refactor(relay): drop dead delivery-signature/verify_token/from_platform_entry auth+descriptor code

This commit is contained in:
Teknium
2026-09-02 19:56:36 -07:00
parent 113f04616b
commit dbd7f76dd8
4 changed files with 35 additions and 277 deletions
+5 -91
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@@ -1,18 +1,10 @@
"""Gateway-side relay authentication primitives. EXPERIMENTAL.
Gateway half of two HMAC schemes whose wire bytes must match the connector's
TypeScript exactly:
1. **WS upgrade auth** (gateway → connector): ``Authorization: Bearer <token>``
on the ``/relay`` upgrade, ``token = make_upgrade_token(gateway_id, secret)``.
Mirrors ``relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken``: ``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")``
with ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}", secret).hexdigest()``.
2. **Inbound delivery signature** (connector → gateway): ``x-relay-timestamp`` +
``x-relay-signature`` headers, ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{ts}.{body_json}", key)``
over the EXACT body bytes, with a replay-window skew check (``deliverySigning.ts``).
Both verify against a multi-secret list (primary first, then a secondary during
a rotation window) so a rotation doesn't invalidate outstanding tokens.
WS upgrade auth (gateway -> connector): ``Authorization: Bearer <token>`` on the
``/relay`` upgrade, ``token = make_upgrade_token(gateway_id, secret)``. Wire bytes
must match the connector's ``relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken`` exactly:
``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")`` with ``sig = HMAC_SHA256(f"{payload}:{exp}",
secret).hexdigest()``. The connector verifies against a multi-secret rotation list.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -21,13 +13,7 @@ import base64
import hashlib
import hmac
import time
from typing import Optional, Sequence
# Header names used by the connector's deliverySigning.ts.
DELIVERY_TS_HEADER = "x-relay-timestamp"
DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER = "x-relay-signature"
_DEFAULT_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS = 300 # connector default replay window
_DEFAULT_UPGRADE_TTL_SECONDS = 300 # connector makeUpgradeToken default
@@ -36,28 +22,6 @@ def sign(payload: str, secret: str) -> str:
return hmac.new(secret.encode("utf-8"), payload.encode("utf-8"), hashlib.sha256).hexdigest()
def verify_signature(payload: str, sig_hex: str, secrets: Sequence[str]) -> bool:
"""Constant-time check of ``sig_hex`` against ANY of ``secrets`` (rotation window).
Length-mismatched candidates are skipped without a timing leak.
"""
try:
sig_buf = bytes.fromhex(sig_hex)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
if len(sig_buf) == 0:
return False
for secret in secrets:
if not secret:
continue
expected = bytes.fromhex(sign(payload, secret))
if len(expected) != len(sig_buf):
continue
if hmac.compare_digest(sig_buf, expected):
return True
return False
def make_token(payload: str, secret: str, ttl_seconds: int = 0) -> str:
"""``base64url(f"{payload}:{exp}:{sig}")``; ``exp`` unix seconds (0 = never).
@@ -74,53 +38,3 @@ def make_upgrade_token(
) -> str:
"""WS-upgrade bearer: ``payload = gateway_id`` (the connector peeks it to index its verify list)."""
return make_token(gateway_id, secret, ttl_seconds)
def verify_token(token: str, secrets: Sequence[str]) -> Optional[str]:
"""Verify a ``make_token`` token; return the payload or None.
Splits from the right so a payload may itself contain colons.
"""
try:
padded = token + "=" * (-len(token) % 4)
decoded = base64.urlsafe_b64decode(padded.encode("ascii")).decode("utf-8")
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return None
parts = decoded.split(":")
if len(parts) < 3:
return None
sig = parts[-1]
try:
exp = int(parts[-2])
except ValueError:
return None
payload = ":".join(parts[:-2])
if exp != 0 and int(time.time()) > exp:
return None
return payload if verify_signature(f"{payload}:{exp}", sig, secrets) else None
def verify_delivery_signature(
body_json: str,
timestamp: Optional[str],
signature: Optional[str],
verify_keys: Sequence[str],
max_skew_seconds: int = _DEFAULT_MAX_SKEW_SECONDS,
*,
now: Optional[int] = None,
) -> bool:
"""Verify a connector→gateway inbound delivery signature.
``body_json`` MUST be the exact request body bytes decoded as UTF-8 (no
re-serialization — the connector signed the literal body).
"""
if not timestamp or not signature:
return False
try:
ts = int(timestamp)
except (ValueError, TypeError):
return False
current = now if now is not None else int(time.time())
if abs(current - ts) > max_skew_seconds:
return False
return verify_signature(f"{ts}.{body_json}", signature, verify_keys)
+19 -62
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@@ -2,15 +2,9 @@
The connector hands one to the gateway's ``RelayAdapter`` at handshake: which
platform it fronts and which capabilities to advertise to the stream consumer
(char limit, draft streaming, edit/threading, markdown dialect, length unit).
One gateway adapter thus serves every platform without per-platform branching.
Schema evolution is additive-only, gated by ``contract_version``
(docs/relay-connector-contract.md). Most fields are a wire projection of
``PlatformEntry`` (``max_message_length``, ``emoji``, ``platform_hint``,
``pii_safe``, ``label``) plus the adapter capability probes
(``supports_draft_streaming``, ``supports_edit``, ``supports_threads``,
``len_unit`` → which ``message_len_fn`` the adapter installs).
(char limit, draft streaming, edit/threading, markdown dialect, length unit), so
one adapter serves every platform without per-platform branching. Schema evolution
is additive-only, gated by ``contract_version`` (docs/relay-connector-contract.md).
"""
from __future__ import annotations
@@ -39,23 +33,22 @@ class CapabilityDescriptor:
emoji: str = "\U0001f50c" # 🔌 (matches PlatformEntry default)
platform_hint: str = ""
pii_safe: bool = False
# All optional bits below default False/empty so an older connector that
# never sends them is treated as "not supported" — additive within
# contract_version 1 (from_json also drops unknown keys, so newer connectors
# are safe against older gateways).
# Optional bits default False/empty so an older connector that never sends
# them reads as "not supported" — additive within contract_version 1
# (from_json drops unknown keys, so newer connectors are safe against older gateways).
# Connector can supply surrounding channel/group CONTEXT for an addressed turn.
supports_context: bool = False
# Platform can host a FLAT continuable cron surface (native Slack's
# ``cron_continuable_surface: in_channel``); the scheduler fails safe to
# thread mode when False (D6 gate).
supports_inchannel_continuable: bool = False
# Platform sender renders block-level formatting from raw markdown; when
# True AND the operator enables rich_blocks/markdown_blocks, the gateway
# stamps ``format_hints`` on outbound send/edit metadata.
# Platform sender renders block-level formatting from raw markdown; when True
# AND the operator enables rich_blocks/markdown_blocks, the gateway stamps
# ``format_hints`` on outbound send/edit metadata.
supports_block_formatting: bool = False
# Outbound op names the connector implements for this platform. Empty =
# the connector predates the field; callers MUST treat that as LEGACY_OPS,
# not "nothing supported". Tuple keeps the frozen dataclass hashable.
# Outbound op names the connector implements for this platform. Empty = the
# connector predates the field; callers MUST treat that as LEGACY_OPS, not
# "nothing supported". Tuple keeps the frozen dataclass hashable.
supported_ops: tuple = ()
# Assumed capability set when a legacy connector sends no supported_ops.
@@ -67,9 +60,7 @@ class CapabilityDescriptor:
A NEW op is therefore only True when explicitly advertised — capability
can be probed without trying the op and parsing an error.
"""
if not self.supported_ops:
return op in self.LEGACY_OPS
return op in self.supported_ops
return op in (self.supported_ops or self.LEGACY_OPS)
def to_json(self) -> str:
"""Compact, stable JSON for the handshake frame."""
@@ -86,7 +77,7 @@ class CapabilityDescriptor:
fallback) when malformed.
"""
raw = json.loads(data)
known = {f for f in cls.__dataclass_fields__} # type: ignore[attr-defined]
known = cls.__dataclass_fields__ # type: ignore[attr-defined]
filtered = {k: v for k, v in raw.items() if k in known}
if "max_message_length" in filtered:
try:
@@ -96,43 +87,9 @@ class CapabilityDescriptor:
filtered["max_message_length"] = 4096
if "supported_ops" in filtered:
raw_ops = filtered["supported_ops"]
if isinstance(raw_ops, (list, tuple)):
filtered["supported_ops"] = tuple(
str(op) for op in raw_ops if isinstance(op, str) and op
)
else:
filtered["supported_ops"] = ()
filtered["supported_ops"] = (
tuple(str(op) for op in raw_ops if isinstance(op, str) and op)
if isinstance(raw_ops, (list, tuple))
else ()
)
return cls(**filtered)
@classmethod
def from_platform_entry(
cls,
entry,
*,
len_unit: str = "chars",
supports_draft_streaming: bool = False,
supports_edit: bool = True,
supports_threads: bool = False,
markdown_dialect: str = "plain",
) -> "CapabilityDescriptor":
"""Project a ``gateway.platform_registry.PlatformEntry`` into a descriptor.
Runtime bits the entry does not encode (length unit, draft/edit/thread/
markdown) come from the caller. A ``max_message_length`` of 0 ("no
limit") maps to the stream_consumer default of 4096.
"""
max_len = getattr(entry, "max_message_length", 0) or 4096
return cls(
contract_version=CONTRACT_VERSION,
platform=entry.name,
label=entry.label,
max_message_length=max_len,
supports_draft_streaming=supports_draft_streaming,
supports_edit=supports_edit,
supports_threads=supports_threads,
markdown_dialect=markdown_dialect,
len_unit=len_unit,
emoji=getattr(entry, "emoji", "\U0001f50c"),
platform_hint=getattr(entry, "platform_hint", ""),
pii_safe=getattr(entry, "pii_safe", False),
)
+11 -86
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@@ -1,105 +1,30 @@
"""Unit tests for gateway/relay/auth.py — the gateway-side relay auth primitives.
Two layers:
Cross-implementation conformance: a frozen vector generated by the connector's
TypeScript (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken``/``sign``) must be
reproduced byte-for-byte by the Python port. If the connector ever changes its
wire scheme, the vector must be regenerated in lockstep (the test fails loudly on
drift). Regenerate with:
1. **Self-consistency** — make_token/verify_token round-trip, delivery-signature
verify, rotation verify list, tamper + skew + expiry rejection.
2. **Cross-implementation conformance** — frozen vectors generated by the
connector's TypeScript (``src/core/relayAuthToken.ts`` ``makeToken``/``sign``)
are reproduced byte-for-byte by the Python port. If the connector ever
changes its wire scheme, these vectors must be regenerated in lockstep
(and that is the point — the test fails loudly on drift). Regenerate with:
node -e 'import("./dist/core/relayAuthToken.js").then(m=>{ \
const s="00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"; \
console.log(m.makeToken("gw-instance-1", s, 0)); \
console.log(m.sign("1750000000."+JSON.stringify({a:1}), s)); })'
node -e 'import("./dist/core/relayAuthToken.js").then(m=>{ \\
const s="00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"; \\
console.log(m.makeToken("gw-instance-1", s, 0)); })'
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
from gateway.relay.auth import make_token, make_upgrade_token
from gateway.relay.auth import (
DELIVERY_SIG_HEADER,
DELIVERY_TS_HEADER,
make_token,
make_upgrade_token,
sign,
verify_delivery_signature,
verify_signature,
verify_token,
)
# A fixed 256-bit hex secret used for the frozen connector vectors below.
# A fixed 256-bit hex secret used for the frozen connector vector below.
_SECRET = "00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff"
# ── Frozen vectors produced by the connector's TypeScript (relayAuthToken.ts).
# Generated via dist/core/relayAuthToken.js makeToken/sign; see module docstring.
# Frozen vector produced by the connector's TypeScript (relayAuthToken.ts).
_CONN_TOKEN = "Z3ctaW5zdGFuY2UtMTowOjM3YWE3YjE0NWU4NzY0ZDQwM2JhOWM2MzlmMjMwZGQ2M2RlOGVkOTliODhmZWQzNmFhMDI2MjVhOGE3ZTM1NjQ"
# The EXACT bytes the connector signed: JS JSON.stringify emits compact JSON
# (no spaces). The gateway verifies over the literal received body, so the
# vector is the compact form — NOT Python's spaced json.dumps default. This is
# the raw-byte-preservation discipline (a single differing byte breaks the HMAC).
_CONN_BODY = '{"type":"message","event":{"text":"hi","source":{"chat_id":"c1"}}}'
_CONN_TS = 1750000000
_CONN_SIG = "ac9509c8dae52b5590f06378260877334ff1adc4b1c96bafa4b514165fae6dc6"
# ── Self-consistency ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def test_upgrade_token_is_make_token_of_gateway_id():
assert make_upgrade_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0) == make_token("gw-1", _SECRET, 0)
def test_token_wrong_secret_rejected():
tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, 0)
assert verify_token(tok, ["deadbeef" * 8]) is None
def test_token_expired_rejected():
# ttl in the past -> exp < now -> rejected.
tok = make_token("p", _SECRET, ttl_seconds=1)
# Force expiry by signing with a manual past exp via the low-level helper.
# Simpler: a 1s ttl token is still valid now; instead assert a clearly-old one.
# Build an already-expired token by hand using the same scheme.
import base64
signed = "p:1" # exp=1 (1970) -> long past
sig = sign(signed, _SECRET)
raw = f"{signed}:{sig}".encode()
expired = base64.urlsafe_b64encode(raw).decode().rstrip("=")
assert verify_token(expired, [_SECRET]) is None
# And the fresh one is accepted.
assert verify_token(tok, [_SECRET]) == "p"
def test_verify_signature_constant_time_multi_secret():
payload = "1700000000.body"
s = sign(payload, _SECRET)
assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong", _SECRET]) is True
assert verify_signature(payload, s, ["wrong"]) is False
assert verify_signature(payload, "zz", [_SECRET]) is False # bad hex
# ── Delivery signature (connector -> gateway inbound) ──────────────────────
def test_delivery_signature_skew_rejected():
body = "{}"
ts = 1700000000
s = sign(f"{ts}.{body}", _SECRET)
# Beyond the 300s replay window in either direction.
assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 301) is False
assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts - 301) is False
assert verify_delivery_signature(body, str(ts), s, [_SECRET], now=ts + 299) is True
# ── Cross-implementation conformance (frozen connector vectors) ────────────
def test_python_make_token_matches_connector_byte_for_byte():
assert make_token("gw-instance-1", _SECRET, 0) == _CONN_TOKEN
@@ -1,38 +0,0 @@
"""Descriptor <- PlatformEntry projection (relay Phase 0, Task 0.3).
Proves the CapabilityDescriptor is a projection of the existing PlatformEntry,
not a parallel concept: the entry's label/limit/emoji/hint/pii fields carry
straight through.
"""
from gateway.platform_registry import PlatformEntry
from gateway.relay.descriptor import CONTRACT_VERSION, CapabilityDescriptor
def _entry(**overrides) -> PlatformEntry:
base = dict(
name="telegram",
label="Telegram",
adapter_factory=lambda cfg: None,
check_fn=lambda: True,
max_message_length=4096,
pii_safe=False,
emoji="\u2708\ufe0f",
platform_hint="You are on Telegram.",
)
base.update(overrides)
return PlatformEntry(**base)
def test_projection_carries_platform_entry_fields():
d = CapabilityDescriptor.from_platform_entry(_entry(), len_unit="utf16")
assert d.contract_version == CONTRACT_VERSION
assert d.platform == "telegram"
assert d.label == "Telegram"
assert d.max_message_length == 4096
assert d.emoji == "\u2708\ufe0f"
assert d.platform_hint == "You are on Telegram."
assert d.pii_safe is False
assert d.len_unit == "utf16"