4bdd64b334
* fix(auth): close the free tier's gaps against the gateway's welcome-tier contract The inference gateway's welcome tier (NousResearch/api DOCS/anon-tier/plan.md) serves an anonymous account exactly one model on its own host, refuses everything else with a structured 429, cross-refuses a request on the wrong host with a 400 (403 while the tier is dark), and tells a signed-in account that still asks for `nous/welcome` what to switch to in an `x-nous-model-switch` header. Four client-side gaps against that contract: - Auxiliary calls were refused on every session. The auxiliary client asked the welcome host for the Portal's recommended compaction/vision model, a guaranteed 429 `model_not_free` before each fallback. On the welcome host it now uses `nous/welcome` (its backing model covers auxiliary work) and skips Nous for vision, which the welcome model does not take. - The structured 429 body was never read. The classifier now parses `reason` / `retry_after` / `alternates` / `upgrade_url`: `model_not_free` and `feature_not_free` are non-retryable gates that fall back; `at_capacity`, `admission_closed` and `rate_limited` are rate limits that honour `retry_after` and never rotate the free tier's only credential. The wrong-host 400 and the dark-tier 403 are deterministic, so they abort this route and fall back instead of retrying or re-exchanging. The terminal paths say what happened and name the sign-in (`/login` in a chat, `hermes auth upgrade` in a terminal). - The `x-nous-model-switch` header was ignored. The chat-completions transport records it beside the rate-limit and credits headers; the next call moves the session, and the config default when it still names `nous/welcome`, to the backing model the gateway named. - A guest fell back to the paid host. With `inference_base_url` absent from the exchange or outside the host allowlist, routing defaulted to inference-api, where every request is a 400. A guest now defaults to the welcome literal at the exchange, in the shared store's shape, and in effective routing. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> (cherry picked from commit fc758aad7efceff6223fc144a9b5c69f13e41bd8) * feat(auth): the free tier is set up on request; nous.guest_setup decides whether also on first use A caller that names nous/welcome on a Nous route with no Nous identity in reach — the guided setup's session (provider=nous, which skips the resolver's nothing-configured rung), the free-tier picker row, a bare --provider nous pointed at it — is asking for the free tier. The OAuth runtime rung now sets it up there instead of failing "not logged in", so the guided chat no longer races the root profile's first-run mint. nous.guest_setup is the policy seam: "auto" (default) keeps today's first-use setup wherever nothing else is configured; "on-request" mints only when the free tier is asked for by name (nous/welcome, /login, hermes auth upgrade, replacing a retired identity). Implicit callers — the resolver's last rung, the first-run check, free_tier.status, the CLI's background setup, the connector token path — still adopt what the shared store holds, so every profile follows the one identity the guided setup created, but never create one on their own. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> (cherry picked from commit ae915ddc65ecdb81b81e29b604671d15cd49233c) (cherry picked from commit 62ad1ff3ab200ea064975a32c502041b25910165) * feat(auth): the guided setup provisions the free tier explicitly; nous.guest_setup is auto | explicit Two questions govern the free tier: may it exist (nous.guest) and who may CREATE the identity (nous.guest_setup). "auto" (default) keeps today's first-use setup wherever nothing else is configured. "explicit" means Hermes never creates one on its own: the only creator is the new provision_free_tier() primitive, exposed as the free_tier.provision RPC, which the guided setup on Hermes Desktop calls as its first step — on the root gateway, before the setup profile and before the guided chat exists — so the identity lands in the root store every profile reads through and is there before any session asks for nous/welcome. That closes the race against the backend's own setup, and makes "only when the setup-bot flow is used" literally true. The earlier "on-request" tier is replaced: it minted whenever any caller named nous/welcome (the hermes model row, --provider nous), which treated a model name as intent and was broader than the guided setup. Under "explicit" a nous/welcome request with no identity fails "not logged in" as before the free tier existed, and /login or hermes auth upgrade report nothing to sign in from. Implicit callers still adopt an identity the shared store holds, and a retired credential is replaced (a continuation, not a creation). Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> (cherry picked from commit c63d2c935c1e59016164fdfb90cf70b4094466a0) * fix(auth): remove the nous.guest_setup knob; the free tier is created on first use `nous.guest_setup: auto | explicit` decided who may CREATE the free-tier identity. Under its default every line it added was inert (`may_mint` always true), nothing in tree set `explicit`, unknown values read as `auto`, and under `explicit` a CLI-only install could never get an identity, which contradicts the first-run contract (first command mints, then chats). The mint race the knob accompanied is already benign: every caller takes the profile lock then the shared-store lock, and the loser adopts what the winner wrote. What makes the guided setup win deterministically is `provision_free_tier()` behind the `free_tier.provision` RPC, which stays. `nous.guest` remains the only free-tier policy. Removed: `guest_setup_policy()` and its constants, the `explicit=` / `may_mint=` threading through `ensure_portal_identity` and `_reconcile_and_provision`, the flag at the three replacement call sites (now no-ops), the config default, the docs section, and the four `guest_setup` test-config entries. The three policy tests that hold regardless of the knob are kept under `TestExplicitProvision`; the two that only tested the knob are deleted. (cherry picked from commit d8a50526d93c374c0067dd935b5a65055e0af261) * fix(gateway): a server-driven model switch off nous/welcome does not evict the cached agent When a signed-in account still asks the paid host for `nous/welcome`, the inference gateway serves the current backing model and names it in `x-nous-model-switch`. `apply_model_switch` moves the live session to that model and moves `config.yaml`'s default off the alias in the same step. The messaging gateway's fallback-eviction check compares the agent's model with the config default and evicts on any mismatch that is not a /model override, so when the config write did not land (unreadable config, lock) the cached agent was evicted once per turn, and prompt caching with it. `apply_model_switch` now stamps the alias it moved the session off on the agent, and `_is_intentional_model_switch` treats "agent moved off the alias the config still carries" as deliberate, beside the existing /model override case. The check takes the agent and the config model instead of a bare model string; its one caller in `_run_agent_evict_on_fallback` passes them. (cherry picked from commit 696d1ec86b69db28bf002c841e9389b85178a954) * fix(auth): the free tier outranks implicit host credentials in provider resolution On a fresh install with a leftover ~/.aws profile, resolve_provider("auto") reached the Bedrock rung before the free-tier rung, so the first turn ran on Bedrock and failed 403 while the free tier was still being minted in the background at agent setup (NS-829). Live on a Mac with ~/.aws present: 28 s, three retries, no answer; the next process then switched to nous/welcome. The free-tier rung now sits directly above the Bedrock chain: when nous.guest is on, an existing free-tier identity answers, else a blocking mint runs, and only then does the boto chain get a say. Everything above is unchanged and still wins: CLI creds, config.yaml model.provider, env keys, the OpenRouter pool, a logged-in active_provider. nous.guest: false skips the rung, and a failed mint still falls through to Bedrock and the no-provider guidance. Tests: six precedence cases (identity present, fresh mint, free tier off, env key still wins, sign-in still wins, failed mint falls through). The opt-out test now neutralizes the AWS chain like the precedence tests do; on a machine with ~/.aws it was failing for the same reason as the bug. Live after the fix, same Mac, AWS credentials visible, isolated shared store: identity minted 2 s in, turn on model=nous/welcome provider=nous, answer in 11 s. (cherry picked from commit a04b05260cd334dd7199ad9b6cd5b2538364c75a) * fix(auth): review follow-ups for the free-tier rung (NS-829) - tests/agent/test_bedrock_integration.py: the Bedrock auto-detect test switches the free tier off; its contract is the boto chain, and the free tier now sits above it. - gateway/run_notifications.py: the free-tier startup line reads auth.json before consulting the resolver, so a gateway boot on a machine with AWS credentials never mints or refreshes over the network. - hermes_cli/anon_auth.py: module docstring says where the free tier sits in the ladder instead of "the ladder is untouched". - tests/hermes_cli/test_provider_precedence.py: two invariant tests instead of six (parametrized ladder cases; a failed mint that returns None or raises falls through to Bedrock). scripts/run_tests.sh on the five affected files: 147 passed, 0 failed. (cherry picked from commit 10790d148c60ada11b9ecdde2cd2c836c6a82a11) * feat(auth): HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING=1 is the one launch gate for the free tier; HERMES_FORCE_GUEST is gone The free tier is pre-GA. Until GA it must not exist for anyone who did not ask for it: no identity minted, no portal traffic, no free-tier copy on any surface. One environment variable now decides that, and one function reads it. `guest_enabled()` returns False unless `HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING` is exactly "1"; only then does `nous.guest` (the user's off switch) get consulted. Every free-tier site already funnels through `guest_enabled()`, so the gate closes minting, routing, connector entitlement, status lines and the picker row in one place. With the variable unset, `resolve_provider("auto")` on a fresh install raises `no_provider_configured` exactly as upstream does. `HERMES_FORCE_GUEST` and `force_guest_mode()` are removed. They inverted the gate (forced the tier ON over `nous.guest: false`), their "new" value re-minted identities as a side effect of provider resolution, and `_has_any_provider_ configured` read them ahead of every other check, making the CLI a second reader of a flag that must have exactly one. `_forced_new_done` and the `force` parameter of `_reconcile_and_provision` go with them. Supersedes the dev lever introduced in fcf9d11679 (rung 1) and hardened in b5c162c3ec. Ruling: NS-845 Q1.1 (recorded on NS-847). Not a user preference: the variable is never written to config.yaml or .env and never shown in setup. It is deleted at GA together with its comment in anon_auth.py. This is a deliberate, temporary exception to the "no new HERMES_* env vars for non-secret config" rule. Tests: fixtures set the gate instead of deleting the old lever; one new invariant (`test_launch_gate_off_means_no_free_tier_at_all`) proves that "", "0", "true" and "new" all leave the tier off with zero portal calls, red on the previous commit. The `HERMES_FORCE_GUEST=new` re-mint test is deleted with the feature. * feat(auth): the free-tier identity is created in one place, at boot; every other site is a read Before this commit eight sites could create a Nous free-tier identity as a side effect of something else: resolving a provider, the CLI's first-run check, the CLI's session setup (in the background beside an own key), a connector bearer read, the desktop polling `free_tier.status`, the sign-in precondition, the desktop's `free_tier.provision`, and the dead-credential re-mint. A poll could mint. Provider resolution could hit the network. Two of them raced each other on a fresh install. Now `hermes_cli/free_tier_bootstrap.py::run_bootstrap` is the only creator. `hermes serve` runs it on a daemon thread from `_lifespan` beside the other background boots; `cmd_chat` runs it synchronously before the first-run guard. It inventories credentials first (`resolve_provider("auto", skip_free_tier=True)`: what would carry inference if the free tier did not exist), creates the identity only when `guest_enabled()`, resolves inference, records a `SetupRecord` in process memory and broadcasts ONE `setup.ready` event. It runs on every boot; only the mint is gated. `ensure_portal_identity` now requires `explicit=True` and raises otherwise. Its callers are the bootstrap, the desktop's `free_tier.provision` (the explicit retry when the boot could not create the identity) and the two dead-credential replacements (`auth_nous.resolve_nous_runtime_credentials`, `managed_tool_gateway._replace_dead_guest_token`). The background thread path and `provision_free_tier` are deleted with their last callers. Reads that used to mint and now only read: `auth.py::resolve_provider` rung 7 (an existing identity still outranks the Bedrock chain, NS-829 ordering kept), `main.py::_has_any_provider_configured`, `cli_agent_setup_mixin._ensure_runtime_credentials`, `managed_tool_gateway.read_nous_access_token` (no identity -> None), `anon_sign_in.run_sign_in` (no identity -> Unavailable), `methods_free_tier` `free_tier.status`. `setup.status` answers from the record for the launch profile, blocking up to 8 s while the bootstrap is in flight so a client's first poll lands after the identity exists rather than racing it; a named profile, or a process that never ran the bootstrap, keeps today's live probe. The record's fields ride along additively (`ready`, `free_tier`, `other_providers`, `inference_provider`). Identity and inference are decoupled (NS-845 Q1.3): the mint sets `active_provider="nous"` only when the inventory found nothing else usable (`_mint_locked(carries_inference=)`); an adopted account always does. A token refresh no longer re-elects the provider it refreshed (`_save_provider_state_to_source` writes credentials, not the user's choice) — that write was how an own-key install ended up on the free tier after the first connector call. Supersedes the mint sites in fcf9d11679, a42d0748fc (first-run check), bbbaa8935a (CLI background setup), 0179efc989 (`free_tier.status` mint), 62ad1ff3ab / c63d2c935c / d8a50526d9 (the `nous.guest_setup` knob and `provision_free_tier`), and a04b05260c (blocking mint in the resolver). Ruling: NS-845 Q1.2 + Q1.3, recorded on NS-847. Tests: `TestBootstrapIsTheOneCreator` (one mint per process; own key keeps inference; reads never reach the portal; a refused mint is memoised), `free_tier.status` fails loudly if it ever calls the creator, the resolver stub fails loudly if resolution ever mints, `setup.status` reads the record, `skip_free_tier` proves the inventory question. The three sign-in tests for the deleted pre-mint collapse into one (`no identity -> Unavailable, zero portal calls`). Live: real `_lifespan` boot with a fake portal, gate on and off (/tmp/ns847-recon/evidence/e2e-rung5-c2-serve-boot.txt), and the CLI matrix incl. an own-key cell (e2e-rung5-c2-bootstrap.txt), 20/20. * fix(credits): the welcome host is free-tier evidence, so a free-tier identity never sees "run /topup" A free-tier identity carries $0 by design, so the portal seed reports `paid_access=False` for it. `is_free_tier_model` did not know the welcome host, read that as a depleted account, and every free-tier turn ended with the credits-depleted notice telling the user to top up an account they do not have. Rule (4) in `is_free_tier_model`: a `base_url` on the Nous welcome host (`anon_auth.route_is_welcome_host`) is the free tier. The host is the evidence, not the model name: the paid inference host can serve `nous/welcome` to a named account and that account's depletion is real, so `("nous/welcome", <inference host>)` stays False. Local data only, like the three rules above it. Restores the two contracts dropped by hermes-magic 674e11d1eaa (the prototype line ran without unit tests): the welcome host is free without any pricing evidence; the model name alone is not. The first is red without this fix. * fix(copy): free-tier text stops promising a connector transfer and never names the config key Sign-in copy on every surface said "Sign in to keep your connectors" and ended with "Your connectors are kept." The transfer registry that would make that true is empty (NS-821): nothing carries over today. The copy now says what signing in does give ("unlock more models and tools") and the completion line names the account, not a transfer. The docs page loses the "connectors carry over" paragraph for the same reason. The picker's off-state line exposed `nous.guest: false` and the word "guest"; user copy names the free tier only (R-USR-1). The docs page gains the pre-rollout note: until GA nothing on it happens without `HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING=1`. Its "first command mints" and "replaced on next use" sentences now describe the boot bootstrap. zh is a strict locale: the `freeTier` block was English placeholder text copied from `en`; it is now Chinese. `connectorsKept` is renamed `completedBody` since it no longer talks about connectors. * feat(desktop): the free-tier launch flag is decided once in Electron and stamped onto every backend spawn The Python backend reads `HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING` and treats exactly "1" as on. Until now nothing in the desktop set it, so a packaged app could never turn the free tier on, and a backend spawned by the app could disagree with the app about whether the tier was live. `electron/guest-onboarding.ts` owns the decision: `guestOnboardingEnabled` is true when the launch env has `HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING=1` or argv has `--guest-onboarding` (the packaged-app spelling). It is read ONCE at launch into a module constant. `desktopBackendSpawnEnv` wraps every backend env as the outermost call and writes the flag LAST, as "1" or an explicit "0", so no earlier spread (`process.env`, `backend.env`) can resurrect a stray value from the parent shell. Stamped onto all three spawn sites: the primary `serve` spawn, the pooled per-profile spawn, and the remote SSH `exec env ...` command (which gains ` HERMES_GUEST_ONBOARDING=1` only when on). The embedded terminal PTY and the backend probes are not backend spawns and do not get it: a `hermes --tui` typed in the pane must not mint. The renderer learns the same fact read-only through the existing `hermes:launch-flags` sync IPC (`guestOnboarding`) and preload (`window.hermesDesktop.guestOnboardingEnabled`). Ruling: NS-845 Q1.1 / Q2 (env var is the contract, `--guest-onboarding` maps to it in main). Two invariant tests on the pure helpers: only "1" or the argv flag enables; the spawn env carries "1"/"0" as the last word and preserves every other key. * feat(desktop): the renderer learns free-tier readiness from one `setup.ready` push, not a 60 s poll The backend's boot bootstrap now announces `setup.ready` once, after it has created (or refused) the free-tier identity and resolved the inference route. The renderer used to discover both by polling `setup.status`, `setup.runtime_check` and `free_tier.status` every 60 s from `useStatusSnapshot`; a fresh install's chip, notice strip and onboarding overlay could sit stale for up to a minute after boot, and three RPCs a minute per window kept asking a question whose answer changes only at boundaries the backend already announces. `handleLifecycleEvent` routes `setup.ready` (active source only, like `skin.changed`) to `notifySetupReady()`, a one-shot tick atom in `live-sync.ts` beside the other change ticks. `useStatusSnapshot` listens to it and runs one readiness round at once (`setup.status` + `setup.runtime_check` + `free_tier.status`). The readiness legs also run once on open and on return from another app, as today. The 60 s tick keeps only `getStatus()`. `SetupStatusSnapshot` types the record's additive fields (`ready`, `free_tier`, `other_providers`, `inference_provider`); readiness semantics are unchanged and still key on `provider_configured` + `runtime_check`. Ruling: NS-845 Q1.2 (renderer half). Tests: the lifecycle branch fires one refresh from the active source and none from another; the snapshot hook's contract is three legs on open, one leg on the tick. * fix(cli): the banner names the free tier's model instead of "no model configured" The welcome banner prints before credentials resolve, so on a fresh install `model` is empty and the banner said, in red, "no model configured — run /model or hermes setup". Under the free tier that is false: the route is already known from local state (identity on disk, tier on), and the first message will run on `nous/welcome`. `_banner_left_lines` now asks the route the same question when `model` is empty (`guest_carries_inference()`, a local read) and shows `welcome · Nous Research`. When nothing resolves the red line stays. Ruling: NS-845 ("the banner's 'no model configured' line reads the resolved route"). Live: fresh HERMES_HOME + fake portal, gate on -> `welcome · Nous Research`; gate off -> the red line, zero portal calls. * fix(aux): vision on the free tier uses nous/welcome too The text-only modality on the gateway's `nous/welcome` row is DeepSeek V4 Flash's, the backing model until the repoint; `z-ai/glm-5.3-flash` is natively multimodal and the repoint declares the welcome row `text+image->text`. Skipping Nous for vision on the welcome host would have sent every image step past the free tier for no reason, so the auxiliary client pins the route's one model for every lane. A backing model that takes no images answers with the upstream's own error, which the ladder handles as it always has. Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com> (cherry picked from commit 7456e028faba55480db43015dc2c8df3e393a415) * fix(gateway): hermes gateway run is a boot owner of the free tier too Rung 5 made every demand-time free-tier site a read: resolve_provider, the connector token, the /login precondition. That is only correct if every process that can reach those sites ran the bootstrap first. The CLI (cmd_chat) and hermes serve (_lifespan) did; the standalone messaging gateway did not. A fresh HERMES_HOME with the gate on and `hermes gateway run` reached provider resolution with no identity to consume, and /login returned Unavailable. Reported by @andrexibiza on #107697 (P1). GatewayRunner.start now runs `free_tier_bootstrap.run_bootstrap` on an executor thread right after startup recovery and BEFORE any adapter connects, so a fast first DM cannot arrive with nothing to resolve. It is its own step, not part of the turn-machinery warm-up: the warm-up is an optimisation with an off switch (HERMES_STARTUP_WARMUP_TIMEOUT<=0); the bootstrap is correctness and must always run. With the gate unset it is a local inventory and no network. Live, real GatewayRunner.start against a fake portal in a fresh home: gate on -> 1 create, identity persisted, resolve_runtime_provider=nous, /login precondition sees the identity gate off -> 0 portal calls, no identity, no_provider_configured Before the fix the gate-on row was identical to the gate-off row. Test: the bootstrap seam runs before _start_prefilter_platforms and delegates to the one creator. Red on 5554eb6993 (no seam), green here. --------- Co-authored-by: Robin Fernandes <robin@soal.org> Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
659 lines
28 KiB
Python
659 lines
28 KiB
Python
"""Tests for evaluate_credits_notices — pure threshold reconciliation policy (L4.1).
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All tests use a fresh latch (new_credits_latch(), the shape every production
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caller builds) per scenario. CreditsState is constructed directly (not parsed
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from headers).
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"""
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from __future__ import annotations
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import pytest
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from agent.credits_tracker import (
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CREDITS_NOTICE_KIND,
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CREDITS_RESTORED_TTL_MS,
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AgentNotice,
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CreditsState,
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evaluate_credits_notices,
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new_credits_latch,
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)
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# ── Helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
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def fresh_latch() -> dict:
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return new_credits_latch()
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def state_with_fraction(
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uf: float | None,
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*,
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paid_access: bool = True,
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denominator_kind: str = "subscription_cap",
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purchased_micros: int = 0,
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purchased_usd: str = "0.00",
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subscription_limit_usd: str | None = "20.00",
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) -> CreditsState:
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"""Build a minimal CreditsState that yields the desired used_fraction.
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used_fraction = (limit - subscription_micros) / limit
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When uf is None, we set limit to None so used_fraction returns None.
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"""
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if uf is None:
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return CreditsState(
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subscription_limit_micros=None,
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subscription_limit_usd=None,
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subscription_micros=0,
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denominator_kind="none",
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paid_access=paid_access,
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purchased_micros=purchased_micros,
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purchased_usd=purchased_usd,
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)
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# We want (limit - sub) / limit == uf → sub = limit * (1 - uf)
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limit = 20_000_000 # $20 in micros
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sub = int(limit * (1.0 - uf))
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return CreditsState(
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subscription_limit_micros=limit,
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subscription_limit_usd=subscription_limit_usd,
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subscription_micros=sub,
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denominator_kind=denominator_kind,
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paid_access=paid_access,
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purchased_micros=purchased_micros,
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purchased_usd=purchased_usd,
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)
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# ── Scenario 1: crossing 90% threshold ───────────────────────────────────────
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class TestWarn90Crossing:
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def test_below_lowest_band_no_notice_but_latch_set(self):
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latch = fresh_latch()
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s = state_with_fraction(0.10) # below the 50% band
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to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
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assert all(n.key != "credits.usage" for n in to_show)
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assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
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assert latch["seen_below_90"] is True
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def test_crossing_to_90_fires_once(self):
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latch = fresh_latch()
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# First call: uf < 0.5 — sets seen_below_90 (below lowest band)
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s1 = state_with_fraction(0.10)
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evaluate_credits_notices(s1, latch)
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# Second call: uf >= 0.9 — should fire the usage band at 90
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s2 = state_with_fraction(0.95)
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to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s2, latch)
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keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
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assert "credits.usage" in keys
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assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
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def test_no_refire_on_repeated_over_90(self):
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latch = fresh_latch()
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s_below = state_with_fraction(0.10)
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evaluate_credits_notices(s_below, latch)
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s_over = state_with_fraction(0.95)
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evaluate_credits_notices(s_over, latch)
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# Third call: still ≥ 0.9 — must NOT re-fire
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to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s_over, latch)
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assert all(n.key != "credits.usage" for n in to_show)
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assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
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# ── Scenario 2: recovery + re-cross ──────────────────────────────────────────
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class TestWarn90RecoveryReCross:
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def test_recovery_clears_warn90(self):
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latch = fresh_latch()
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# Cross below → above
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evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
# Recovery: uf drops back below ALL bands → usage notice clears entirely
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in to_clear
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in latch["active"]
|
||
|
||
def test_recross_after_recovery_fires_again(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch) # recovery
|
||
# Re-cross: uf >= 0.9 again — should fire again because the band is clearable
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in keys
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 3: open-already-over (hybrid Q3 gate) ───────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestOpenAlreadyOver:
|
||
def test_warn90_does_not_fire_without_seen_below_90(self):
|
||
"""First call uf≥0.9 with seen_below_90=False — warn90 must NOT fire."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
assert latch["seen_below_90"] is False
|
||
s = state_with_fraction(0.95)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.usage" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 3b: boundary — exact 0.9 and just-below-1.0 ────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestBoundaryFractions:
|
||
def test_exact_0_9_fires_warn90(self):
|
||
"""used_fraction == 0.9 exactly must fire warn90 (threshold is inclusive)."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
# First: prime seen_below_90 with a sub-50% observation
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
# Now construct a state where used_fraction is EXACTLY 0.9:
|
||
# subscription_limit_micros=20_000_000, subscription_micros=2_000_000
|
||
# → used = 18_000_000 / 20_000_000 = 0.9 exactly
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=20_000_000,
|
||
subscription_limit_usd="20.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=2_000_000,
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
paid_access=True,
|
||
)
|
||
assert s.used_fraction == 0.9
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in keys
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
|
||
|
||
def test_just_below_1_0_does_not_fire_grant_spent(self):
|
||
"""subscription_micros = limit - 1 (used_fraction just under 1.0) must NOT fire grant_spent.
|
||
|
||
Locks the boundary so a future used_fraction clamp refactor cannot fire
|
||
grant_spent a micro early.
|
||
"""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
limit = 20_000_000
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=limit,
|
||
subscription_limit_usd="20.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=1, # limit - 1 → used_fraction < 1.0
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=5_000_000,
|
||
purchased_usd="5.00",
|
||
paid_access=True,
|
||
)
|
||
assert s.used_fraction is not None and s.used_fraction < 1.0
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.grant_spent" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.grant_spent" not in to_clear
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 4: grant_spent ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestGrantSpent:
|
||
def _grant_state(self, purchased_micros: int = 12_340_000) -> CreditsState:
|
||
return state_with_fraction(
|
||
1.0,
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=purchased_micros,
|
||
purchased_usd="12.34",
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_grant_spent_fires_on_live_crossing(self):
|
||
"""Observing the grant NOT yet spent (uf < 1.0) opens the gate; the later
|
||
crossing to >= 1.0 with top-up remaining announces once."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.75), latch)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(self._grant_state(), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.grant_spent" in [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
|
||
def test_grant_spent_no_refire(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.75), latch) # open the gate
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(self._grant_state(), latch)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(self._grant_state(), latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.grant_spent" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.grant_spent" not in to_clear
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_sub_cent_residual_does_not_open_gate(self):
|
||
"""A float-derived portal seed can report a sub-cent grant residual where
|
||
the inference headers say exactly spent. Below GRANT_UNSPENT_MIN_MICROS
|
||
the observation must NOT open the gate — otherwise the first header
|
||
after such a seed re-creates the at-open nag."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=20_000_000,
|
||
subscription_limit_usd="20.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=4_000, # $0.004 left — sub-cent residue
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=12_340_000,
|
||
purchased_usd="12.34",
|
||
paid_access=True,
|
||
)
|
||
assert s.used_fraction is not None and s.used_fraction < 1.0
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(self._grant_state(), latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.grant_spent" for n in to_show)
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 5: depleted + recovery ──────────────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestDepleted:
|
||
def test_depleted_fires_level_error_kind_sticky(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = CreditsState(paid_access=False)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
depleted_notices = [n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.depleted"]
|
||
assert len(depleted_notices) == 1
|
||
n = depleted_notices[0]
|
||
assert n.level == "error"
|
||
assert n.kind == CREDITS_NOTICE_KIND
|
||
|
||
def test_recovery_emits_clear_and_restored(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
# Fire depleted
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=False), latch)
|
||
# Now recovered
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=True), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" in to_clear
|
||
restored = [n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.restored"]
|
||
assert len(restored) == 1
|
||
r = restored[0]
|
||
assert r.level == "success"
|
||
assert r.kind == "ttl"
|
||
assert r.ttl_ms == CREDITS_RESTORED_TTL_MS
|
||
|
||
def test_depleted_refires_after_recovery(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=False), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=True), latch)
|
||
# Goes depleted again
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=False), latch)
|
||
keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" in keys
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 5b: free-model suppression of the depleted notice ───────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestDepletedFreeModelSuppression:
|
||
def test_depleted_suppressed_when_model_is_free(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = CreditsState(paid_access=False)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch, model_is_free=True)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.depleted" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" not in latch["active"]
|
||
assert to_clear == []
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_genuine_recovery_still_emits_restored_when_notice_active(self):
|
||
"""paid_access flip back to True with the notice showing → clear + restored
|
||
(unchanged behaviour, regardless of the model-free flag)."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(CreditsState(paid_access=False), latch)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(
|
||
CreditsState(paid_access=True), latch, model_is_free=True
|
||
)
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" in to_clear
|
||
restored = [n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.restored"]
|
||
assert len(restored) == 1
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 5c: is_free_tier_model (local-data-only check) ──────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestIsFreeTierModel:
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_pricing_cache_peek_zero_priced_model(self, monkeypatch):
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import is_free_tier_model
|
||
import hermes_cli.models as models_mod
|
||
from hermes_cli import models_pricing
|
||
|
||
# The picker keys the cache on the pre-/v1 root (get_pricing_for_provider
|
||
# strips a trailing /v1 before fetch_models_with_pricing).
|
||
monkeypatch.setattr(models_pricing, "_pricing_cache",
|
||
{
|
||
"https://inference-api.nousresearch.com": {
|
||
"some/zero-priced": {"prompt": "0", "completion": "0"},
|
||
"some/paid": {"prompt": "0.000001", "completion": "0.000002"},
|
||
}
|
||
},
|
||
)
|
||
# The agent holds the /v1-suffixed URL (DEFAULT_NOUS_INFERENCE_URL) —
|
||
# the helper must normalize it down to the picker's cache key.
|
||
base = "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/zero-priced", base) is True
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/paid", base) is False
|
||
# Pre-stripped and trailing-slash variants resolve to the same key.
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/zero-priced", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/") is True
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/zero-priced", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1/") is True
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_nous_welcome_host_is_free_without_pricing(self, monkeypatch):
|
||
"""Anything the welcome host serves is the free tier, with no pricing lookup: the portal seeds
|
||
paid_access=False for a free-tier identity ($0 by design), and that must never raise
|
||
credits.depleted ("run /topup") on a surface that cannot top up."""
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import is_free_tier_model
|
||
from hermes_cli import models_pricing
|
||
|
||
monkeypatch.setattr(models_pricing, "_pricing_cache", {})
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("nous/welcome", "https://welcome-api.nousresearch.com/v1") is True
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/other", "https://welcome-api.nousresearch.com") is True
|
||
|
||
def test_paid_nous_host_still_needs_pricing_evidence(self, monkeypatch):
|
||
"""The free-tier rule is the host, not the model name: the paid inference host can serve
|
||
nous/welcome to a named account, and a depleted named account still sees the notice."""
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import is_free_tier_model
|
||
from hermes_cli import models_pricing
|
||
|
||
monkeypatch.setattr(models_pricing, "_pricing_cache", {})
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("nous/welcome", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1") is False
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/paid", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1") is False
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("nous/welcome", "") is False
|
||
|
||
def test_exception_fails_open_to_false(self, monkeypatch):
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import is_free_tier_model
|
||
import hermes_cli.models as models_mod
|
||
from hermes_cli import models_pricing
|
||
|
||
class _Exploding:
|
||
def get(self, *_a, **_kw):
|
||
raise RuntimeError("boom")
|
||
|
||
monkeypatch.setattr(models_pricing, "_pricing_cache", _Exploding())
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/model", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com") is False
|
||
|
||
def test_stealth_prefix_detected_as_free(self):
|
||
"""Stealth-preview SKUs (stealth/...) are free-tier but carry no
|
||
:free suffix. Suppression must engage so the depleted banner doesn't
|
||
fire on a false paid_access:false from the server's stealth pool."""
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import is_free_tier_model
|
||
|
||
# No base_url needed — stealth/ is a zero-network signal, same as :free.
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("stealth/ox-alpha", "") is True
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("stealth/ox-alpha", "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1") is True
|
||
# Non-stealth model without :free suffix → not free (without pricing cache).
|
||
assert is_free_tier_model("some/paid-model", "") is False
|
||
|
||
def test_depleted_suppressed_for_stealth_model(self):
|
||
"""End-to-end: paid_access:false on a stealth/ model must NOT fire
|
||
the depleted banner (the exact scenario from issue #91843)."""
|
||
from agent.credits_tracker import (
|
||
CreditsState, evaluate_credits_notices, is_free_tier_model,
|
||
)
|
||
|
||
state = CreditsState(
|
||
version=1,
|
||
remaining_micros=0,
|
||
remaining_usd="0.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=0,
|
||
subscription_usd="0.00",
|
||
purchased_micros=0,
|
||
purchased_usd="0.00",
|
||
paid_access=False,
|
||
captured_at=1.0,
|
||
from_header=True,
|
||
)
|
||
model = "stealth/ox-alpha"
|
||
base_url = "https://inference-api.nousresearch.com/v1"
|
||
model_is_free = is_free_tier_model(model, base_url)
|
||
assert model_is_free is True
|
||
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(state, latch, model_is_free=model_is_free)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.depleted" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" not in latch["active"]
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 6: denominator none (uf is None) ────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestDenominatorNone:
|
||
def test_no_warn90_when_uf_none(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = state_with_fraction(None)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.usage" for n in to_show)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in to_clear
|
||
|
||
def test_no_grant_spent_when_uf_none(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=None,
|
||
denominator_kind="none",
|
||
purchased_micros=5_000_000,
|
||
purchased_usd="5.00",
|
||
)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.grant_spent" for n in to_show)
|
||
|
||
def test_warn90_clears_when_uf_becomes_none(self):
|
||
"""If warn90 was active and uf becomes None, it should clear."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
# Establish usage notice active: cross below → above
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in latch["active"]
|
||
# Now uf becomes None (denominator changed to "none")
|
||
s_none = state_with_fraction(None)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s_none, latch)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in to_clear
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in latch["active"]
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 7: copy / verbatim USD strings ──────────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestNoticeCopy:
|
||
def test_warn90_contains_verbatim_subscription_limit_usd(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
s = state_with_fraction(0.95, subscription_limit_usd="20.00")
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
warn_notice = next(n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.usage")
|
||
assert "$20.00" in warn_notice.text
|
||
assert "cap" in warn_notice.text
|
||
|
||
def test_grant_spent_contains_verbatim_purchased_usd(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch) # open the crossing gate
|
||
s = state_with_fraction(
|
||
1.0,
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=12_340_000,
|
||
purchased_usd="12.34",
|
||
)
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
grant_notice = next(n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.grant_spent")
|
||
assert "$12.34" in grant_notice.text
|
||
assert "top-up left" in grant_notice.text
|
||
|
||
def test_depleted_mentions_credits_command(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
s = CreditsState(paid_access=False)
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
depleted_notice = next(n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.depleted")
|
||
assert "/topup" in depleted_notice.text
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 8: severity order in a single call ──────────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestSeverityOrder:
|
||
def test_multiple_new_notices_ordered_ascending_severity(self):
|
||
"""grant_spent < depleted in to_show when both fire in one call.
|
||
|
||
(usage is suppressed here: purchased>0 — see TestTopUpSuppression.
|
||
usage + grant_spent are now mutually exclusive by design.)
|
||
"""
|
||
latch = {"active": set(), "seen_below_90": True, "usage_band": None,
|
||
"seen_grant_unspent": True}
|
||
|
||
# Build state: subscription_cap, uf >= 1.0, purchased_micros > 0, NOT paid_access
|
||
# grant_cond: subscription_cap + uf >= 1.0 + purchased > 0 ✓
|
||
# depleted_cond: not paid_access ✓
|
||
# usage band: suppressed (purchased > 0)
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=20_000_000,
|
||
subscription_limit_usd="20.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=0, # uf = 1.0
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=5_000_000,
|
||
purchased_usd="5.00",
|
||
paid_access=False,
|
||
)
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
assert "credits.usage" not in keys
|
||
assert "credits.grant_spent" in keys
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" in keys
|
||
# Ascending severity: grant_spent before depleted
|
||
assert keys.index("credits.grant_spent") < keys.index("credits.depleted")
|
||
|
||
def test_usage_before_depleted_without_topup(self):
|
||
"""With no top-up funds, usage fires and precedes depleted."""
|
||
latch = {"active": set(), "seen_below_90": True, "usage_band": None}
|
||
s = CreditsState(
|
||
subscription_limit_micros=20_000_000,
|
||
subscription_limit_usd="20.00",
|
||
subscription_micros=0, # uf = 1.0
|
||
denominator_kind="subscription_cap",
|
||
purchased_micros=0,
|
||
purchased_usd="0.00",
|
||
paid_access=False,
|
||
)
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
keys = [n.key for n in to_show]
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in keys
|
||
assert "credits.depleted" in keys
|
||
assert keys.index("credits.usage") < keys.index("credits.depleted")
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 8b: top-up suppression of the usage gauge ───────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestTopUpSuppression:
|
||
"""purchased_micros > 0 suppresses the sub-cap usage gauge: the cap is the
|
||
wrong denominator for an account that can keep spending top-up funds."""
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_topup_landing_mid_session_clears_active_band(self):
|
||
"""A showing 90% warn must clear when a top-up lands (purchased 0 → >0)."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] == 90
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.95, purchased_micros=10_000_000, purchased_usd="10.00"),
|
||
latch,
|
||
)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in to_clear
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] is None
|
||
assert all(n.key != "credits.usage" for n in to_show)
|
||
|
||
def test_band_resumes_after_topup_spent(self):
|
||
"""purchased back to 0 with usage still in-band → gauge resumes."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.95, purchased_micros=10_000_000, purchased_usd="10.00"),
|
||
latch,
|
||
)
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] is None
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
n = next(n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.usage")
|
||
# uf 0.95 of a $20 cap → used = $19.00 (cap − remaining, clamped).
|
||
assert "$19.00" in n.text
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] == 90
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Invariant: never fire + clear same key in one call ────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestNoFireAndClearSameKey:
|
||
def test_usage_never_both_fired_and_cleared(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
# Run many state transitions; across each, assert no key is in both lists
|
||
states = [
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.10),
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.95),
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.10),
|
||
state_with_fraction(0.95),
|
||
state_with_fraction(None),
|
||
]
|
||
for s in states:
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
fired_keys = {n.key for n in to_show}
|
||
cleared_keys = set(to_clear)
|
||
overlap = fired_keys & cleared_keys
|
||
assert not overlap, f"Key(s) both fired and cleared: {overlap}"
|
||
|
||
def test_depleted_never_both_fired_and_cleared(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
states = [
|
||
CreditsState(paid_access=False),
|
||
CreditsState(paid_access=True),
|
||
CreditsState(paid_access=False),
|
||
]
|
||
for s in states:
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(s, latch)
|
||
fired_keys = {n.key for n in to_show}
|
||
cleared_keys = set(to_clear)
|
||
overlap = fired_keys & cleared_keys
|
||
assert not overlap, f"Key(s) both fired and cleared: {overlap}"
|
||
|
||
|
||
# ── Scenario 9: escalating usage bands (50 → 75 → 90) ────────────────────────
|
||
|
||
|
||
class TestUsageBands:
|
||
"""The usage notice shows the HIGHEST crossed band as a single escalating line."""
|
||
|
||
def _band_text(self, to_show):
|
||
n = next((n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.usage"), None)
|
||
return n.text if n else None
|
||
|
||
def test_50_band_fires_info(self):
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch) # prime
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.55), latch)
|
||
n = next(n for n in to_show if n.key == "credits.usage")
|
||
# uf 0.55 of a $20 cap → used = $11.00; band 50 fires at info level.
|
||
assert "$11.00" in n.text and n.level == "info"
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] == 50
|
||
|
||
|
||
|
||
def test_step_down_on_recovery(self):
|
||
"""Recovering steps the band back down, then clears below the lowest band."""
|
||
latch = fresh_latch()
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.95), latch)
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] == 90
|
||
# drop to 80% → steps down to 75 (used = $16.00 of $20)
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.80), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in to_clear
|
||
assert "$16.00" in self._band_text(to_show)
|
||
# drop to 55% → steps down to 50 (used = $11.00 of $20)
|
||
to_show, _ = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.55), latch)
|
||
assert "$11.00" in self._band_text(to_show)
|
||
# drop below 50% → clears entirely
|
||
to_show, to_clear = evaluate_credits_notices(state_with_fraction(0.10), latch)
|
||
assert "credits.usage" in to_clear
|
||
assert latch["usage_band"] is None
|
||
|
||
|
||
|