a4c6821218
Buzz platform agents could not use the `buzz` CLI from the terminal tool: the BUZZ_* vars (BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY, BUZZ_AUTH_TAG, BUZZ_RELAY_URL, and the other BUZZ_* names) are added to _HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST from the buzz plugin.yaml (messaging category), and env_passthrough refuses to re-allow anything in the blocklist (GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf). In the reported `hermes acp` scenario the Buzz adapter's register() is never invoked, so the agent runs in-process and its terminal uses _make_run_env directly — there was no path for the platform credentials to reach terminal children. Fix: a terminal-only, first-party carve-out in the scrub paths themselves (not adapter registration). BUZZ_* vars pass through to foreground (_make_run_env) and background/PTY (_sanitize_subprocess_env) terminal children via a new prefix predicate (_TERMINAL_FIRST_PARTY_ENV_PREFIXES). Everything else stays sealed and unchanged: the blocklist itself, the env_passthrough refusal, execute_code scrubbing, hermes_subprocess_env (browser/TUI-host/copilot-executor spawns), and docker children. The GHSA-rhgp-j443-p4rf seal is preserved because no registration path is opened; skills/config still cannot register these names. Follow-up hardening from review: - First-party matches use the merged env value directly instead of _resolve_passthrough_value: under multiplex with no profile secret scope installed the resolver raised UnscopedSecretError (fail-closed) at call sites like the webhook-filter script runner, a regression where the script previously ran without the var. The vars are the process's own env values and are never scope-resolved. - LocalEnvironment now excludes first-party terminal env names from the shared login-shell snapshot (_additional_profile_scoped_passthrough_names override): BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY can never be in the get_all_passthrough() exclusion set (env_passthrough refuses blocklisted names), so without this a multiplexed gateway would dump profile A's key into hermes-snap-<id>.sh and profile B sharing the collapsed LocalEnvironment would source it — a cross-profile nsec leak. The names are now excluded from the dump and save/restored per command. - Docs now name the _sanitize_subprocess_env consumers (search workers like ddgs, computer-use driver, user-script runners) that also receive first-party platform vars. Fixes #78026 Co-authored-by: factory-droid[bot] <138933559+factory-droid[bot]@users.noreply.github.com>
228 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
228 lines
8.7 KiB
Python
"""Tests for hermes_subprocess_env() — the centralized credential-safe env
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builder for the non-terminal subprocess spawn surface.
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Covers GHSA-m4m8-xjp4-5rmm / issue #29157: subprocesses spawned by the
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gateway/browser/ACP/installer paths must not blindly inherit the operator's
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full credential environment. Two tiers:
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* Tier 1 (_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS): gateway bot tokens, GitHub auth, infra
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secrets — stripped even when inherit_credentials=True.
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* Tier 2 (_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_BLOCKLIST): LLM provider/tool keys — stripped
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unless the caller opts into inherit_credentials=True.
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"""
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import os
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from unittest.mock import patch
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from tools.environments.local import (
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hermes_subprocess_env,
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_ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS,
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_HERMES_PROVIDER_ENV_FORCE_PREFIX,
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)
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_TIER1_SAMPLE = {
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"GH_TOKEN": "ghp_secret",
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"TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN": "bot-token",
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"SLACK_APP_TOKEN": "xapp-secret",
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"MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET": "modal-secret",
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"HERMES_DASHBOARD_SESSION_TOKEN": "dash-secret",
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}
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_PROVIDER_SAMPLE = {
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"OPENAI_API_KEY": "sk-fake",
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"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "ant-fake",
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"OPENROUTER_API_KEY": "or-fake",
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}
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_SAFE_SAMPLE = {
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"PATH": "/usr/bin:/bin",
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"HOME": "/home/user",
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"USER": "testuser",
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"MY_APP_VAR": "keep-me",
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}
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def _build(extra=None, *, inherit_credentials=False):
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env = dict(_SAFE_SAMPLE)
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if extra:
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env.update(extra)
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with patch.dict(os.environ, env, clear=True):
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return hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=inherit_credentials)
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class TestStripByDefault:
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def test_provider_keys_stripped_by_default(self):
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result = _build(_PROVIDER_SAMPLE)
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for var in _PROVIDER_SAMPLE:
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assert var not in result, f"{var} leaked with inherit_credentials=False"
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def test_tier1_secrets_stripped_by_default(self):
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result = _build(_TIER1_SAMPLE)
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for var in _TIER1_SAMPLE:
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assert var not in result, f"{var} leaked (Tier-1) with inherit_credentials=False"
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def test_buzz_platform_vars_stripped_by_default(self):
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"""BUZZ_* first-party platform credentials must NOT reach the
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non-terminal spawn surface (browser / TUI host / copilot-executor),
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even though they pass through to terminal children (issue #78026)."""
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buzz_sample = {
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"BUZZ_PRIVATE_KEY": "nsec1fake",
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"BUZZ_AUTH_TAG": '["tag","data","kind","sig"]',
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"BUZZ_RELAY_URL": "https://mycommunity.communities.buzz.xyz",
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}
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result = _build(buzz_sample)
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for var in buzz_sample:
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assert var not in result, f"{var} leaked via hermes_subprocess_env"
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def test_pythonutf8_set(self):
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result = _build()
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assert result.get("PYTHONUTF8") == "1"
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class TestInheritCredentials:
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def test_provider_keys_preserved_when_inheriting(self):
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result = _build(_PROVIDER_SAMPLE, inherit_credentials=True)
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for var, val in _PROVIDER_SAMPLE.items():
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assert result.get(var) == val, f"{var} should survive inherit_credentials=True"
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def test_tier1_secrets_stripped_even_when_inheriting(self):
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"""The whole point of Tier 1: gateway/GitHub/infra secrets never reach
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a child, even a model-driving CLI that legitimately needs provider keys."""
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result = _build({**_PROVIDER_SAMPLE, **_TIER1_SAMPLE}, inherit_credentials=True)
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for var in _TIER1_SAMPLE:
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assert var not in result, (
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f"{var} (Tier-1) must be stripped even with inherit_credentials=True"
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)
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# ...while provider keys survive.
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for var in _PROVIDER_SAMPLE:
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assert var in result
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def test_pythonutf8_set_when_inheriting(self):
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assert _build(inherit_credentials=True).get("PYTHONUTF8") == "1"
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class TestTierInvariants:
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def test_tier1_always_stripped_both_paths(self):
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"""Behavioral invariant: every Tier-1 key is stripped on BOTH the
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default path and the inherit_credentials=True path. This is what
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guarantees no gap, regardless of whether the key also happens to be
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in the provider blocklist."""
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sample = {k: f"secret-{k}" for k in _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS}
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for inherit in (False, True):
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result = _build(sample, inherit_credentials=inherit)
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leaked = {k for k in _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS if k in result}
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assert not leaked, (
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f"Tier-1 keys leaked with inherit_credentials={inherit}: {sorted(leaked)}"
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)
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def test_tier1_covers_gateway_bot_token(self):
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assert "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN" in _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS
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def test_tier1_covers_github_auth(self):
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assert {"GH_TOKEN", "GITHUB_TOKEN"} <= _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS
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def test_tier1_covers_infra_secrets(self):
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assert {"MODAL_TOKEN_ID", "MODAL_TOKEN_SECRET", "DAYTONA_API_KEY"} <= _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS
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class TestBrowserPassthroughPattern:
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def test_browser_keys_recoverable_after_strip(self):
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"""Browser tool pattern: strip everything, then re-add the browser
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backend keys agent-browser actually needs."""
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from tools.browser_tool import _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS
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leaked = {
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"BROWSERBASE_API_KEY": "bb-key",
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"BROWSERBASE_PROJECT_ID": "bb-proj",
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"FIRECRAWL_API_KEY": "fc-key",
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"ANTHROPIC_API_KEY": "ant-should-go",
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"TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN": "bot-should-go",
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}
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with patch.dict(os.environ, {**_SAFE_SAMPLE, **leaked}, clear=True):
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env = hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=False)
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for key in _BROWSER_PASSTHROUGH_KEYS:
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if key in os.environ:
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env[key] = os.environ[key]
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assert env["BROWSERBASE_API_KEY"] == "bb-key"
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assert env["FIRECRAWL_API_KEY"] == "fc-key"
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# Provider + gateway secrets must NOT come back.
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assert "ANTHROPIC_API_KEY" not in env
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assert "TELEGRAM_BOT_TOKEN" not in env
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class TestDelegatedChildMarker:
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def test_delegated_child_context_scrubs_parent_kanban_keys_and_sets_marker(self):
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from agent.delegation_context import delegated_child_context
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with patch.dict(
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os.environ,
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{
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**_SAFE_SAMPLE,
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"HERMES_KANBAN_TASK": "t_parent",
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"HERMES_KANBAN_RUN_ID": "123",
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"HERMES_KANBAN_DB": "/tmp/parent-kanban.db",
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"HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACE": "/tmp/parent-workspace",
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},
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clear=True,
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):
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with delegated_child_context():
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env = hermes_subprocess_env(inherit_credentials=True)
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assert env["HERMES_DELEGATED_CHILD_CONTEXT"] == "1"
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assert "HERMES_KANBAN_TASK" not in env
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assert "HERMES_KANBAN_RUN_ID" not in env
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assert "HERMES_KANBAN_DB" not in env
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assert "HERMES_KANBAN_WORKSPACE" not in env
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assert env["MY_APP_VAR"] == "keep-me"
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_INTERNAL_DYNAMIC_SAMPLE = {
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"AUXILIARY_VISION_API_KEY": "sk-vision",
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"AUXILIARY_VISION_BASE_URL": "http://internal:1234/v1",
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"AUXILIARY_WEB_EXTRACT_API_KEY": "sk-webx",
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"GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET": "relay-secret",
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"GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY": "relay-delivery",
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}
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class TestInternalDynamicSecrets:
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"""AUXILIARY_*_API_KEY / _BASE_URL and GATEWAY_RELAY_* auth are stripped on
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BOTH paths — including inherit_credentials=True — since a model-driving CLI
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(codex/copilot) never needs them even when it needs provider keys."""
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def test_stripped_by_default(self):
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result = _build(_INTERNAL_DYNAMIC_SAMPLE)
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for var in _INTERNAL_DYNAMIC_SAMPLE:
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assert var not in result, f"{var} leaked with inherit_credentials=False"
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def test_auxiliary_non_secrets_preserved(self):
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"""AUXILIARY_*_PROVIDER / _MODEL routing config survives (not secrets)."""
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result = _build(
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{"AUXILIARY_VISION_PROVIDER": "openai", "AUXILIARY_VISION_MODEL": "gpt-4o"},
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)
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assert result.get("AUXILIARY_VISION_PROVIDER") == "openai"
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assert result.get("AUXILIARY_VISION_MODEL") == "gpt-4o"
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def test_gateway_relay_id_stripped_even_when_inheriting(self):
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"""GATEWAY_RELAY_ID has no secret suffix (predicate skips it) but is
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gateway-identifying auth material provisioned alongside the relay
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secret. It's in _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS so it's stripped on the inherit path
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too — closes the codex/copilot leak the predicate alone would miss."""
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result = _build(
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{**_PROVIDER_SAMPLE, "GATEWAY_RELAY_ID": "relay-id"},
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inherit_credentials=True,
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)
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assert "GATEWAY_RELAY_ID" not in result
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# provider keys still flow (codex auth)
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for var in _PROVIDER_SAMPLE:
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assert var in result
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def test_relay_triplet_in_always_strip(self):
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assert {
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"GATEWAY_RELAY_ID", "GATEWAY_RELAY_SECRET", "GATEWAY_RELAY_DELIVERY_KEY",
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} <= _ALWAYS_STRIP_KEYS
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