_to_async_client rebuilds default_headers from scratch and dropped the blank
Authorization set by _create_openai_client, so every async aux call (the path
aux tasks actually take) for a free-tier OpenCode model still shipped the
keyless placeholder as a bearer and 401'd. Re-apply the same keyless policy on
the async twin.
Review finding: fourth client builder (_to_async_client) missed the keyless header policy.
A free slug (deepseek-v4-flash-free) re-resolved under the paid `opencode` profile — via
`/model --provider opencode`, a fallback switch, or a config default — resolves to the
keyless placeholder, but the primary client builder blanked the Authorization header only
when `agent.provider == "opencode-free"`. The placeholder then went on the wire as a
bearer, the Zen relay 401'd every request, and the credential pool (size 0) had nothing to
rotate: the loop reported in #110831.
Key the header policy on the placeholder as well as the provider, matching agent_init and
auxiliary_client which already do so.
build_model_state dropped every inventory row whose slug name matched a
named `providers:` entry and relabelled the current provider `custom:<key>`
unconditionally. When a `providers:` key shadows a canonical provider name
(providers.openrouter: -> proxy with a models: list), a session genuinely
running on openrouter.ai lost all canonical rows and its current id became
custom:openrouter:..., which resolves to the proxy base_url — picking the
"current" row silently re-routed the session to a different endpoint.
Only rows flagged is_user_defined are replaced by the named catalogs now,
and the current provider is promoted to custom:<key> only when the session
base_url matches that entry's api_url or no canonical row for the raw key
exists (the reported relay/MixedCase class keeps its custom:<key> id).
Review finding: named entry shadowing a canonical provider dropped canonical rows and re-routed the current session to the proxy.
Stored tool call ids are minted per turn (terminal:0, terminal:1…), so the
same id recurs on later turns of one session. The Responses adapter replayed
each pair verbatim, putting the same call_id on the wire N times; strict
validators (opencode Console, OpenAI) reject the request with 400
"Duplicate function_call_output for call_id" and every retry fails the same
way (#102629, #111231 bug 1).
Every occurrence past the first now gets a `_dup<n>` wire id and the matching
tool output pops the id its function_call was given, in call order, so pairs
stay intact and stored history is untouched.
Re-applied onto the facade split (helpers moved into _replay_tool_call_items /
_tool_output_items) from PR #102634.
With no fallback_chain (or an exhausted one) the ladder tail returned the
_RERAISE_ORIGINAL sentinel and call_llm's bare `raise` re-raised the ORIGINAL
error. After a 401 that the refresh rung already healed, the retry's actionable
"404 requires available credits" was hidden behind "401 Unauthorized", steering
the user to re-login instead of top-up. Raise the narrowed `first_err` from the
ladder tail instead and drop the sentinel; the pool-rotation rung shares the
same tail so it is covered by the same change.
Review finding: exhausted no-chain path re-raised the healed 401 instead of the retry's 404 credits error.
Review feedback on the fall-through fix: the accept boundary and the
retry-fails-with-a-connection-error path through the credential rung were
reachable but untested, and two comments described behavior the code does
not have. Tests and comments only, no behavior change.
Both auth-refresh rungs in the auxiliary recovery ladder performed their
post-refresh retry with a bare `yield` inside a `return` statement, so an
exception from that retry escaped `_aux_recovery_ladder` instead of being
converted into `(None, err)` by `_rung()`. The ladder therefore never reached
`_ladder_provider_fallback` and the configured
`auxiliary.<task>.fallback_chain` was silently skipped.
Observable case: a stale Nous runtime token makes the auxiliary request return
401; the ladder refreshes the credential and retries; when the retried model is
out of credits the resulting 404 escapes the ladder and the task fails (context
compression degrades to truncation) even though a healthy fallback_chain is
configured. With a fresh token the same 404 takes the payment path, which
already falls through correctly.
Guard both rungs with `_rung()` - the helper the sibling payment rung and the
credential-pool rung below already use - so a failed retry resumes the ladder.
Copilot enterprise custom models (BYOK) expose catalog ids shaped
owner/sub/model. normalize_copilot_model_id() only tried the full id and the
id minus its FIRST segment, and returned the stripped form when neither
matched the (unreachable) catalog - corrupting those ids into sub/model,
which the CLI's second normalization pass then stripped again to model. The
Copilot API answered HTTP 400 model_not_supported on every call.
Only accept the strip guess when the remainder is itself a flat id: a result
that still contains "/" cannot be a Copilot id.
Fixes#110597
_is_structured_output_rejection matched several phrasings for a provider refusing the
structured-output field, but not gateways that validate the body with a strict pydantic
model and reject the OBJECT-form json_schema by shape:
HTTP 422: {"detail":[{"loc":["body","response_format","json_schema"],
"msg":"str type expected","type":"type_error.str"}]}
422 already passes the status check; only the phrasing was missing, so the
one-retry-without-response_format rung never engaged and the auxiliary task failed
hard (title generation left 'HTTP 422' in the session title). Treat the shape error as
a rejection: the field is what the provider refuses and the remedy is identical.
Fixes#110631
_is_unsupported_parameter_error matched "does not support" but not the contraction Bedrock
Converse returns for xAI Grok ("This model doesn't support the temperature field"), nor the
inference-profile Claude wording ("`temperature` is deprecated for this model"), so the aux
ladder's retry-without-temperature rung never fired and the ValidationException surfaced on
title/vision/compression calls (#111043, second half).
Bedrock-hosted xAI Grok (us./global. inference-profile prefixes) rejects
temperature/topP in Converse with a hard 400 — the same restriction as
Claude Opus 4.6+, but _forbids_sampling_params is Claude-only, so Grok
needs its own denylist gate in build_converse_kwargs.
Fixes#111043
`hermes profile create <name> --clone` copies whatever `hermes import-agent`
had pulled into the source profile, but leaves import-sync.json behind, so
the clone can never run `import-agent --sync` itself: its imported skills and
memories freeze at clone time.
`--sync-imports` (with --clone / --clone-from) also copies the manifest. It
is deliberately narrow: the manifest points at EXTERNAL Claude Code / Codex
trees, never at the source profile, so both profiles remain independent
islands (root AGENTS.md ruling) — config.yaml, SOUL.md and skills are still
one-off copies. Opt-in, one-directional, explicit; --clone-all already
carries the file as part of the full copy. Refused without a clone source.
faulthandler.register(SIGUSR2, ..., chain=True) writes the stack dump and
then re-raises the signal to its previous handler. SIGUSR2's default
disposition is "terminate", so the diagnostic hook added for #70344 kills the
very process an operator is trying to inspect (rc = -12), which is what the
#110437 reporter hit while introspecting a long-lived gateway. Nothing else
in the gateway installs a SIGUSR2 handler, so there is nothing to chain to.
Test: a child interpreter runs the real _start_install_faulthandler, receives
SIGUSR2, and must still be alive with a dump in gateway_faulthandler.log.
Red on origin/main (rc=-12), green with chain=False. Docs: the stack-dump
signal is now documented next to the event-loop watchdog.
#89322 fixed the bridge-local normalizeWhatsAppId, but bridge.js has since
moved its id handling to bridge_helpers.js::normalizeWhatsAppId, which still
turned `<user>:<device>@lid` into the malformed `<user>@<device>@lid` for
mentionedJid / quoted participant / reaction keys, and the Python side
(gateway/platforms/whatsapp_common.py::_normalize_whatsapp_id) did the same
':'->'@' swap on botIds. Drop the local duplicate in bridge.js, import the
helper, and strip the `:<device>` suffix on both layers so the bot's own ids
compare equal to the bare ids WhatsApp sends for mentions and quotes.
One invariant test: device-qualified botIds match a bare mentionedId and a
bare quotedParticipant; a plain group message still does not trigger.
Drop tests/gateway/test_slack_conversational_senders.py (12 parametrized
cases driving _handle_slack_message end-to-end for allow_bots policies and
canvas mentions — the allow_bots matrix is already covered by the existing
bot-filter tests in test_slack.py) and fold the remaining coverage into two
_prefilter_inbound tests: every housekeeping subtype is dropped, and every
conversational subtype (absent, file_share, thread_broadcast, me_message,
document_mention, bot_message under allow_bots=all) still passes. Distinct
ts per event: the prefilter dedups by (team, ts) before the subtype gate.
Adds the contributor email mapping for the second author.
Drop the unreachable handle_message assertion in the drop tests
(_prefilter_inbound never calls it) and state the deliberate
file_comment drop decision in the allowlist comment.
Housekeeping subtypes (channel_join/leave/topic/name/purpose,
convert_to_private/public, pins, deletions) are not a person speaking,
yet _prefilter_inbound only rejected message_changed/message_deleted,
so each of them started a full agent turn in free-response channels.
Replace the denylist with an allowlist: a message passes when subtype
is absent, file_share, thread_broadcast or me_message; everything else
is dropped. Fixes#110778.
`_clarify_callback_sync` decided "no answer arrived" by testing whether the
response text starts with '[' (the shape of the timeout / undeliverable
sentinels). A real answer can start with '[' too — a "[A] staging" choice
label picked by number, or "[urgent] ..." free text after Other — so the
clarify resolved and the agent got the answer, yet the Slack card was
rewritten to "This prompt expired" and typing was never re-armed.
`_clarify_send_then_wait` now returns `(response, answered)` and the runner
branches on that flag only.
The Slack click handler popped the retire entry as soon as Other was
clicked, but Other is not terminal: the clarify stays pending for typed
text, so a later timeout or /new reset found nothing to retire and the card
stayed stuck on "Awaiting typed answer". The entry is now popped only on a
terminal outcome (a choice click, or Other on an already-dead entry).
A typed answer to a native card (numeric pick, or text after Other) never
reaches the click handler, so the card kept its buttons forever; the
TEXT_RESOLVED intercept now retires it with the answer.
Review finding: '[' prefix mistaken for the timeout sentinel; Other click dropped the retire entry; typed answers never rewrote the card.
One adapter-facing seam replaces the Slack-only callback: an adapter whose
clarify prompt is a persistent card (Slack Block Kit) defines
`retire_clarify_card(clarify_id, notice)`, and the gateway calls it from
every path that ends a clarify without a button click:
- TurnRunner._clarify_callback_sync: when the bounded wait returns a
sentinel (timeout, /new or run-end clear_session), schedule the retire
with the expired notice on the gateway loop (#110821).
- run_inbound TEXT_REJECTED_PROSE: retire with the cancelled notice before
the prose is routed as a follow-up (#111019). Lookup is on the adapter
class so MagicMock doubles cannot fabricate the method; no platform ==
SLACK special-case.
The Slack map is keyed by clarify_id and popped before the first await, so
a late timer cannot touch a newer prompt and the button handler's ts-keyed
guard makes a racing click a no-op. Gateway-restart-orphaned cards stay
out of scope: nothing is waiting on the new process, and the click path
already renders them expired.
Tests trimmed to invariants: the runner-level timeout probe (card adapter
vs no-card adapter), the inbound prose retire, and one Slack test covering
buttons-dropped + late-click-noop. Docs updated for the new in-place edit.
Aligns the star ranking with the rule the skills index already follows:
GitHub is consulted only by the twice-daily skills-index.yml schedule, whose
artifact every docs deploy reuses. deploy-site.yml now runs
fetch-plugin-stars.py without --probe (reuse-only: artifact → live site copy →
disk → empty) and cannot call the API at all, so a same-day merge train adds
zero requests regardless of cache age.
The probe itself collapses from one REST call per repo (~26 today, growing
with the catalog) to a single GraphQL query with aliased repository fields,
so the scheduled run costs one request no matter how big the catalog gets. A
failed probe (rate limit, renamed repo, bad token) keeps the previous counts.
- Drop the 900s "inbound liveness" INFO line from the salvage: a periodic
log heartbeat is a feature with a separate scoping call (#111211 item 3);
the existing stall watchdog already escalates when getUpdates stops.
- The polling error_callback interpolated the raw exception and left the
redaction call inside the format string, so its lines read
"Telegram network _redact_telegram_error_text(error), scheduling
reconnect: ..." and leaked unredacted text. Redact for real.
- Tests: keep two invariants (recovered wording after network errors;
clean bootstrap stays "confirmed healthy") and the transport test.
Moving the dedup flush and thread lookup from asyncio.to_thread onto the
adapter-owned pool fixed the torn-down default executor, but to_thread also
copies the caller's contextvars and run_in_executor does not. A multiplexed
profile's HERMES_HOME override and secret scope are contextvars, so those
workers silently ran under the launch profile. _run_blocking now runs the call
through contextvars.copy_context().run, matching to_thread semantics.
Review finding: _run_blocking lost the profile HERMES_HOME override / secret scope on the worker.
_connect_websocket now submits the SDK thread to _get_sdk_executor() instead
of the loop default executor; the SimpleNamespace adapter stub in the
profile-scope test predates that contract and lacked the method.
The regression test swaps in a torn-down default executor but never
restores the pristine one, leaking the poisoned executor to anything
sharing the loop. Save/restore via the private slot because
set_default_executor() rejects None, which is exactly the pristine
(lazy-creation) state. Also apply ruff format to the file.
A dead background event loop tears the loop's default executor down, and
after that every inbound message was dropped inside the dedup gate with a
RuntimeError out of asyncio.to_thread — the adapter went permanently deaf
while the gateway process, websocket and service all stayed healthy.
#10849 already moved the outbound SDK calls onto an adapter-owned,
self-healing pool; this gives the inbound dedup-state flush the same
treatment, so a default-executor teardown can no longer wedge message
intake.
The bridge wrote GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS into os.environ only when unset and
never cleared it. In-process restart paths (gateway restart watcher, dashboard
profile actions) copy os.environ into the child, so a config.yaml grant became
a sticky env var: flipping allow_all_users to false and restarting left the
gateway OPEN. The bridge now tracks its own write (module flag), overwrites or
clears it on reload, exports only a truthy grant (presence-based readers such
as the Telegram intake prefilter treated "false" as configured auth), and the
two restart env builders drop the bridge-owned value so the child re-derives
the posture from its own config.yaml. Under multiplex_profiles the DEFAULT
profile's events are authorized inside its secret scope, where gate readers
never fall to os.environ; the bridged grant is now seeded into that profile's
scope mapping only (secondaries never inherit it).
Review finding: bridged GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS survives restart and overrides a flipped config.yaml; inert for the default profile under multiplex; "false" exported as configured auth.
`gateway.allow_all_users: true` (and the top-level spelling) in config.yaml
was a silent no-op: `_TOPLEVEL_BRIDGE` never forwarded it, GatewayConfig has
no field, and every allow-all reader (authz mixin default-deny branch,
startup access check, own-policy adapters, Discord/Matrix/Email plugin
gates) consults the GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS env var only.
Bridge the YAML key into that env var in `bridge_core_env_settings`, the
one seam every reader already shares, instead of threading a new config
attribute through ten readers:
- first-writer-wins: an explicit env var beats YAML (matches every other
{PLATFORM}_* gate);
- skipped inside a multiplexed secondary profile's scope (#80099 class):
the secondary's config.yaml must not become the default profile's policy,
and the isolation test now asserts GATEWAY_ALLOW_ALL_USERS stays unset;
- a startup warning names config.yaml as the grant source, because the key
was inert until now and a forgotten `true` flips the posture to open.
Tests: both spellings authorize a stranger through `_is_user_authorized`;
`false`, absent key, and env=false over YAML=true all stay denied.
Docs: security guide, env-var reference, gateway internals.
Fixes#110690
Drop the change-detector asserting the default attribute value; the two remaining tests
pin the invariants (a delta-fed consumer keeps the WeCom ack-race warning, an interim-only
consumer does not).
The cron/webhook lane compared the stripped response and its first/last
line against the marker set without stripping edge punctuation, while
the interactive predicate did. A Chinese lane naturally renders the
sentinel as 【静默】 or 静默。, which chat suppressed but cron still
delivered — the very lane #110935 was filed against. Route the three
autonomous candidates through is_intentional_silence_response so both
lanes share one canonical form; the bracketed-prefix rule and the
embedded-in-prose rejection are unchanged.
Review finding: is_autonomous_silence_response never de-punctuated, so 【静默】 / 静默。 passed cron/webhook while is_intentional_silence_response suppressed them.
Follow-up to the salvaged #110940 commit:
- `cron/scheduler_prompt.py::_CRON_HINT` tells the model the sentinel is a literal
ASCII control token that must never be translated or rephrased — the prompt-side
half of the fix, so a lane answering in any other language is steered to the
canonical token instead of relying on the filter knowing that language.
- Docs: the supported-token list ('Intentional Silence Tokens') gains the zh-Hans
forms in the English page and the zh-Hans mirror gets the section it lacked.
- Tests trimmed to two invariants (translated forms match in every shape the English
ones do; prose that mentions the word is still delivered), proven red on origin/main.
A model lane that does not think in English answers the cron instruction
("respond with exactly [SILENT]") by translating the sentinel rather than
dropping it. LIVE_GATEWAY_SILENT_MARKERS is English-only, so the whole control
token is delivered to the user as content. Carry the zh-Hans forms (the only
non-English locale this project documents) and derive the autonomous lane's
bracketed-prefix rule from the set so the two rules cannot drift.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_011oAAQ4T859Y8fWNXRoiNEB
The archived-holder carve-out in _set_session_title lets the next Bot open
claim the "Bot Chat" title from an archived canonical row. That is correct
for a deliberate sidebar archive, but archive_stale_sessions (the opt-in
sessions.auto_archive sweep) could also archive an idle hidden Bot Chat with
end_reason NULL, which unarchive_recoverable_session refuses; the next Bot
click then stripped the old row's title, retiring the bot's whole history
on an idle timer with no way back.
Skip the hidden canonical Bot Chat in the sweep SELECT using the same
hidden + exact-title predicate set_session_pinned already uses to protect
it, so only an explicit archive retires a Bot Chat. Reword the bot-mode doc
so it no longer promises the retired (still hidden) chat is reachable from
the archive view.
Review finding: auto_archive sweep could irreversibly retire the canonical Bot Chat; docs over-promised archive-view reachability.
The API server's _resolve_media_to_data_urls ran MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE over the
raw final_response, bypassing the sentinel seam this branch added in
gateway/platforms/base.py. A provider that leaked its end-of-sequence token
glued to the last MEDIA path (MEDIA:/x.png<|eos|>) therefore still produced no
inline image and returned the raw tag to the HTTP client (non-stream and SSE
chat completions) - the exact symptom fixed for the chat platforms. The scan
now stops at _terminal_sentinel_start and drops the control token only when a
tag actually resolved, so unrelated responses stay byte-identical.
_terminal_sentinel_start also recognises a run of repeated exact tokens
(MEDIA:/x.png<|eos|><|eos|>), so a doubled leak no longer hides the attachment
either; mid-text or non-exact sentinels are still not a media boundary.
Review finding: api_server sibling MEDIA surface bypassed _mask_media_scan_text; doubled terminal sentinel still leaked
A provider that leaks its end-of-sequence control token glued to the last
MEDIA path (MEDIA:/x.png<|eos|>) made BasePlatformAdapter.extract_media
return no media: neither MEDIA_TAG_CLEANUP_RE nor MEDIA_EXTENSIONLESS_TAG_RE
accepts '<' as a path terminator (deliberately - widening the delimiter set
reopens the glue classes #68773/#88038), so the file was silently dropped
and the raw tag leaked into the chat.
Recognise the one exact token at the shared normalization seam instead:
_mask_media_scan_text blanks a terminal <|eos|> (offset-preserving) so the
glued tag ends on whitespace for every scan - extraction, display strip and
stream cleanup - across the known-extension, unknown-extension and
extension-less branches; _deliverable_tag_spans deletes the sentinel with
the tag it terminated. Not the exact token, not terminal, or inside a
protected code/JSON span: byte-identical to before.
Fixes#111046
Co-authored-by: Hukla <129692708+huklaa@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: joaomarcos <joaomarcosdias444@gmail.com>
#111809 accepted any *.nousresearch.com https host once the operator's Portal override
pointed at a non-production Portal. That let a network-provenance value — the Portal's
refresh response — pick any Nous-owned host as the bearer recipient, including hosts that
are not inference gateways. Owning the DNS suffix is not the same as being an authorized
recipient, and the validator's threat model (an injected refresh response) is exactly the
case a suffix rule fails to bound.
The recipient is now the operator's own NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL: a non-production host
returned by the Portal is accepted exactly when it equals that override's host, otherwise
the strict production set stands. The Portal override grants nothing by itself. What the
operator gains over plain use of the override is that the Portal's value is then persisted
and used for the pricing scope and proxy instead of being healed to production, and the
per-turn "refusing inference URL host" warning stops. No environment is named in code.
Raised on #111809 review. Tests: recipient match accepted, unrelated Nous host refused, no
override refused, Portal override alone grants nothing, the match follows the profile scope
under multiplexing; the widening cases are red on main. Docs row for NOUS_INFERENCE_BASE_URL.
Co-authored-by: Ben Barclay <ben@nousresearch.com>
get_secret() already reads os.environ in a single-profile process; it raises
UnscopedSecretError only when multi-profile hosting is active and the call has no profile
scope. _nous_inference_env_override and _nous_portal_env_override caught that and read the
ambient env anyway, which is the launch profile's value — so a routed call that lost its
scope could POST a secondary's refresh token to the launch profile's Portal, or send its
inference bearer to the launch profile's host. Since #111620 the launch profile itself
carries a frozen-env scope while hosting, so the exception never means "single-profile
CLI"; it means the caller has no authority over that value. Both readers now go through
_scoped_operator_override, which returns None in that state — the override is absent, the
stored/default routing applies, nothing raises (pricing, runtime_provider and the guest
path rely on these never raising).
Raised on #111809 review. One parametrized invariant test over both readers: environ when
unscoped single-profile, the scope's value under hosting, None on a scoped miss, None with
no scope; the no-scope leg is red on main.