Same behavior as the salvaged #76487 migration (fresh installs get the v3
shape; v1/v2 tables rebuild with profile_name leading the PK, legacy rows
into 'default' only, CASCADE FK supplied on the way), with the per-table
DDL written once instead of three times and the now-redundant v1->v2
CASCADE-only rebuild dropped (the v3 rebuild subsumes it).
Co-authored-by: Celio Monteiro <crdesign8@hotmail.com>
Address hermes-sweeper review on #76487:
- Prefer hermes_profile from send metadata when pruning stale topic
bindings so profile_routes cannot delete the transport adapter's
namespace instead of the routed runtime's
- Namespace lobby/capability cooldowns and /topic off cleanup by
(profile, chat_id)
- Document profile_name PKs and scoped cleanup SQL in telegram.md
- Regression: primary-adapter stamp + routed metadata prune isolation
Issue #76423: under multiplex_profiles a shared state.db keyed topic mode
and bindings only by Telegram chat_id/thread_id, so private-chat ids
collided across bots/profiles.
- Add profile_name to telegram_dm_topic_mode and telegram_dm_topic_bindings
- Schema v2→v3 rebuild; legacy rows migrate into the "default" namespace
- Keyword-only profile_name="default" on SessionDB topic APIs (compat)
_build_slash_event and _dispatch_thread_session built their SessionSource
without guild_id/parent_chat_id, while on_message passes both. Route
matching in build_source keys off exactly those fields, so under
gateway.multiplex_profiles a guild- or channel-routed profile never matched
a native slash command: /new, /reset, /model, /profile, /status ... all ran
against the default profile and reset the wrong session (#69178, #91633).
Pass guild_id (interaction.guild_id, falling back to channel.guild like the
message path) and the thread's parent channel id into build_source at both
sites. One test pins channel + thread routing parity with messages.
Fixes#69178Fixes#91633
Co-authored-by: Sora-bluesky <179361977+Sora-bluesky@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: jondgilbert <42873618+jondgilbert@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: tensorbit89-netizen <257030052+tensorbit89-netizen@users.noreply.github.com>
The handoff watcher entered _profile_runtime_scope synchronously on the
event loop each tick; hydrate_profile_secret_sources + build_profile_secret_scope
do blocking file/secret-source IO, so a slow profile secret read stalled every
adapter (#100014). Load the secret scope via asyncio.to_thread, then enter
the existing sync scope with prepared_secret_scope=.
Fixes#100014
Co-authored-by: Tranquil-Flow <66773372+Tranquil-Flow@users.noreply.github.com>
_process_handoff caught a config load failure for a secondary profile,
logged a warning, and kept going with self.config, which is the primary
profile's config. The handoff then went out through the right bot to the
primary's home channel and the row was reported completed. That is the
exact wrong delivery the multi-profile handoff work exists to prevent,
and the same fail closed posture the no-live-adapters branch already
takes.
A load failure now logs an error and raises, which marks the row failed
so the CLI can report and retry it. The default profile path is
untouched, it never reloaded config.
Follow-ups on the salvaged #101081 guard:
- A clean close() lets SQLite unlink the WAL sidecars legitimately; the
guard treated that as a lost generation and permanently halted the
handle, so the #94736 late-write self-heal reopen dropped transcript
tails (4 existing tests failed). close() now clears the recorded
sidecar generation, and _wal_generation_was_lost() re-adopts the
current sidecars after a clean /proc/self probe instead of relying on
a stale snapshot.
- Healthy writes no longer walk /proc/self/fd: once a sidecar
generation is recorded, the stat-based inode check alone detects an
unlink/replace. The fd probe only runs in the empty-identity state
(fresh DB, post-close reopen).
- DeletedWalGenerationError now subclasses StateDbReplacedError, so the
gateway retry queue and run_agent flush divert transcripts to the
JSONL fallback exactly as they do for a replaced store, instead of
retrying forever against a halted handle.
- __init__ refuses once (under the startup lock) instead of twice per
open, halving the system-wide /proc scan; dropped the dead
include_self parameter and the dead _IS_WINDOWS clause.
- Test fixes: rstrip(' (deleted)') char-set bug -> removesuffix; the
non-linux test now patches sys.platform (the real gate) instead of
_IS_WINDOWS.
A live writer can keep a deleted state.db-wal inode while a second opener
mints a fresh WAL at the same path. Fail closed on writable open (before
connect) and on the write-path sidecar identity check so the second
generation is never created.
Co-authored-by: Noa <rainbowgore@users.noreply.github.com>
`_find_live_session_by_key` matched live runtimes by bare stored session id.
Stored ids are timestamp-based and can exist in more than one profile's
store, so `session.resume` for profile B (fast path, post-build re-check, and
`_claim_or_reuse_live`) could hand back profile A's live runtime — the turn
then ran with A's persona/tools and wrote A's memory (#100029).
Give the lookup an optional `profile_home` (default: any profile, unchanged
for callers that have no profile to scope by) using the same string compare
`_find_live_unpersisted` already uses, and pass the resolved home at every
resume/claim site. `_claim_parked_runtimes` gets the same scope so a resume
under B never finalizes A's parked runtime of the same id.
Reimplements the profile-scope half of #100213 by @Finn763; the Group-title
capability-sync change from that PR is intentionally not carried.
Co-authored-by: Finn763 <165816600+finn763@users.noreply.github.com>
Follow-up to the salvaged #99560 commit: restore the original docstring
wording (user writes still always land everywhere else), name the
llm-outranks-derived hole the guard now closes, and annotate the two new
tests with what each pins.
Drop the no-field fallback vitest case and the get_compression_chain
unit test: the fallback is implied by the predicate (Boolean(undefined))
and the chain walk is covered by test_list_serves_full_lineage_ids_for_projected_rows
through the real list projection.
Compression rotates a conversation's tip id while tiles stay keyed by
whichever segment id they were opened with. focusOpenSession and
openSessionTile tested exact ids, so right after a rotation the same
chat read as 'not open' and opened again in a second tab — and a tile
keyed to a MIDDLE segment (the tip when it was opened) could no longer
prove it names the conversation at all, rendering as an untitled ghost.
The projected list row now carries the full chain
(SessionDB.get_compression_chain, served as _lineage_ids by
list_sessions_rich and the sidebar tree row), lineageAliases indexes
every segment, sessionMatchesStoredId accepts membership, and the tab
focus/open paths dedupe through the lineage instead of the exact id.
Older gateways omit the field and degrade to today's root/tip pairing.
Extends the TTS lease from #100912 (4e3feb8bbb) beyond built-in local
engines: when the configured tts.provider is user-declared, acquiring
the first lease and releasing the last one now reach it, so a
self-hosted TTS server can preload its model when read-aloud / voice
conversation turns on and unload when it turns off (Discord request).
- agent/tts_provider.py: TTSProvider gains concrete no-op warm() /
release() (not abstract — existing plugins are unaffected).
- tools/tts_tool.py: _signal_user_tts_provider() forwards the lease
hook; plugin providers get warm()/release(), command providers run
optional `warm_command` / `release_command` (config.yaml, under
tts.providers.<name>) through the existing _run_command_tts helper
on a daemon thread — best-effort, output discarded, failures at
debug. warm_tts_provider() and release_tts_provider() call it.
- tests/tools/test_tts_lifecycle_leases.py: fake plugin provider and
fake command provider observe warm/release through acquire/release
lease (both fail on main with action == "noop").
- docs: features/tts.md — lease section, command-provider optional
keys table, plugin optional hooks.
hermes_cli/container_boot.py resolved multiplexing from the
GATEWAY_MULTIPLEX_PROFILES env var only, while the gateway runtime
resolves env -> config.yaml -> default. A deployment enabling
multiplex_profiles via config.yaml alone therefore auto-started every
named profile's gateway slot at boot, which then crash-looped in the
double-bind guard against the multiplexing default gateway.
Resolve through load_gateway_config().multiplex_profiles (the shared
resolver, so env override precedence is preserved) and fall back to the
env var only when config loading fails.
Salvage of #85437 (test module trimmed to config-only + env-override).
Fixes#85413
A multiplexed Hermes process (gateway.multiplex_profiles, unified
dashboard/TUI, or cron) serves several profiles at once, but terminal.*
resolved through process-global TERMINAL_* env vars bridged ONCE at
startup from the launch profile (gateway/run.py ~2700-2760) plus the
one-shot _ensure_terminal_env_bridged() guard. Every routed profile
therefore inherited the launch profile's backend, cwd, docker volumes,
SSH target and shared-container key: a local profile ran inside another
profile's docker sandbox (or a docker profile escaped to the host), and a
container labeled profile A carried profile B's RW bind mounts.
Fix: an authoritative per-profile terminal policy seam, mirroring
agent/secret_scope.py:
- tools/terminal_scope.py: ContextVar holding the routed profile's
COMPLETE effective TERMINAL_* policy (defined defaults <- profile .env
TERMINAL_* <- config.yaml terminal:). While bound, terminal_env()
resolves ONLY from it - an omitted key yields the defined default,
never os.environ. Unreadable/malformed policy installs a refusal
scope; terminal_tool / execute_code refuse instead of running under
ambient launch-process policy (fail closed).
- Installed at every in-process profile boundary: gateway
_profile_runtime_scope, tui_gateway session/build/turn scopes, cron
per-job fire. The unscoped single-process path is byte-identical.
- Every terminal.* consumer reads through the scope: terminal_tool
(_get_env_config, _resolve_container_task_id shared key, orphan
reaper lifetime, degraded mode), gateway/platforms/base.py docker
media translation (volumes, shared key, persistence), runtime_cwd /
agent_init / skill_utils / code_execution_tool / file_tools cwd
anchors, prompt_builder / browser_tool / env_probe backend checks,
gateway footer, @-refs and slash-command cwd. env_probe resolves the
backend in the caller's context, since the probe worker thread does
not inherit the ContextVar.
Salvage of #99225 onto current main: adds the three ambient reads the PR
missed (tools/file_tools.py TERMINAL_CWD, tools/browser_tool.py and
tools/env_probe.py TERMINAL_ENV; shape from #79117) and trims the test
module to the leak matrix driven through the real gateway boundary,
omitted-key defaults, refusal, and boundary reset.
Fixes#68559Fixes#94200Fixes#101132Fixes#95470
Co-authored-by: x7peeps <9640837+x7peeps@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Eva <239388517+100yenadmin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: ExitMaster <292490062+ExitMaster@users.noreply.github.com>
Posts made with a user token (xoxp-) arrive with app_id and no
client_msg_id, so _event_declares_bot_sender dropped them as app traffic;
the only workaround was allow_bots: all. Adds
platforms.slack.extra.api_human_users (SLACK_API_HUMAN_USERS fallback), a
users-only allowlist consulted inside the predicate.
Salvaged from #100964 (users only: an app-id allowlist would also admit
the app's own xoxb bot posts, which share the user+app_id shape).
Symptom: picking a model in the Desktop composer for the primary chat
silently rewrote config.yaml (model.default + model.provider) as the
profile default, ignoring model.persist_switch_by_default. A throwaway
pick that resolved to e.g. openai-api (no key) left the profile with an
unusable default on the next launch (#90235).
Root cause: 7d96537bc8 (#86414) made use-model-controls.ts send --global
for every primary-tile pick so a fresh profile would get a persisted
provider instead of falling through to a leftover OPENAI_API_KEY env var.
That put a persistence policy in the client, contradicting the
server-side rule /model uses (resolve_persist_behavior).
Fix:
- resolve_persist_behavior gains one rule, ahead of the --provider
session-only rule: when neither model.default nor model.provider is
configured yet, persist. This preserves #86414's first-pick motivation
for CLI, gateway and Desktop alike. With a default configured, a plain
pick is session-only unless --global / persist_switch_by_default.
- Desktop primary-tile picks send no scope flag and let the gateway decide.
Secondary tiles and MoA presets still send --session.
- /model help text in cli.py said "(persists)"; it now matches reality and
lists --global.
- Docs: desktop.md picker note + slash-commands /model row.
Tests: test_first_pick_persists_then_session_only (fails on main), and the
existing use-model-controls vitest updated to assert the flag-less request.
After one failed/stalled summary attempt arms the 60/300/900s compression-
failure cooldown, a provider context_length_exceeded rejection entered the
reactive overflow branch in conversation_loop, which called _compress_context
without force. Since #97488 the cooldown gate returns the soft "temporarily
paused, retry in a moment" deferral instead of exhaustion, so every turn
deferred until the cooldown lapsed, and the next failure extended the ladder:
long-running sessions wedged with no automatic recovery (#100661, four sessions
lost).
Thread a narrow `bypass_cooldown` kwarg from the three provider-proven overflow
call sites (generic overflow, 413, output-cap recovery) through
AIAgent._compress_context -> compress_context -> ContextCompressor.compress ->
_generate_summary. It skips ONLY the summary-failure cooldown check at each gate.
Unlike force=True it does not clear the cooldown, does not skip the feasibility /
anti-thrash breakers, and a failed attempt records its cooldown normally. The
attempt is bounded by the existing compression_attempts/max_compression_attempts
budget, so there is no retry loop. The preflight threshold gate is unchanged:
ordinary over-threshold pressure still honors the cooldown (#11529).
Engines whose _automatic_compression_blocked()/compress() predate the kwarg
(plugins, test doubles) are called with the legacy signature.
Tests: cooldown armed + bypass_cooldown -> summarizer invoked and transcript
compacted; ordinary pass still deferred. Docs note the cooldown/overflow
contract in the developer guide.
Fixes#100661Closes#97766 (overflow-force idea; the bundled continuation changes were not taken)
Co-authored-by: sgtworkman <178342791+sgtworkman@users.noreply.github.com>
Adds two bounded fast modes on top of the static /fast toggle, default OFF:
- `auto`: every user turn opens a `agent.fast_auto_seconds` (default 60s)
window; requests inside it carry the provider fast param, later tool-loop
requests fall back to standard pricing.
- `cold`: the same window, but only on the first turn of a session (no prior
user/assistant/tool history).
agent/fast_mode.py holds the whole policy: `begin_turn()` at the
run_conversation ingress arms `agent._fast_until`; `effective_request_overrides()`
is consumed in the ONE place request_overrides feed the transports
(build_api_kwargs), so the fast param is a per-request kwarg only. System
prompt, tools and messages are untouched — the prompt cache is preserved.
resolve_fast_mode_overrides() is now the single gate for static and bounded
modes and accepts provider/base_url: OpenRouter, Nous, Copilot, Azure,
Bedrock and custom base_urls never receive service_tier/speed (#34308's
route gating). Both existing callers (CLI turn route, gateway turn route)
and the TUI config.set path pass the route.
Surfaces: config `agent.service_tier: auto|cold` + `agent.fast_auto_seconds`,
`/fast auto|cold` in CLI, gateway (picker gains both entries), TUI/desktop
config.set; status shows the mode; web dashboard select lists the real
values. Docs: configuration.md Fast Mode section with mode table + cost note,
slash-commands, cli-config.yaml.example, locale strings for the two picker
entries.
Salvages #89991 (bounded fast modes) and #34308 (route gating).
Fixes#64785, #74730.
Co-authored-by: Eva <239388517+100yenadmin@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: kbaicai <kbaicai@qq.com>
The speed=fast allowlist still gates on Opus 4.6, but the fast-mode
matrix has changed twice since it was written (verified against the
live docs, platform.claude.com/docs/en/build-with-claude/fast-mode):
- Opus 4.8 and Opus 5 SUPPORT fast mode (research preview, Claude API
only — not Bedrock/Vertex/Foundry).
- Opus 4.6 LOST fast mode on 2026-06-29. The parameter does not error:
requests silently run at standard speed and bill standard rates
(usage.speed: 'standard'). Today's allowlist therefore shows 4.6
users a fast toggle that does nothing, while denying it to the two
models that actually support it.
- Opus 4.7 never had it and hard-400s (unchanged).
- Dedicated '…-fast' model ids (OpenRouter's claude-opus-4.8-fast)
select fast inference via the model field and are explicitly
excluded from the param gate.
Both gates move in lock-step as before: the adapter param gate
(agent.anthropic_adapter._supports_fast_mode) and the CLI toggle gate
(hermes_cli.models._is_anthropic_fast_model). Docstrings now record
the history in both directions so the next matrix change has context.
## How to test
scripts/run_tests.sh tests/agent/test_anthropic_adapter.py tests/cli/test_fast_command.py -- -q
113 tests pass. The updated predicate/matrix tests fail against the
previous allowlist (verified by stashing the source changes). Tested
on Linux (aarch64).
Follow-up to the #99641 salvage:
- One module-level _normalize_security() (ssl/tls/implicit -> tls, starttls,
plain/none -> plain; unknown -> WARNING + secure default) replaces the three
copies of the alias set; _connect_imap/_connect_smtp/_standalone_send all
compare against the canonical value. Unknown modes no longer raise.
- _tls_context(verify, host) is module-level and shared by all sites; when
verification is disabled for a non-loopback host it logs a WARNING.
- _esecret_bool: an unset/empty env var now yields the caller's default
(previously is_truthy_value('') returned False, silently disabling TLS
verification whenever EMAIL_*_TLS_VERIFY was unset).
- Documented surface is platforms.email.extra.{imap,smtp}_security and
{imap,smtp}_tls_verify in config.yaml; env vars remain an internal bridge
and are NOT added to plugin.yaml (optional_env feeds hermes setup prompts).
- Docs: Proton Mail Bridge / local relays recipe in user-guide/messaging/email.md.
- Tests: starttls builds IMAP4 then .starttls(); unknown mode falls back to
tls/starttls with verification still on.
ALIBABA_CODING_PLAN_CN_API_KEY is checked first for the China Coding Plan
endpoint (mirroring kimi-coding-cn), so the intl and CN rows no longer
light off the same key. Fixes#101122.
The goal judge now returns 'blocked' for unachievable goals, but the
/loop --until gate only checked == 'done', so an impossible stop
condition would re-fire every tick until loops.max_ticks. Pause the
loop with the judge's reason instead. Also collapse the kanban gate
callers' 'gate_verdict == "continue" or rejection is not None' to
'rejection is not None' (rejection is None iff verdict == done), drop
the duplicate blocked-verdict goal test, and document the verdict.
`hermes profile delete` read the target profile's gateway.pid raw and
SIGTERMed it. When that pid file was poisoned by a sibling profile's gateway
(the #89315 shape), deleting profile A killed profile B's running gateway.
- gateway/status.py: `_pid_record_belongs_to_profile()` helper — a pid
record whose recorded home differs from the expected profile home is not
ours; legacy records without a home prove nothing and are left alone.
- hermes_cli/profiles.py: `_stop_gateway_process` refuses (and says so)
when the record belongs to another profile; still stops its own gateway.
The stop/restart paths in hermes_cli/gateway.py did not need a guard:
`get_running_pid()` already filters cross-profile records and unlinks the
poisoned pid file before any kill can happen — verified live; the test for
that path now pins the real contract (returns False, other process alive,
poisoned pid file gone).
Live repro (unpatched main): `_stop_gateway_process(tim_home)` -> "Gateway
stopped (PID ...)" and the OTHER profile's process exits -15. After: "Refusing
to stop PID ..." and the process stays alive. 8 tests; sabotage (guard
removed) fails 1.
Skipping the explicit PRAGMA wal_checkpoint(PASSIVE) in close() left
sqlite3.Connection.close() running SQLite's own last-connection PASSIVE
checkpoint, which still checkpoints the WAL and unlinks -wal/-shm on a
structurally corrupt file (E2E: the -wal vanished on close despite the
quarantine). Python 3.12+ exposes SQLITE_DBCONFIG_NO_CKPT_ON_CLOSE via
Connection.setconfig(); arm it in _halt_db_corrupt so the WAL image
survives close() for forensics/recovery. On 3.11 the switch does not
exist; the docstring and docs now say so instead of claiming sqlite3
cannot reach it at all.
Follow-up to #101095; flagged by JoaoMarcos44 on #101093.
A bare SQLITE_CORRUPT/NOTADB on a live write (not FTS-scoped, not a
replaced file) now sets a sticky per-instance flag: later writes fail
fast with StateDbCorruptError, the handle never reopens after close(),
and close() skips its explicit PASSIVE WAL checkpoint. Gateway and agent
flush paths divert pending transcripts to JSONL/spool like the replaced
case instead of retrying forever.
Field evidence: a handle that kept writing for ~50 minutes after the
first structural error checkpointed 15 pages under the wrong page
numbers on shutdown (page 1 <- messages_fts_trigram_data leaf), turning
"malformed" into "file is not a database".
Refs #90837, #90950, #97940, #89332, #45383
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01CNX8rNYHqA5pT4tAGSzXtb
Regression coverage for the #100130 salvage, all against real SessionDB
files and a real child process holding the flock:
* errno table for `is_advisory_lock_contention` (EAGAIN/EWOULDBLOCK/EACCES
contend; ESTALE/ENOTSUP/ENOLCK/EIO fail fast); no misleading "held by
another process" line on the fast-fail path; `_cross_process_repair_lock`
shares the filter (sibling site).
* `retry_deferred_fts_recovery`: open under a live holder -> stale; retry
returns in <2s with a 30s admission budget (timeout=0); rate limit +
60s->120s backoff engaged; holder dies -> same instance recovers, triggers
restored, breadcrumb cleared; no-op when not stale / read-only.
* `_start_gateway_housekeeping` tick (real loop, 50ms interval) recovers a
stale shared-registry SessionDB with no direct call and no extra thread.
Backoff floor: a monkeypatched 0s base interval must not zero the doubled
interval (min 1s), so the cap math is testable.
Sabotage run (source at origin/main, these tests): 16 failed / 35 passed,
including 30s timeouts on the fast-fail tests.
The #14694 recovery clock (`_anti_thrash_recovery_deadline`) was a
process-local `time.monotonic()` value zeroed in `bind_session_state()`.
The gateway rebuilds the AIAgent (and its ContextCompressor) on every
cache eviction, so each fresh compressor bound to a durably tripped
session row (#69872) re-armed a full 300s window and the half-open probe
never fired — a long messaging conversation above the threshold stayed
blocked permanently.
Persist the deadline as a wall-clock epoch in a new
`sessions.compression_recovery_deadline REAL` column (declarative column
reconciliation; SCHEMA_VERSION 26 -> 27) with
`SessionDB.get/set_compression_recovery_deadline`. The compressor loads it
in `bind_session_state()` and writes it on change only via
`_set_anti_thrash_recovery_deadline()`. A fresh compressor with no stored
deadline still starts a full window blocked (#54923 restart contract); one
that loads an armed deadline resumes that window. Backward clock jumps are
bounded to one window. The 300s window is unchanged.
Minimal salvage of #100185 (the probe-lease/fencing state machine and
model_config-blob storage were not carried).
Refs #100185
Co-authored-by: Komzpa <me@komzpa.net>
Every gateway/plugin platform adapter hard-coded aiohttp.ClientSession(trust_env=True)
(~20 sites), so a gateway launched by a Windows Scheduled Task that inherits a stale
HTTP_PROXY (Clash/V2Ray on 127.0.0.1:7890) looped on 'Cannot connect to host' with no
way to opt out short of NO_PROXY hacks per vendor host.
- gateway/platforms/base.py: gateway_trust_env() reads gateway.trust_env (default true);
resolve_proxy_url() skips generic HTTP(S)_PROXY/ALL_PROXY + macOS system-proxy
auto-detect when false (explicit per-platform vars still win).
- All aiohttp ClientSession sites in weixin, qqbot, matrix, line, wecom, slack, sms,
teams, google_chat now pass trust_env=gateway_trust_env(); mattermost + homeassistant
bare sessions gain the same kwarg (intent of #70119 / #56229).
- DEFAULT_CONFIG + cli-config.yaml.example + messaging docs.
- tests/gateway/test_gateway_trust_env.py: config flip + no-bare-literal sweep.
Reported-by: @ranlingfeng (#48820), @frontnopipe-cloud (#76309)
Co-authored-by: rcarrata <rcarratalasanchez@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Backroads4Me <TEDLANHAM@GMAIL.COM>
Follow-up to the salvaged #100114 commit. Its two-pass anchor selection
scanned steers first and real user rows second, so a transcript shaped
[user A, tool(steer B), ..., user C] anchored the already-consumed steer B
over the newer real request C — the same replay class the PR set out to
fix. Replace it with one reversed positional scan that picks whichever
intent-bearing row is last (real role=user or steer-bearing role=tool),
and make the compressed-transcript steer check count only role=tool rows
(the only place the runtime delivers a steer), so a summary quoting the
marker cannot masquerade as live intent.
Adds S1/S2/S3 regression tests (steer dropped by compaction, steer
surviving in tail, newer user turn after steer) plus alternation and
use-exactly-once assertions.
The _clean_registry fixture clears _generations and _retired between
tests; the new _opening map needs the same reset so a test that aborts
mid-construction cannot leave a stale opening event that stalls the
next test's cold acquire.
Every bot-to-bot DM is a fresh `hermes -p <bot> chat -Q` process, so it
pays agent startup on each hop. Profiling one hop showed the single
largest controllable cost was a live GET /models against the provider on
EVERY launch (0.3-0.6s normally, up to the 15s probe timeout on a slow
endpoint) — the in-memory endpoint-metadata cache is per process and the
Nous persistent context cache is bypassed by design so the portal stays
authoritative.
- model_metadata: memoize successful remote /models probes on disk
(cache/endpoint_model_metadata.json) with the SAME 300s TTL as the
in-memory cache, so authority semantics are unchanged (reconciliation
still lands within 5 minutes) but the answer is shared across
processes. Local endpoints are never memoized (LM Studio reloads).
- bot_relay: the cross-machine reply waiter polls the reply file every
250ms instead of every 2s — up to 2s of dead air on every relayed reply.
Nothing here changes turn ordering: DMs and group rounds stay serial.
Live (polis-hermes bot, spawn -> first API request, cold, 5-6 runs):
main median 1.23s (one 20.8s outlier = probe stall) -> 0.96s, no stalls.
Upgrading from a UTC-scheduling build to one that honours the profile
timezone (Europe/Brussels) left daily cron jobs sitting in jobs.json with
pre-migration instants — e.g. next_run_at "2026-09-02T04:00:00+00:00" for
expr "0 4 * * *". _ensure_aware normalizes that to 06:00+02, which the
expression excludes, so the stale-expression guard (#93049) read it as a
direct jobs.json edit, logged exactly that, and re-anchored to tomorrow
without firing. The due occurrence disappeared with no error anywhere.
The guard only asked "is the stored instant an occurrence of the current
expr?", never "why not?" — and the two possible answers demand opposite
actions. Add _classify_stale_cron_next_run, which distinguishes them by
whether normalization itself moved the wall clock:
* expr_edit — wall clock unchanged (or the stored wall clock is
not an occurrence either): the instant is genuinely
excluded by the current expression. Re-anchor
without firing, exactly as before.
* timezone_migration — the stored value's own wall clock IS a legal
occurrence and it only left the lattice because
_ensure_aware converted it to a different offset.
Fall through and fire the overdue run once.
Because every value written by this build carries the configured offset, a
real expr edit leaves the wall clock untouched and can never be reclassified
as a migration, so the #93049 protection is intact. At-most-once is
unchanged: the fire flows through the normal due path and the usual
advance_next_run / mark_job_run re-anchor rewrites next_run_at in the
current offset, so the legacy instant is never read again. Future local
wall-clock occurrences are untouched — not-yet-due rows never reach the
guard, and the #28934 offset-repair branch still runs first for a
still-future stored wall clock.
The migration case is classified explicitly rather than retried broadly: it
logs cron.timezone_migration.catch_up with the stored and normalized
instants plus both offsets, and increments a probe-visible counter
(get_timezone_migration_catchup_stats, timezone_migration_catchups.jsonl)
kept separate from catch_up_occurrences so an operator can tell "the upgrade
backlog is draining" from "runs are missing their grace window".
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
De-risking for the #48820 behaviour change: before this branch, credentials
in the environment force-enabled twelve platforms regardless of an explicit
enabled: false in config.yaml. Now that the explicit disable wins, users who
relied on the old override would see the platform go dark with no trace.
_enable_from_env (and Slack's inline copy) now emit ONE WARNING per platform
per process when the platform is explicitly disabled AND its env credentials
are present, naming the platform, the winning key
(platforms.<x>.enabled: false), the env var(s) being ignored, and the remedy.
A plain disable with no credentials, an enabled platform, and the env-only
(no YAML opinion) path stay silent; repeated config reloads do not repeat it.
_ENV_ENABLE_CREDENTIALS maps every _enable_from_env platform to its
triggering env var(s); a test pins that the map covers every routed branch.
Docs: messaging/index.md gains a 'Disabling a platform whose credentials are
still in .env' section with the exact warning text.
Live repro (real load_gateway_config on a temp HERMES_HOME with
platforms.weixin/telegram.enabled: false + WEIXIN_TOKEN/TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN in
env): before — both stayed disabled with zero log output; after — one
WARNING each ('Platform 'weixin' is explicitly disabled by
platforms.weixin.enabled: false ... (WEIXIN_TOKEN, WEIXIN_ACCOUNT_ID) will
NOT start its adapter ...'), none for the enabled homeassistant, none on the
second load.
Twelve credential-presence branches in _apply_env_overrides (weixin,
whatsapp_cloud, homeassistant, email, sms, dingtalk, feishu, wecom,
wecom_callback, bluebubbles, qqbot, yuanbao) force-set enabled = True
unconditionally, so a user's explicit `platforms.<x>.enabled: false` in
config.yaml was silently overridden whenever the platform's token/secret
lived in .env. Telegram/Discord/Slack/Signal/Matrix already routed through
_enable_from_env, which honors the `_enabled_explicit` marker written by
load_gateway_config.
Route all twelve sites through the same helper. Credentials are still wired
into the (disabled) PlatformConfig so send-only tooling keeps working —
the same contract Slack and api_server already follow.
Live repro (real load_gateway_config against a temp HERMES_HOME, yaml
`enabled: false` + creds in env): 12/13 platforms flipped to enabled=True
on main; 0/13 after the fix (telegram control unchanged).
Bug 2 of #48820. Fix direction from @JoaoMarcos44 in #48852 (surgically
reapplied on current main — the June branch no longer applies).
Co-authored-by: JoaoMarcos44 <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com>
Manual /compress on a compute-host (turn_isolation) session blocked its RPC
waiter for a hard-coded 120s, answered error 5019, and then DROPPED the
host's late `control.ack`: HostSupervisor.control() popped the pending
queue in `finally`, so `_handle_host_frame` had nothing to deliver to. The
host kept compressing, succeeded minutes later, rotated the session — and
the gateway session never mirrored the new session_key/history_version and
the desktop never refreshed its transcript.
- host_supervisor: `control(..., on_late_ack=)` leaves a one-shot handler
registered when the waiter times out; control.ack/control.error/error
frames for that request_id fire it (bounded: 30min TTL, cap 64). A host
crash fails outstanding handlers with a synthetic control.error.
- server: `_compute_host_compress_wait_seconds()` derives the wait from
`compression.context_total_ceiling_seconds` (+30s slack, floor 120s,
cap 630s) instead of the literal 120. `_adopt_late_compute_host_compress_ack`
applies the metadata mirror and emits the same `session.info` a normal
compress does plus the existing `status.update kind=compacted` edge; a
late error goes out through the existing `error` event.
- session.compress / slash.compress (methods_tools + _mirror_slash_side_effects):
on waiter timeout answer `status: pending` (not 5019) and register the
late-ack handler.
- desktop: SESSION_COMPRESS_TIMEOUT_MS 120s -> 660s (above the gateway cap);
`status: 'pending'` renders as an info notice, not `error:`; the
`compacted` status edge rehydrates an idle active session's transcript
(mid-turn compaction still defers to the turn settle path).
Minimal extraction of the design in #99630 by @vsd2807 (design trace by
@andrexibiza and @JoaoMarcos44 in the #97948 thread); no new DB tables,
modules, or polling protocol.
Refs #97948
Co-authored-by: VVV <vaibhavdahiya28@gmail.com>
Follow-up on top of the salvaged #94095 commit:
- maybe_auto_prune_and_vacuum() now returns 'closed' (stale open state-owned
sessions marked ended) alongside 'pruned', so entrypoints can report the
reconciliation without parsing logs.
- Docstring explains the two-window lifecycle (close now, delete after a
further retention window).
- Regression test: cron/kanban/subagent rows with ended_at NULL are closed on
pass 1 and deleted on pass 2; a telegram row is never touched.
- website/docs sessions.md documents the automatic stale-open sweep.
NousDashboardAuthProvider._verify_jwt (and the identical hunk in the
self-hosted OIDC provider) folded EVERY PyJWKClient failure into
ProviderError, which the gate translates to HTTP 503
{"detail":"Auth provider 'nous' unreachable"}. That branch fires for
jwt.DecodeError('Not enough segments') — i.e. the bearer is not a JWT at all
(an opaque peer key, a legacy token, garbage) — and for PyJWKSetError (JWKS
fetched fine, foreign kid). Neither involves reaching Portal, which is why
the hosted sjc agents in #94558 returned a fast, well-formed 503 that
survived token re-mint and instance restart while Portal was healthy.
Add one shared classifier, hermes_cli.dashboard_auth.classify_jwks_lookup_error:
only PyJWKClientConnectionError (transport) and an unexpected bare
PyJWKClientError stay ProviderError; DecodeError / PyJWKSetError /
InvalidTokenError become InvalidCodeError so verify_session() returns None
and the middleware proceeds to the next provider / refresh / 401 exactly as
the protocol documents. Both providers now use it.
Live repro (real NousDashboardAuthProvider against a local reachable JWKS
server; and the real gated web_server app): before — opaque bearer ->
ProviderError "JWKS lookup failed: DecodeError('Not enough segments')" ->
503 unreachable; after — verify_session() -> None, gated GET /api/auth/me
with the opaque bearer -> 401; a real JWT against an unreachable JWKS still
-> ProviderError (503).
This does not add /api/v1/message to the public-path allowlist (#94579):
that route has no verifier in this repo, so bypassing the gate would leave a
state-changing ingress fail-open. The correct fix is classification, which
also covers every other opaque-bearer surface.
Refs #94558
Concurrent or nested delegation batches (a parent's 9-way fan-out plus a
child's own 3-way fan-out) printed interleaved `✓ [3/3]` / `✓ [3/9]` lines
with nothing identifying which batch each belongs to.
- CLI: batch header `🔀 [6a66] delegating 9 tasks`; completion lines and
child tree-view lines become `[6a66 3/9]`; spinner remaining-count tagged.
- Relay: `delegation_id` rides on every `subagent.*` event (TUI gateway
payload, api_server SSE subagent.start/complete).
- TUI: `[6a66 3/9]` prefix on /agents rows; Desktop Agents pane groups
workers by exact delegation_id (heuristic shape/time grouping kept for
older backends) and shows the tag on the group header.
- Tag = last 4 hex of the deleg_xxxxxxxx id (format_batch_tag), same id
returned by the dispatch and used for cache/delegation/live/<id>/.