_entry(entries: List[PooledCredential], provider: str, source: str, p
field_updates = {}
extra_updates = {}
_field_names = {f.name for f in fields(existing)}
incoming_token = payload.get("access_token")
token_changed = (
"access_token" in payload
and payload["access_token"] is not None
and payload["access_token"] != existing.access_token
incoming_token is not None
and incoming_token != existing.access_token
)
if token_changed and not existing.access_token:
# Borrowed sources (``claude_code``, env-backed rows, ...) are written
# to auth.json without their secret: a reloaded entry carries only a
# ``secret_fingerprint``. Comparing the freshly re-seeded token against
# that empty string reports a rotation on *every* load, which silently
# cleared the DEAD/exhausted state the previous process had just
# persisted — resurrecting a quarantined credential on restart.
# Compare fingerprints instead, so only a genuinely different secret
# counts as a rotation.
known_fingerprint = existing.extra.get("secret_fingerprint")
if isinstance(known_fingerprint, str) and known_fingerprint:
token_changed = fingerprint_secret_value(incoming_token) != known_fingerprint
for key, value in payload.items():
if key in {"id", "priority"} or value is None:
continue
@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
"""Failure-injection coverage for the Anthropic refresh *commit* step.
Anthropic OAuth refresh tokens are single-use: the POST that returns a new
pair also invalidates the one that was sent. The replacement therefore exists
only in memory until it reaches its authoritative on-disk store —
``~/.claude/.credentials.json`` for ``claude_code`` entries,
``~/.hermes/.anthropic_oauth.json`` for ``hermes_pkce`` ones. Those singletons
are authoritative in the strict sense: ``_seed_from_singletons()`` re-reads
them on every ``load_pool()`` and writes what it finds over the pool row.
Before this coverage existed, both writers caught ``OSError``/``IOError``,
logged at debug level, and returned nothing, so no caller could tell a durable
commit from a failed one. A refresh could therefore spend the only refresh
token, report success, and leave the consumed pre-rotation pair on disk to be
re-seeded — with the next refresh replaying a spent token and failing with
``invalid_grant`` / ``refresh_token_reused``.
Every test here forces the writer to fail and asserts the same invariant from
a different entry point: the rotation is never reported, marked, or persisted
as successful, and a subsequent ``load_pool()`` cannot bring the pre-refresh
pair back as a usable credential.
Companions: ``test_credential_pool_oauth_writethrough.py`` covers the
successful write-through, ``test_credential_pool_anthropic_refresh_race.py``
the contention between two refreshers.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import time
import pytest
from agent import anthropic_adapter as AA
from agent.anthropic_adapter import CredentialPersistError
from agent.credential_pool import (
AUTH_TYPE_OAUTH,
CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON,
STATUS_DEAD,
CredentialPool,
PooledCredential,
load_pool,
)
# Far enough in the past that every ``_entry_needs_refresh`` check fires.
_EXPIRED_MS = 1_000
# Synthetic, non-functional token material.
_STALE_ACCESS = "sk-ant-oat01-stale"
_STALE_REFRESH = "sk-ant-ort01-stale"
_ROTATED_ACCESS = "sk-ant-oat01-rotated"
_ROTATED_REFRESH = "sk-ant-ort01-rotated"
@pytest.fixture
def hermes_home(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Real on-disk HERMES_HOME so ``load_pool()`` re-reads what we persisted."""
home = tmp_path / "hermes"
home.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(home))
monkeypatch.delenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("ANTHROPIC_TOKEN", raising=False)
(home / "auth.json").write_text(
json.dumps({"version": 1, "providers": {}}), encoding="utf-8"
)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"hermes_cli.auth.is_provider_explicitly_configured", lambda pid: True
)
return home
@pytest.fixture
def claude_credentials(tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""Point the ``claude_code`` singleton at a tmp file holding a stale pair."""
cred_path = tmp_path / "claude" / ".credentials.json"
cred_path.parent.mkdir(parents=True, exist_ok=True)
cred_path.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"claudeAiOauth": {
"accessToken": _STALE_ACCESS,
"refreshToken": _STALE_REFRESH,
"expiresAt": _EXPIRED_MS,
"scopes": ["user:inference", "user:profile"],
}
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "claude_code_credentials_path", lambda: cred_path)
# The Keychain reader shadows the file on macOS; keep the file the only
# source so this suite behaves identically on every platform.
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "_read_claude_code_credentials_from_keychain", lambda: None)
return cred_path
def _rotating_refresh(*_a, **_kw):
"""Stand-in for the token endpoint: always rotates the pair."""
return {
"access_token": _ROTATED_ACCESS,
"refresh_token": _ROTATED_REFRESH,
"expires_at_ms": int(time.time() * 1000) + 3_600_000,
}
# Only the two authoritative Anthropic singletons are made unwritable. The
# pool's own ``auth.json`` commit must keep working, otherwise the quarantine
# these tests assert on could never be persisted and the injection would be
# proving the wrong failure.
_SINGLETON_FILENAMES = frozenset({".credentials.json", ".anthropic_oauth.json"})
def _break_durable_write(monkeypatch):
"""Make the singleton atomic rename fail, i.e. the commit never lands."""
real_replace = os.replace
def _failing_replace(src, dst):
if os.path.basename(os.fspath(dst)) in _SINGLETON_FILENAMES:
raise OSError(13, "Permission denied")
return real_replace(src, dst)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA.os, "replace", _failing_replace)
def _entry(source: str) -> PooledCredential:
return PooledCredential(
provider="anthropic",
id="anthropic-1",
label="anthropic oauth",
auth_type=AUTH_TYPE_OAUTH,
priority=0,
source=source,
access_token=_STALE_ACCESS,
refresh_token=_STALE_REFRESH,
expires_at_ms=_EXPIRED_MS,
)
def _read_claude_pair(cred_path):
data = json.loads(cred_path.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))["claudeAiOauth"]
return data["accessToken"], data["refreshToken"]
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# The writers themselves
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_claude_code_writer_raises_instead_of_swallowing(
claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
"""A failed durable write must be reported, not logged and dropped."""
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
with pytest.raises(CredentialPersistError):
AA._write_claude_code_credentials(
_ROTATED_ACCESS, _ROTATED_REFRESH, _EXPIRED_MS + 3_600_000
)
assert _read_claude_pair(claude_credentials) == (_STALE_ACCESS, _STALE_REFRESH), (
"the failed commit must leave the previous file contents intact"
)
def test_hermes_oauth_writer_raises_instead_of_swallowing(hermes_home, monkeypatch):
oauth_file = hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json"
oauth_file.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"accessToken": _STALE_ACCESS,
"refreshToken": _STALE_REFRESH,
"expiresAt": _EXPIRED_MS,
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
with pytest.raises(CredentialPersistError):
AA._write_hermes_oauth_credentials(
_ROTATED_ACCESS, _ROTATED_REFRESH, _EXPIRED_MS + 3_600_000
)
on_disk = json.loads(oauth_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert on_disk["refreshToken"] == _STALE_REFRESH
def test_failed_write_leaves_no_temp_file_behind(claude_credentials, monkeypatch):
"""The 0600 temp file must not survive a failed commit."""
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
with pytest.raises(CredentialPersistError):
AA._write_claude_code_credentials(_ROTATED_ACCESS, _ROTATED_REFRESH, 0)
leftovers = [
p.name for p in claude_credentials.parent.iterdir() if ".tmp." in p.name
]
assert leftovers == [], f"temp credential files left on disk: {leftovers}"
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Direct resolver path (resolve_anthropic_token -> _refresh_oauth_token)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_direct_resolver_fails_closed_when_rotation_cannot_commit(
claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
"""``_refresh_oauth_token`` must not hand back a token it could not persist.
The refresh POST has already spent ``_STALE_REFRESH``; returning the new
access token here would report a rotation that no restart can reproduce,
because the refresh half of the pair was lost with the failed write.
"""
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _rotating_refresh)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
creds = AA.read_claude_code_credentials()
assert creds is not None
assert AA._refresh_oauth_token(creds) is None, (
"a refresh whose authoritative write failed must be reported as a "
"failed refresh, not as a usable access token"
)
assert _read_claude_pair(claude_credentials) == (_STALE_ACCESS, _STALE_REFRESH)
def test_resolve_from_credentials_returns_none_on_failed_commit(
claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
"""The resolver wrapper propagates the fail-closed verdict."""
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _rotating_refresh)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
assert AA._resolve_claude_code_token_from_credentials() is None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pool path: claude_code
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_pool_claude_code_fails_closed_and_reload_cannot_resurrect(
hermes_home, claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _rotating_refresh)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
entry = _entry("claude_code")
pool = CredentialPool("anthropic", [entry])
assert pool._refresh_entry(entry, force=True) is None, (
"an uncommitted rotation must not be returned as a refreshed credential"
)
quarantined = pool.entries()[0]
assert quarantined.last_status == STATUS_DEAD
assert quarantined.last_error_reason == CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON
assert quarantined.access_token == _STALE_ACCESS, (
"the rotated pair must never be adopted onto the entry: it is not "
"backed by the authoritative store"
)
assert quarantined.refresh_token == _STALE_REFRESH
assert _read_claude_pair(claude_credentials) == (_STALE_ACCESS, _STALE_REFRESH)
reloaded = [
e for e in load_pool("anthropic").entries() if e.source == "claude_code"
]
assert reloaded, "the entry should still exist after reload"
assert reloaded[0].refresh_token == _STALE_REFRESH
assert reloaded[0].last_status == STATUS_DEAD, (
"a reload must not resurrect the pre-refresh pair as a usable "
"credential — that token was already consumed by the refresh POST"
)
def test_reauthentication_clears_the_persist_failure_quarantine(
hermes_home, claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
"""The quarantine is terminal for the spent pair, not for the account.
Re-running ``claude setup-token`` rewrites the singleton with a genuinely
new access token; ``_upsert_entry`` sees the token change and clears the
terminal status, so the user recovers without hand-editing auth.json.
"""
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _rotating_refresh)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
entry = _entry("claude_code")
pool = CredentialPool("anthropic", [entry])
assert pool._refresh_entry(entry, force=True) is None
assert pool.entries()[0].last_status == STATUS_DEAD
# Restore a working filesystem, then simulate the re-login rewriting the
# authoritative file with a genuinely new pair.
monkeypatch.undo()
monkeypatch.setenv("HERMES_HOME", str(hermes_home))
monkeypatch.delenv("ANTHROPIC_API_KEY", raising=False)
monkeypatch.delenv("ANTHROPIC_TOKEN", raising=False)
monkeypatch.setattr(
"hermes_cli.auth.is_provider_explicitly_configured", lambda pid: True
)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "claude_code_credentials_path", lambda: claude_credentials)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "_read_claude_code_credentials_from_keychain", lambda: None)
claude_credentials.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"claudeAiOauth": {
"accessToken": "sk-ant-oat01-relogin",
"refreshToken": "sk-ant-ort01-relogin",
"expiresAt": int(time.time() * 1000) + 3_600_000,
"scopes": ["user:inference", "user:profile"],
}
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
reloaded = [
e for e in load_pool("anthropic").entries() if e.source == "claude_code"
]
assert reloaded
assert reloaded[0].refresh_token == "sk-ant-ort01-relogin"
assert reloaded[0].last_status != STATUS_DEAD
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pool path: hermes_pkce
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_pool_hermes_pkce_fails_closed_and_reload_cannot_resurrect(
hermes_home, monkeypatch
):
oauth_file = hermes_home / ".anthropic_oauth.json"
oauth_file.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"accessToken": _STALE_ACCESS,
"refreshToken": _STALE_REFRESH,
"expiresAt": _EXPIRED_MS,
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _rotating_refresh)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "read_claude_code_credentials", lambda: None)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
entry = _entry("hermes_pkce")
pool = CredentialPool("anthropic", [entry])
assert pool._refresh_entry(entry, force=True) is None
quarantined = pool.entries()[0]
assert quarantined.last_status == STATUS_DEAD
assert quarantined.last_error_reason == CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON
assert quarantined.refresh_token == _STALE_REFRESH
on_disk = json.loads(oauth_file.read_text(encoding="utf-8"))
assert on_disk["refreshToken"] == _STALE_REFRESH
reloaded = [
e for e in load_pool("anthropic").entries() if e.source == "hermes_pkce"
]
assert reloaded
assert reloaded[0].refresh_token == _STALE_REFRESH
assert reloaded[0].last_status == STATUS_DEAD
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Pool path: the sync-and-retry-once recovery branch
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def test_retry_path_fails_closed_when_rotation_cannot_commit(
hermes_home, claude_credentials, monkeypatch
):
"""The retry branch used to persist an "ok" row *before* committing.
That ordering meant a failed write left an entry marked healthy in
``auth.json`` while the authoritative file still held the consumed pair —
exactly the state ``_seed_from_singletons()`` reverses on the next load.
The commit now runs first, and a failure quarantines instead.
``_refresh_entry_impl`` is driven directly here: the pre-POST sync in
``_refresh_entry`` would adopt the newer file pair and return before ever
reaching this branch.
"""
posts: list[str] = []
def _refresh(refresh_token, use_json=False):
posts.append(refresh_token)
if refresh_token == _STALE_REFRESH:
# The pair we hold was already spent by another process.
raise RuntimeError("invalid_grant")
return _rotating_refresh()
# The winner's rotated pair, as seen by our re-read of the shared file.
claude_credentials.write_text(
json.dumps(
{
"claudeAiOauth": {
"accessToken": "sk-ant-oat01-winner",
"refreshToken": "sk-ant-ort01-winner",
"expiresAt": _EXPIRED_MS,
}
}
),
encoding="utf-8",
)
monkeypatch.setattr(AA, "refresh_anthropic_oauth_pure", _refresh)
_break_durable_write(monkeypatch)
entry = _entry("claude_code")
pool = CredentialPool("anthropic", [entry])
assert pool._refresh_entry_impl(entry, force=True) is None
assert posts == [_STALE_REFRESH, "sk-ant-ort01-winner"], (
"the retry branch should re-POST with the synced token exactly once"
)
quarantined = pool.entries()[0]
assert quarantined.last_status == STATUS_DEAD
assert quarantined.last_error_reason == CREDENTIAL_PERSIST_FAILED_REASON
assert quarantined.access_token != _ROTATED_ACCESS, (
"the retry path must not mark the uncommitted rotation as healthy"
)
assert _read_claude_pair(claude_credentials) == (
"sk-ant-oat01-winner",
"sk-ant-ort01-winner",
)